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Abstract 
 
Requirements for the defendant to actively participate in the criminal process have been 
increasing in recent years such that the defendant can now be penalised for his non-
cooperation. This thesis explores the procedural implications of penalising a defendant’s non-
cooperation, particularly its effect on the English adversarial system. This thesis uses three key 
examples: 1) limitations placed on the privilege against self-incrimination, 2) adverse inferences 
drawn from a defendant’s silence, and 3) adverse inferences drawn from defence non-
disclosure. The thesis explores how laws regarding the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
right to silence and pre-trial disclosure came to be reformed such that the defendant can now 
be penalised for his non-cooperation, and how these laws have been approached by the courts.  
 
A normative theory of criminal procedure is developed in the thesis and is used to challenge the 
idea of penalising defendant non-cooperation in the criminal process. The theory proposes that 
the criminal process should operate as a mechanism for calling the state to account for its 
accusations and request for official condemnation and punishment of the accused. Within this 
framework, the defendant should be free to choose whether or not to cooperate and 
participate throughout the process.  
 
The theory rests upon a broad interpretation of the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair 
trial, and a conception of the relationship between citizen and state. Conversely, the thesis finds 
that, by placing participatory requirements on the defendant and penalising him for his non-
cooperation, a participatory model of procedure has developed. This model relies on the active 
participation of the defendant in pursuit of efficient fact finding. The participatory model is far 
removed from England’s history of adversarialism and, unfortunately, has less regard for 
legitimacy, fairness and respect for defence rights.   
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
There has been an increasing trend in criminal justice reforms over the past two decades to 
secure the active participation and cooperation of the defendant as an individual and the 
defence as a party representing the defendant. These reforms often entail detrimental 
consequences for those who do not comply with their participatory requirements. This thesis 
examines the implications of procedural practices which effectively penalise failure to 
participate in, or cooperate with, the criminal process during the pre-trial and trial stages. It 
explores the reasoning behind them and their impact on the nature of criminal procedure. 
Although there are increasing and objectionable expectations on the defence to participate as a 
party,1 the main focus is the participatory requirements placed on the defendant as an 
individual, because it is often the existence of the defence party which allows the defendant to 
take a passive role in the criminal process. The relevance of the distinction between the 
participatory role of the defendant as an individual and the defence as a party is discussed in 
chapter 4. 
 
Three key examples of penalising non-cooperation are presented within the thesis. These are: 
adverse inferences drawn from defence non-disclosure; adverse inferences drawn from a 
defendant’s silence; and limitations placed on the privilege against self-incrimination. There are 
several other practices which now effectively penalise the defendant, or the defence party, for 
their failure to cooperate. These are addressed in different contexts within the thesis and 
include a loss of sentence reduction for those who do not plead guilty, and sanctions for failure 
to comply with case management directions under the Criminal Procedure Rules. Reverse 
burdens of proof are another form of required participation and will be discussed in chapter 4; 
however, because the defence’s failure to discharge a legal burden of proof will result in a 
conviction, rather than a specific penalty for non-compliance, they are not dealt with in the 
same way as the three key examples. Instead they are explored in relation to their effect on the 
presumption of innocence.  
                                                             
1 These include the case management provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules discussed in chapter 3. 
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The idea of penalising non-cooperation is challenged on the basis of a normative conception of 
criminal procedure within which the criminal process should operate as a mechanism for calling 
the state to account for its accusations and request for official condemnation and punishment of 
the accused.2 Whilst recognising that concessions are made in practice, this theory applies a 
relatively absolutist ‘no assistance’ approach to the defendant’s role in the criminal process. As 
such, the defendant should be free to choose whether or not to cooperate and participate, with 
the trial offering a forum to test the prosecution’s case. The focus is on the pre-trial and trial 
stages of the criminal process from charge to verdict, as this is where penalties for non-
cooperation usually accrue. Although the majority of criminal cases do not culminate in a trial, 
the possibility of a trial overshadows the investigative and pre-trial stages.  Thus, where the 
focus is on the trial, it is on the basis that the potential for trial shapes what happens 
beforehand.  
 
Use of the term ‘penalise’ in this context does not refer specifically to the use of criminal 
sanctions, but to the risk of a detriment that would not be endured if the accused were to 
comply or cooperate.  With the exception of some cases involving the privilege against self-
incrimination which are sanctioned criminally, the examples explored in this work largely rely on 
the use of adverse inferences to penalise defendants. These inferences can contribute to a 
finding of guilt, meaning that non-cooperation can have a detrimental effect on the accused and 
the outcome of the case. Providing for detrimental consequences, whether through adverse 
inferences or otherwise, often results in unwarranted pressures to cooperate. To penalise the 
defendant is to treat him as though he had done something wrong. By pressuring him to 
cooperate and then putting him in a disadvantaged position if he does not comply, this is the 
message that we get from the practices explored in this thesis. Reference to the defendant’s 
‘cooperation’ throughout the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process assumes his active 
participation. The defendant is a participant when he is actively involved as an individual 
through means such as responding to questioning, providing information and giving evidence at 
trial.  
                                                             
2 Hock Lai Ho presents a similar theory of the adversarial criminal trial as primarily a process of holding the 
executive to account on its request for conviction and punishment. He proposes an understanding of the 
trial as a matter of doing justice to the accused. See, HL Ho ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (2010) 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87. 
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1.1 Arguments against penalising non-cooperation 
 
It is important to make clear, at the outset, why it is argued that the idea of penalising non-
cooperation is objectionable. The objection stems from fundamental legal norms, namely the 
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and a normative conception of the proper 
relationship between state and citizen in a liberal democracy. These also offer theoretical 
grounding for the normative theory of criminal procedure based on calling the state to account 
for its accusations. This theory is developed throughout the thesis and provides a useful tool 
from which to analyse the concept of penalising non-compliance. The presumption of 
innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the relationship between state and citizen are key themes 
which are explored and expanded in the following chapters. Whilst there are important links 
between them, they are able to offer individual arguments against penalising non-cooperation.  
It is useful to briefly set out here the way in which they do this.  
 
1.1.1 The presumption of innocence 
 At a minimum, the presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to bear the burden of 
proving the defendant’s guilt at the criminal trial. In England, this must be done to a standard of 
beyond reasonable doubt. However, on a broader scale, the presumption operates throughout 
the criminal process as a direction to treat the accused as if he were innocent. These two 
approaches to the presumption have been explored by Ho as a common law rule on the one 
hand, and a human right on the other.3 These, in part, correspond to what Ashworth has 
labelled the ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ concepts of the presumption of innocence.4 The accused’s right 
to have the case against him proved beyond a reasonable doubt, whether viewed from a narrow 
trial centred approach or from a wider human rights basis, underpins the case against penalising 
defendants for not cooperating in the criminal process and provides a backbone for the 
normative theory put forward. The presumption allows citizens to challenge the state and hold 
it to account before it can exert its powers of condemnation and punishment. 
                                                             
3
 HL Ho ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in P Roberts and J Hunter Criminal Evidence and 
Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart: Oxford, 2012). 
4 A Ashworth ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E and P 241, 243. 
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All three of the specific examples of penalising non-cooperation explored in this thesis operate 
so as to weaken the effect of the presumption of innocence. However, it is important to note 
that, in practice, there is disagreement as to the proper scope and implications of the 
presumption.5  Where the presumption of innocence is referred to in a general sense within the 
thesis, it is intended to reflect a wide conception which operates at trial by requiring the 
prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt, and operates beyond the trial as a direction to 
officials to treat the suspect as if he were innocent at all stages until guilt is proven. From a 
normative standpoint, it implies that the accused should not have to play a role in the state’s 
obligation to account for its accusations.  
 
1.1.2 The right to a fair trial 
Before an accused person can be convicted of a crime, he is entitled to a fair trial with a range of 
procedural safeguards.6 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
guarantees the right to a fair trial, is an important element of this thesis because it sets out the 
minimum conditions of fairness and has been influential in many decisions regarding penalties 
for non-cooperation. There is an important link between rights and participation which is 
evidenced throughout the thesis, as it is often the existence of rights which allows the accused 
to refuse to participate. Particular examples are the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination, both of which have been implied into Article 6.7 These rights are discussed in 
detail in chapters 5 and 6, so it is sufficient to mention here that they provide the accused with 
specific rights not to assist in the criminal process and help to ensure that the state can account 
for its accusations. However, as will become clear, the privilege against self-incrimination is not 
an uncontroversial principle and there is a lack of consensus as to its scope and rationale.8 
Nevertheless, providing for penalties against those who do not cooperate undermines the rights 
                                                             
5
 This includes arguments concerning the imposition of legal burdens on the defence and is discussed in 
chapter 4. 
6 A Ashworth and L Zedner ‘Justice Prevention: Preventive Rationales and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ 
in A Duff and P Green (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2011) 292. 
7 Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29. 
8
 See chapter 5; D Dolinko ‘Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?’ (1986) 33 
UCLA Law Review 1063; M Redmayne ‘Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination’ (2007) 7 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 209. 
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which guarantee accused persons a fair trial, and which underpin the normative account of the 
criminal process by ensuring that the state accounts for its accusations.  
 
1.1.3 The relationship between citizen and state 
This thesis rests on the supposition that England is a liberal state in which state power is limited 
and citizens are viewed as rights bearers.9 The normative theory of calling the state to account is 
developed to apply within this context. It is beyond the scope of this work to undertake an 
exploration of political or liberal philosophies and their controversies. Instead, it relies on 
standard ideas of liberal values such as autonomy and dignity. Citizens have a moral and political 
claim to fair treatment by the state; the claim is the simple one that, as a matter of principle, a 
liberal polity should treat all its citizens as law-abiding until it proves otherwise.10 The theory of 
calling the state to account reflects a conception of the proper relationship between the state 
and its citizens in a liberal democracy. Within this relationship, the accused should not be 
required or expected to assist the state in proving guilt.  
 
The relationship stems from the fact that, in a democratic society, the state’s far-reaching 
powers of investigation, prosecution, trial and sentencing should be exercised according to 
certain standards that show respect for the dignity and autonomy of each individual.11 The value 
attached to freedom and autonomy means that the state should justify its allegations against 
the defendant before exerting its power to convict and punish him. Autonomy is respected 
through freedom of choice, exhibited in the freedom to plead guilty or not, in the right to 
silence, in the privilege against self-incrimination and other participatory and non-participatory 
rights.12 It is important that state resources are not used unwarrantedly in the obligation to 
account for accusations. The state’s potentially oppressive powers can be kept in check by 
placing limitations on what it can legitimately require of the accused. Most fairness norms 
operate as restraints on the state’s power as well as a means of protecting the accused’s 
autonomy and dignity. There is a link between the prosecutorial powers of the state in terms of 
its resources, and the extent of the defendant’s duty to participate in the criminal process: when 
                                                             
9 Commentators such as Ashworth and Redmayne also rely on this premise. A Ashworth and M Redmayne 
The Criminal Process 4th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010). 
10
 I Dennis ‘The Human Rights Act and the Law of Evidence Ten Years On’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 
333, 345. 
11
 Ashworth (n 4) 249. 
12 Ho ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (n 2) 99. 
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the state uses its powers against its citizens to require participation, irrespective of its burden of 
proof and their rights of non-participation, it undermines the proper relationship between 
citizen and state. This conception of the relationship between citizen and state is expanded 
upon in chapter 5. 
 
 
1.2 The link between the criminal process and the criminal law 
 
It is important to link the normative theory of the criminal process to the substantive criminal 
law, as the criminal process is a means of enforcing the criminal law through denunciation and 
punishment of those who do not comply with it. The criminal law is the strongest form of official 
censure of an individual for conduct.13 A conviction has the effect of labelling the accused as a 
criminal. It makes a public condemnatory statement about the defendant as blameworthy. It 
creates a social stigma which, even in the absence of official punishment, may have damaging 
consequences through, for example, an inability to gain employment. The far-reaching 
consequences of a criminal conviction offer increased justification for ensuring that the state is 
held accountable in its enforcement of the criminal law through a process based on calling the 
state to account for its accusations and requests for condemnation and punishment.  
 
One’s perceptions of the goals of the criminal law can impact how one perceives the proper 
function of the criminal process. The theory of criminal law underpinning the normative account 
of criminal procedure, based on calling the state to account, purports that the purpose of 
forbidding certain actions is to protect citizens and the state from harm without undermining 
the values behind a liberal democracy within which freedom of choice is to be fostered.14 The 
criminal law should be enforced, and the criminal process carried out, in a way that respects the 
rights of the accused, promotes fairness and limits the potentially oppressive power of the state. 
The scope and rationale of the criminal law is part of the wider context within which this thesis 
is based. The link between law and process shows the relevance of the normative stance taken. 
However, whilst the link is further emphasised in the following chapter, substantive criminal law 
theory is an area that is not elaborated on, due to its remoteness from the central topic.  
                                                             
13
 Ashworth and Zedner (n 6) 289. 
14 This is not an uncontroversial account of the criminal law. See chapter 2. 
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1.3 Implications for English criminal procedure  
 
Requiring defendant participation and penalising non-cooperation through the use of adverse 
inferences and offences of non-compliance interferes with defence rights and notions of 
fairness, due process and adversarialism which have developed throughout the history of 
English criminal procedure. Although the English system cannot carry the label ‘adversarial’ in 
any strict sense of the term, such as Damaska’s core meaning of it,15 it claims to accord 
defendants with those rights which ensure fairness and which became established norms as part 
of adversarialism. When a defendant has rights he has a protection against the power of the 
state, irrespective of the role he plays in the criminal process. This makes it harder to hold him 
to account and easier for him to demand that the case against him be proven. Reforms in 
criminal justice and procedure over the past two decades have shifted English criminal 
procedure further away from adversarialism. The issue is not so much that England is moving on 
from having an adversarial system, but that it is also moving on from a strong sense of due 
process and from legal norms and rights which have become universally recognised ways of 
limiting the state’s potentially oppressive powers against citizens accused of criminal 
wrongdoing.  
 
Changes in England’s procedural style have been the subject of some recent academic 
commentary. For example, Dennis has noted an emerging ‘dialogue’ between the prosecution 
and the defence, 16  whilst Richardson has expressed concern over the shift away from due 
process concerns in the name of political and economic expediency.17 Both Hodgson18 and 
                                                             
15 A contest which unfolds as an engagement of two adversaries before a relatively passive decision 
maker whose principal duty is to reach a verdict. M Damaska The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A 
Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1986) 3. The adversarial 
model is described more fully in chapter 3.  
16 I Dennis The Law of Evidence 4th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2010), 453. 
17
 J Richardson ‘A “Just” Outcome: Losing Sight of the Purpose of Criminal Procedure’ (2011) Journal of 
Commonwealth Criminal Law Inaugural Issue 105. 
18
 J Hodgson ‘The Future of Adversarial Criminal Justice in 21
st
 Century Britain’ (2010) 35 North Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 319. 
16 
 
McEwan19 attribute a change in procedural style to the prevalence of efficiency and managerial 
concerns. Furthermore, Duff et al. recognise that principles central to the traditional conception 
of the trial are being challenged and eroded.20 The approach taken in this thesis is distinctive 
because it focuses on developments in the defendant’s participatory role in the criminal process 
and the negative consequences of penalising non-cooperation. In doing so, it examines the 
purpose of the criminal process, its aims and values, and the principles which underpin and 
constrain it. It also identifies the origins, practice and procedural impact of the specific reforms 
to the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence and disclosure. It, thus, provides 
an important opportunity to examine the wider effects of often controversial reforms which 
have been altering the nature of criminal procedure and the role of the defendant. Rather than 
looking at the emergence of an efficiency model, this thesis finds that England has developed a 
participatory model of criminal procedure. This model has not been developed by design; rather 
it is the result of reforms aimed at the perceived benefits of defence cooperation and 
participation without regard for their wider consequences.  
 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 
Following this introduction, there are six chapters and a conclusion. Chapters 2 through to 4 
construct a theoretical framework which is used to understand and evaluate the criminal 
process and the concept of penalising those who do not cooperate. Chapters 5 through to 7 go 
on to apply this framework to the three particular examples of penalising non-cooperation.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out the aims of the English criminal process. It uses the overriding objective of 
the Criminal Procedure Rules as a structural basis for doing so; also, it draws on Ashworth and 
Redmayne’s rights based account.21 Starting with an examination of the aims currently 
associated with criminal procedure is a useful way of determining which aims must necessarily 
be emphasised in order to justify penalising defendant non-compliance in the criminal process.  
 
                                                             
19
 J McEwan ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 
519. 
20 A Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall and V Tadros (eds) The Trial on Trial Volume 3 (Hart: Oxford, 2007). 
21 Ashworth and Redmayne (n 9). 
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Chapter 3 outlines several models of criminal procedure. These are: adversarial; inquisitorial; 
hybrid; efficiency; and European. Identifying and exploring these models assists in establishing 
the procedural position England is in and the participatory direction in which it has shifted as a 
result of the trend of reforms aimed at securing cooperation. As reference is made to these 
models throughout the thesis, this chapter also serves as important explanatory information 
and helps to bring together the bigger picture of criminal process aims and procedural style in 
relation to the issue of penalising non-cooperation.  
 
Chapter 4 explores the issue of defendant participation and argues that, in order to respect the 
defendant’s rights and to uphold some of the fundamental features of the English criminal 
justice system, participation should be a choice rather than a requirement. It begins by 
examining Duff et al.’s communicative account of the nature of the criminal trial,22 and offers a 
critique of it. By contrasting this account with the normative theory put forward, in which the 
criminal process should be a means of calling the state to account, important issues surrounding 
defendant participation are raised. Drawing on the research of Langbein23 and Beattie,24 chapter 
4 then looks at the historical development of the adversarial system in terms of the role of the 
defendant and the rise of defence rights which can facilitate a lack of participation. The 
defendant’s position as a participant in the current English criminal process, particularly at trial, 
is examined. This highlights the trend towards an obligation on the defendant to participate. 
Finally, the definition and rationale of the presumption of innocence is considered in more detail 
in relation to the defendant’s participatory role. 
 
The first specific example of penalising non-cooperation arises from reliance on the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Chapter 5 examines the concept of the privilege, its scope and the 
place it holds in the English criminal process, particularly as a defence right and as a way of 
limiting the defendant’s participation. It notes Redmayne’s notion of the privilege as a 
distancing mechanism,25 and highlights its value in relation to upholding a proper relationship 
between citizen and state. This chapter critically evaluates how our modern understanding of 
                                                             
22 Duff et al. (n 20). 
23
 JH Langbein The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003). 
24 JM Beattie Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1986). 
25 Redmayne (n 8). 
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the privilege has been limited. Reliance on the privilege can now, in some circumstances, lead to 
the direct penalty of criminal prosecution for non-cooperation.  
 
Chapter 6 provides the second example of penalising the defendant for not cooperating in the 
criminal process. It examines developments to the right to silence in English law. The main point 
of interest is the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the case law surrounding it, 
which controversially allow the fact finder to draw adverse inferences of guilt in certain 
situations. By equating silence with guilt, it has become difficult for the defendant to test the 
prosecution case without actively participating.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the pre-trial disclosure obligations placed on the defence by the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The provisions for drawing adverse inferences where the 
defendant fails to comply with these obligations constitutes a penalty for non-compliance with 
the criminal process. However, the provisions are also controversial because they create, for the 
first time in the history of English criminal procedure, general pre-trial disclosure obligations for 
the defence. Although defence disclosure aims to secure convictions as quickly and efficiently as 
possible, requiring the defence to disclose the details of its case raises important issues of 
principle. This chapter also considers the link between, and procedural implications of, the case 
management provisions in the Criminal Procedure Rules and a perceived need to tackle ambush 
defences. As with chapters 5 and 6, the factors which led to the disclosure reforms, and whether 
they are justifiable in light of the theoretical framework, are evaluated.  
 
This thesis attempts to state the law as at 1st May 2012.  
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2 
Aims 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Examining the aims of the criminal process is a useful way of determining which aims must 
be emphasised in order to prioritise defendant participation and justify penalising 
defendants for not cooperating. Whilst the focus of this chapter is on the aims of the pre-
trial and trial stages of the process, from charge to verdict, one’s theory on other elements 
of the criminal justice system, such as punishment and sentencing, may influence how one 
views the aims of the criminal process as a whole. For example, Ashworth and Redmayne’s 
rights based approach to criminal procedure is influenced by their retributive, or deserts-
based, rationale for punishment.1 Within their conception, punishment should be 
underpinned by the same principles of proportionality and respect for the accused as a 
rational rights-bearing subject, as the criminal process is.2 A normative theory based on 
calling the state to account for its accusations against the accused also correlates to a 
retributive theory of punishment; once the state has justified and accounted for its 
accusations and request for punishment, that punishment can be carried out so as to 
censure the accused for his wrongdoing.3  
 
One’s perceptions of the criminal law can also impact how one perceives the aims of the 
system, since ‘an analysis of criminal procedure’s functions is inextricably interwoven with 
one’s vision of the goals of the substantive criminal law.’4  The criminal process enforces the 
criminal law through denunciation and punishment of those who do not comply with it. It is, 
therefore, important that the criminal process can demand state accountability in its 
enforcement of the criminal law.5 In response to the question, why are certain kinds of 
action forbidden by law and so made crimes or offences, Hart states: ‘To announce to 
                                                             
1 A Ashworth and M Redmayne The Criminal Process 4th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) 
21. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Theories and justifications for punishment are part of the wider context of this thesis and are not 
elaborated on due to space constraints and remoteness from the central topic.  
4 P Arenella ‘Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ 
Competing Ideologies’ (1983) 72 Georgetown Law Journal 185, 197. 
5
 HL Ho ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in P Roberts and J Hunter Criminal Evidence 
and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart: Oxford, 2012) 277. 
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society that these actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them are done. 
These are the common immediate aims of making any conduct criminal.’6 A central purpose 
of criminal law is forbidding certain actions in order to protect citizens and the state from 
harm and disorder without undermining the values behind a liberal democracy within which 
freedom of choice is to be fostered. The normative theory of calling the state to account 
adopts this position. However, a theory which justifies the criminal law as a response to 
harm does have shortcomings,7 and alternative justifications, such as Feinberg’s ‘offense 
principle’, have been proposed.8 Rather than relying on a philosophical theory, the content 
of the criminal law may be better explained as a matter of historical development. 
Nevertheless, the goal of protecting the state and its citizens from harm can be pursued 
legitimately through a criminal process which enforces the criminal law through 
denunciation and punishment whilst ensuring that, in accordance with the rights and 
freedom granted to citizens in a liberal democracy, the state can account for its accusations. 
However, this does not satisfy the question of what the criminal process aims to achieve in 
terms of case outcome. 
 
Accurate fact finding and conflict resolution are identified in this chapter as the primary aims 
of the criminal process. However, the process cannot be accepted as legitimate if the aims 
are not carried out fairly and in accordance with the rights of the accused. This conclusion 
satisfies both the descriptive question of what the aims of the criminal process are and the 
normative question of what they should be. This differs from Ho’s analysis of the criminal 
trial. He argues that rather than portraying the trial as a search for truth, it should be more 
accurately seen as a process of calling upon the executive to account for its request to have 
a citizen officially condemned and punished.9 It is for the police to search for truth, and their 
                                                             
6 HLA Hart Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1968) 6.  
7
 For example, Ashworth and Zedner doubt that prevention is a satisfactory or sufficient justification 
for many significant features of contemporary criminal law including many inchoate, preparatory and 
possession offences which have tended to grow in an unprincipled manner, propelled by the apparent 
irresistibility of preventive purposes. See A Ashworth and L Zedner ‘Justice Prevention: Preventive 
Rationales and the Limits of the Criminal Law’ in A Duff and P Green (eds) Philosophical Foundations 
of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011). Furthermore, many criminal offences either 
exceed the harm principle (such as outraging public decency) or fail to meet it (such as many minor 
regulatory offences). See C Wells and O Quick Reconstructing Criminal Law 4th edn (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2010) 11-13.   
8 Through his ‘offense principle’, Feinberg argues that it is necessary to prevent offensiveness as well 
as harmful conduct. J Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 2: Offence to Others 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1985). 
9
 HL Ho ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (2010) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87, 90. 
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search should be over by the time the case reaches court.10 Ho’s account is based on liberal 
principles and political accountability. This thesis relies on a similar theory of calling upon 
the executive to account, but applies it to the operation of the criminal process as a whole, 
rather than limiting it to the function of the court. Unlike Ho’s account, this theory does not 
distinguish between the pre-trial and trial stages, with the executive searching for truth pre-
trial, and its case being scrutinised and challenged at trial.11 Instead, it sees accurate fact 
finding and conflict resolution as the aims, or desired end results, of a process which should 
itself be an exercise in calling the state to account. The constraints which requirements of 
fairness, legitimacy and respect for rights place on the pursuance of the process aims help to 
ensure this. 
 
This chapter examines the aims and values of the criminal process in light of the overriding 
objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules. Rule 1 sets out the overriding objective as dealing 
with criminal cases justly. This is followed by a list of seven criteria for meeting this 
objective: 
(a) acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty; 
(b) dealing with the prosecution and the defence fairly; 
(c) recognising the rights of a defendant, particularly those under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights; 
(d) respecting the interests of witnesses, victims and jurors and keeping them informed 
of the progress of the case; 
(e) dealing with the case efficiently and expeditiously; 
(f) ensuring that appropriate information is available to the court when bail and 
sentence are considered; and 
(g) dealing with the case in ways that take into account― 
(i) the gravity of the offence alleged, 
(ii) the complexity of what is in issue, 
(iii) the severity of the consequences for the defendant and others affected, and 
(iv) the needs of other cases. 
 
The first four of these are examined in detail and the remaining three are outlined briefly. 
The aim of conflict resolution, which is also examined, is not expressly provided for in the 
Rules.  
 
The Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 formalised the aims of criminal litigation in England and 
Wales for the first time. They have been replaced by the Criminal Procedure Rules 2011. 
These Rules are setting the tone for developments in procedure and play an important role 
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 Ho does recognise that the court plays a useful epistemic role in its ability to counteract police 
‘tunnel vision’. Ibid 88. 
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in establishing the duties of the parties and the court by prescribing deadlines and methods 
of performing tasks, and laying down the powers of the courts to deal with a variety of 
situations. Furthermore, they have carved out a more active and cooperative role for the 
defence, increasing the state’s ability to require participation and effecting a ‘sea change’ in 
the way cases should be constructed.12 The Criminal Procedure Rules do not apply to the 
entire criminal process, but many elements, particularly those related to the overriding 
objective, reflect the aims of the process. The Rules, thus, provide a useful framework and 
structural tool for this chapter.  
 
 
2.2 Rule 1.1(2)(a) Acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty 
 
Determining the facts surrounding a particular offence with a view to ascertaining whether 
the accused committed the offence is an obvious aim for the pre-trial and trial stages of the 
criminal process. The fact that the objectives of ‘acquitting the innocent and convicting the 
guilty’ are stated in the Rules with apparent equivalence did cause concern for some 
criminal law practioners. It was felt that the wording did not sufficiently emphasise the 
fundamental principle that it is the prosecution which brings the case, and must prove it 
beyond reasonable doubt.13  However, there does not seem to be any question of the rule 
breaching the prosecution’s burden. The wording may simply reflect the general aim of 
accurate fact finding rather than the principles which govern its pursuit. Richardson takes 
issue with the inclusion of acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty in the Rules on 
the basis that it is inconsistent with an adversarial system of criminal justice to oblige the 
court to abandon its position of impartial arbiter, and instead to take on an active role in 
having the case conducted by the parties in such a manner as will produce a true outcome.14 
Such is the role of the judge in an inquisitorial system.15 However, it is unlikely that this Rule 
alone has had such an effect on the role of the court, and it remains a reflection of an 
important process aim. 
 
                                                             
12 R (on the application of DPP) v Chorley Justices and Andrew Forrest [2006] EWHC 1795 (Admin) [24]. 
13 J Sprack A Practical Approach to Criminal Procedure 12th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) 
14. 
14 J Richardson ‘A “Just” Outcome: Losing Sight of the Purpose of Criminal Procedure’ (2011) Journal 
of Commonwealth Criminal Law Inaugural Issue 105, 110-111. 
15 The features of adversarial and inquisitorial systems are outlined in chapter 3. 
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Although fact finding and truth determination are central aspects of the criminal process, 
the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ are not straightforward. Clarifying these terms is, 
therefore, important. Williams makes a distinction between four types of fact: primary facts, 
which are principally concerned with whether a witness is to be believed about those facts  
which he did or perceived, such as what he saw; inferential facts which concern the factual 
inferences to be drawn from the primary facts; evaluative facts which concern the legal 
assessment of facts as reasonable, negligent, et cetera; and denotative facts which are 
concerned with the application of words used in legal rules, for instance, whether something 
amounts to ‘grievous bodily harm’.16  Accurate fact finding as a criminal process aim is 
predominantly concerned with ‘primary facts’ and those facts surrounding the criminal act 
directly. Establishing these facts accurately is the best way of ensuring an accurate outcome 
for the case. The evaluative, inferential, and denotative facts must often be established as a 
consequence of the primary facts. They help to clarify and legitimise the laws’ ability to 
determine the truth.  
 
By establishing all of these facts, one would hope to unveil the objective truth, namely 
whether a particular suspect did or did not in fact commit the offence for which he has been 
charged.  However, as William’s analysis suggests, the truth as determined through the 
criminal process is rarely this objective. Legal norms and rules of evidence, including 
exclusionary rules, must be taken into account. As a result, the fact finder may not be privy 
to all of the available or relevant information, leading to legal determinations of truth that 
do not necessarily reflect the objective truth. Ashworth notes that reference to ‘truth’ and 
‘facts’ carries an aura of objectivity and incontrovertibility that is often exaggerated.17 Two 
other terms which he believes warrant consideration are ‘selectivity’ and ‘interpretation’. In 
all cases that come to court, the prosecution’s version of the facts is a selection and may 
often be open to different interpretations. The defence case is also a construction 
dependent on selection and interpretation. One must, therefore, recognise that cases are 
constructed in a particular way. Although we work on the basis that the system is equipped 
to achieve accurate verdicts, we must accept that this is not always the case. It is the 
difference between asserting that the defendant is guilty, as opposed to having been proved 
guilty. 
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 G Williams ‘Law and Fact’ [1976] Crim LR 472, 472. 
17 A Ashworth ‘Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism’ [1996] Crim LR 220, 227 
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Whilst the aim is ultimately to find the objective truth of the prosecution’s charges, so as to 
hold the state to account for the particular accusations it makes against the accused, the 
extent to which the objective truth and the legal outcome will align may depend on the 
procedural model of justice employed. For example, the inquisitorial model is often 
perceived of as being concerned with truth, whereas the adversarial model is concerned 
with proof.18 However, this does not guarantee that one type of system will secure more 
accurate verdicts than the other. The model of justice used may determine the primacy of 
accurate fact finding as an aim, but not necessarily its ability to achieve it. Also, there is 
significant disagreement about which type of system is best suited to finding the truth. Jorg 
et al. suggest that the adversarial system’s notion that the truth is best established through 
two equal parties presenting their best cases is ‘at best unproven, and at worst highly 
implausible.’19  
 
In his influential article on evidential barriers to convictions, Damaska argues that the 
adversarial model’s commitment to values other than the pursuit of truth has caused it to 
develop higher evidentiary barriers.20 Furthermore, in 1993, the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice accepted that the adversarial system is not always focused on truth seeking 
and, for this reason, some of their recommendations were geared towards shifting the 
English system in an inquisitorial direction.21 On the other hand, Sanders and Young believe 
that there is ample opportunity for an inquisitorial judge to become biased, and the way in 
which the search for the truth is conducted may shape the ‘truth’ that is proclaimed in 
court.22 There does seem to be some degree of consensus that adversarial type systems are 
less concerned with accurate outcomes than inquisitorial ones. However, which is better at 
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent remains undetermined.  
 
Despite rhetoric suggesting that the English system is unequipped to find truth, recent 
reforms, including the limits placed on the right to silence and the privilege against self-
incrimination, have emphasised the fact finding aim. Furthermore, the importance attached 
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to avoiding miscarriages of justice, and the existence of remedies for victims of them, show 
that the English system does value objective truth, particularly where the defendant has 
been wronged. There are also exceptions to the double jeopardy rule, allowing those 
previously acquitted of certain offences to be retried where there is new and compelling 
evidence.23 If accurate fact finding were the only consideration of the criminal justice 
process, it would be difficult to argue against requiring defendant cooperation, since the 
defendant often has knowledge of the facts. Yet, in reality, the pursuit of accurate fact 
finding is constrained by evidentiary rules and procedural norms which should prohibit the 
state from legitimately requiring the defendant to participate. As Ho suggests, the criminal 
process is much more than a search for truth; it provides an opportunity to hold the state to 
account for the accusations that it makes and its request for official condemnation and 
punishment of individual citizens.24  Other aims and values, recognised as part of the 
overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules, therefore, require consideration.  
 
 
2.3 Rule 1.1(2)(b) Dealing with the prosecution and defence fairly 
 
This heading is used to explore the concepts of fairness and legitimacy. 
 
2.3.1 Fairness 
Principles of fairness have been said to lie at the heart of the criminal process.25 This view is 
strengthened by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which 
specifically provides for the right to a fair trial and has become Europe’s defining standard 
for determining fairness in criminal proceedings. The concepts of fairness and fair trials are 
broad. However, the rights which constitute fairness under Article 6 are discussed in various 
contexts throughout this thesis. Although the term ‘fair’ is ambiguous, the phrase ‘dealing 
with the prosecution and defence fairly’ as laid out in the Rules, seems to imply equality 
between the two parties, and this is in line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the principle of equality of arms.  
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Whilst the European Court developed the principle of equality of arms, it has roots in both 
the common and civil law traditions.26 In accordance with the principle, the prosecution and 
defence should be on a procedurally equal footing. This includes having access to relevant 
information before the trial. Fairness at the trial may thus depend upon fair disclosure 
before the trial.27 In Edwards v UK, the European Court held that Article 6 requires that the 
prosecution disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or against 
the accused, and that failure to do so can give rise to a defect in the trial proceedings.28 This 
position was also followed by the Court in Rowe and Davis v UK.29 At trial, equality of arms 
suggests equality in presenting and questioning evidence as stated in Article 6(3). However, 
despite this principle, the defence and prosecution are often in divergent positions, in terms 
of resources, throughout the criminal process. The defence lack the independent 
investigatory and coercive powers of the prosecution, and do not have access to the same 
type of information or technology, such as access to forensic services or the criminal records 
of witnesses. They must rely on the prosecution’s disclosure. This reinforces the importance 
of keeping the state’s powers in check so that the defence party is not put at a procedural 
disadvantage.  
 
In Horncastle,30 Lord Phillips identified two principal objectives of a fair trial. These are that a 
defendant who is innocent should be acquitted; and a defendant who is guilty should be 
convicted.31 Achieving fairness may, thus, be tantamount to accurate fact finding. However, 
this would link fairness only to outcome. Ensuring fairness goes beyond ensuring the 
discovery of the truth at trial; it also requires that the defendant be treated fairly and that 
his rights are upheld throughout the criminal process. Lord Phillips went on to recognise this 
by pointing out that English law has different kinds of rules designed to ensure a fair trial. 
These rules relate to the procedure itself (including the defendant’s Article 6 rights) and to 
the evidence that can be placed before the tribunal.32 The issue in Horncastle related to 
admissibility rules. More specifically, it referred to whether a conviction based ‘solely or to a 
decisive extent’ on the statement of an absent witness, whom the defendant has had no 
chance of cross-examining, necessarily infringes the defendant’s rights under Articles 6(1) 
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and 6(3)(d). Although the European Court had seemingly cemented this test in Al-Khawaja 
and Tahery v UK,33 the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to apply the rule in 
England, and that sufficient safeguards existed in domestic law to ensure that admitting such 
evidence would not impede the fairness of the trial. The European Court has since conceded 
to this view.34 
 
The concept of fairness can help to reinforce an argument against requiring defendant 
participation, and further assists in forming a basis for the normative conception of criminal 
procedure. Many of the standards of a fair trial are intrinsic to the function of the criminal 
process as an exercise of calling the state to account in its enforcement of the criminal law.35 
Principles of fairness provide fundamental guarantees against arbitrary state conduct and 
potential misuse of state authority, an authority which is considerable when the public 
censure of conviction and state punishment are at stake.36 By imposing penalties against 
those who do not cooperate, the rights which guarantee an accused person’s fairness 
throughout the criminal process are being interfered with and undermined. This has 
implications not just for a conception of criminal procedure based on calling the state to 
account, but also for the existing criminal process, in terms of the value it places on its 
commitment to fairness and human rights.  
 
Whilst most fairness norms operate as restraints on the state’s power and as a means of 
protecting the accused’s autonomy and dignity, it is misleading to speak of fairness as an aim 
of the criminal process itself. Rather, fairness is a necessary prerequisite to achieving the 
aims of the criminal process. In relation to the idea of fairness being a central and necessary 
aspect of criminal procedure, Ho has argued that the law of evidence should be viewed from 
the perspective of a fact finder seeking to do justice in the search for truth.37 Instead of 
merely discovering whether the law of evidence has succeeded in achieving factually 
accurate outcomes, Ho believes that justice in trial deliberation requires that the fact finder, 
‘must appreciate, from the position of [the defendant], the value of respect and 
concern…The standard of proof and evidential reasoning used in reaching the verdict must 
express adequate respect and concern’.38 Practically speaking, this approach, taken from an 
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‘internal perspective’, may differ very little from other fairness and rights based approaches 
to criminal procedure. It may be enough to state that ensuring fairness, principally by 
upholding the defendant’s fair trial rights, is (and should remain) an important aspect of 
criminal procedure and a key means of legitimising the process.  
 
2.3.2 Legitimacy 
In any liberal and democratic society, it is essential that the state acts legitimately. Since the 
state has such vast resources for dealing with criminal matters, it is particularly important 
that the criminal justice system operates in a legitimate manner and that there is a certain 
degree of consensus on how it operates and what it aims to achieve. Dennis puts forward a 
theory of legitimacy, arguing that the production of legitimate verdicts is the key aim of the 
criminal trial. He states that, ‘If official adjudications are to succeed in gaining acceptance 
and respect as authoritative decisions, it is essential that they are, and are seen to be, 
legitimate.’39 Legitimacy in this respect is distinct from the concept of true facts as it includes 
notions of integrity and acceptability. According to Dennis, a verdict of guilty or not guilty is 
more than just a factual statement. ‘Guilt’ is a moral concept and a verdict of ‘guilty’ is an 
expression of moral blame. Additionally, it is an expression of the norms of the criminal law 
and of the consequences of breach of such norms.40 It follows that the verdict should have 
three qualities: it should be factually accurate; it should be morally authoritative; and it 
should be founded on respect for the rule of law. Although truth finding becomes the 
primary means by which a legitimate verdict is secured, it is the legitimacy of that verdict 
which is the ultimate goal.41 Dennis argues that whilst the defendant has a unique interest in 
the factual accuracy of the verdict, he does not have a similar unique interest in its moral 
authority or expressive value of the rule of law which applies to all citizens of the state.42  
 
Commentators such as Ashworth and Redmayne take a different view point and believe that 
legitimacy is an elusive concept which cannot be obviously differentiated from the aim of 
accurate fact finding taken together with respect for defence rights.43 Ho believes that the 
legitimacy of a particular verdict depends on how the trial was conducted, on the quality of 
the interaction between state and accused in the process by which the outcome is 
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reached.44 The legitimacy of the verdict means its worthiness to be recognised, its moral 
weight, normative acceptability, rightful authority or some such notion.45 According to Ho, 
due process is important to this conception because it legitimises the verdict, it also has 
intrinsic value: ‘the liberal trial is not merely a method of determining guilt or a means of 
bringing criminals to justice; it is also a process of doing justice to accused persons, a 
political obligation owed by the state to the citizens it seeks to censure and punish.’46 When 
the accused is treated unfairly, the state’s right to expect him or her, and the citizenry in 
general, to accept the resulting conviction is somehow undermined.47 
 
Whilst there are differing understandings and uses for the term ‘legitimacy’, it would seem 
that the criminal process is legitimised through accurate fact finding, respect for individual 
rights, and due process and fair procedures. As such, legitimacy is not an aim of the criminal 
process itself. However, it is an essential aspect of it. The process is legitimate if its aims are 
pursued fairly and in accordance with the rights of the accused. The concepts of fairness and 
legitimacy are linked and place constraints on how the criminal process can operate. They 
may limit the ability to achieve the process aims, and can prevent cooperative obligations 
being put on the accused. Normatively speaking, a guilty verdict will be legitimate where the 
state can be said to have accounted for its accusations and request for punishment through 
a fair procedure which respects the rights of the accused. Where it has failed to do so, the 
defendant should be acquitted. 
 
 
2.4 Rule 1.1(2)(c) Recognising the rights of a defendant and the defence, 
particularly those under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Human rights concerns have become increasingly prevalent in the field of criminal 
procedure and are a significant factor in maintaining fairness and ensuring legitimacy. 
Ashworth and Redmayne in particular stress the importance of respecting rights; they 
believe that this should be seen as a concomitant aim of the criminal process rather than a 
mere side constraint on the pursuit of accurate verdicts.48 England has several international 
rights obligations, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
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European Convention on Human Rights which has become an integral aspect of criminal 
procedure and was given domestic force under the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 6 of the 
ECHR reads:  
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law… 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when 
the interests of justice so require; 
d)  to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court. 
 
Article 6 is intended to protect suspects throughout the criminal process and several rights 
have been read into it, including the principle of equality of arms,49 the right to silence,50 and 
the privilege against self-incrimination.51 The rights which make up a fair trial are not limited 
to those expressed and inferred in the Convention; member states are free to afford citizens 
a broader range of rights. As Dennis puts it, Article 6 ‘is better treated as a restatement of 
basic principles of natural justice than as a legislative code of the conditions of a fair trial. As 
a code it is incomplete and the apparently absolute terms used to describe the rights can be 
misleading.’52 It is recognition of the accused’s rights which can allow criminal proceedings 
to be structured so as to require the prosecution to prove the state’s accusations and limit 
the participatory obligations put on the defendant.  
 
Although the ECHR is directly enforceable by individuals against the state, Article 6 is not an 
absolute guarantee of respect for rights. One problem with rights based accounts of the 
criminal process is that rights often conflict with one another as well as with other social 
values. Within the ECHR, some rights are qualified in that they may be interfered with in 
certain circumstances (namely where it is proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate aim), 
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whilst others are non-derogable in that they cannot be interfered with unless very strict 
circumstances apply. Between these qualified and non-derogable rights are rights such as 
Article 6 which Ashworth and Redmayne refer to as ‘strong rights’.53 They suggest that it is 
wrong to conclude that these rights can be traded off against other values, or that rights 
based approaches are not distinctive.54 Although Ashworth and Redmayne present a 
theoretically sound argument, in practice the rights conferred by Article 6 have been 
qualified and restricted by both the European Court and the domestic courts, particularly in 
cases regarding the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination. However, the 
European Court has also held that such restrictions must not destroy the ‘very essence’ of 
the right.55 Nonetheless, defence rights are being set aside in pursuance of other values and 
this could lead to greater acceptance of penalising defendants for their lack of cooperation.  
 
2.4.1 Balancing rights 
Duff et al. pose the question of whether the violation of a defendant’s process rights should 
be balanced against the good of accurate convictions, or whether the very aim of the 
criminal trial should be seen as having been undermined when a process right is violated.56 It 
is submitted here that when the legitimacy of the process is brought into question by 
undermining defence rights, the aims of the trial and the process more generally, are also 
undermined. However, it can be noted that some rights, such as the right to confrontation, 
promote accurate fact finding as well as ensuring fairness. Dennis has identified two 
dimensions to the various confrontation rights of the defence.57 These are the instrumental 
value for the outcome of the case, directed to ensuring the factual accuracy of the verdict, 
and the process value which acknowledges the autonomy and dignity of the accused, 
irrespective of the likely outcome of the case. This second dimension is described as non-
consequentialist and gives effect to the defendant’s claim to concern for his interests as a 
participant in the process of adjudication.58 Where the rights being balanced away are of 
instrumental value, the balancing exercise may be counter-productive in trying to achieve 
the aim of factual accuracy. When rights are set aside, whether of instrumental or process 
value, the state can use its powers to coerce individuals into cooperating and, in so doing, 
undermine their autonomy and freedom of choice. This does not correlate with a political 
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theory of liberal democracy or with a notion of criminal procedure based on calling the state 
to account. Yet, the matter of balancing rights against accurate outcomes has become a 
familiar one, with recent legislation and judicial opinion suggesting that the good of accurate 
verdicts should take precedence.  
 
The rhetoric of ‘balance’ is often used by governments, courts and policy makers in criminal 
justice discussions. Examples can be found in the report of the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice in 1993, judicial opinions concerning Article 6, and the White Paper Justice 
For All. Justice For All culminated in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which substantially altered 
many important aspects of criminal evidence and procedure in the name of rebalancing the 
system in favour of the victim.59 Similarly, the right to silence was curtailed by the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in the pursuit of accurate fact finding.60 The increase in 
political momentum behind this rebalancing threatens traditional conceptions of criminal 
justice, including those based on adversarialism and testing the prosecution’s case.61 
Ashworth and Redmayne view the metaphor of balance as a rhetorical device of which one 
must be extremely wary. Many of those who adopt the terminology fail to stipulate exactly 
what is being balanced, what factors and interests are to be included, what weight is being 
assigned to particular values and interests, and so on.62 This makes it all the more worrying 
that a ‘balancing’ act has been used to determine breaches of the privilege against self-
incrimination. In Brown v Stott,63 for example, the Privy Council found that there was ‘a clear 
public interest in enforcement of road traffic legislation’ and that limiting the privilege 
against self-incrimination was not a disproportionate response to this.64 This was held 
despite the fact that the privilege against self-incrimination is an implied Article 6 right and 
so, according to Ashworth and Redmayne at least, cannot simply be traded off by reference 
to the public interest.65  
 
Sacrificing rights in the pursuit of accurate fact finding presents a dilemma, as the system 
cannot be accepted as legitimate without accounting for certain factors, including respect 
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for the defendant’s procedural rights. As will become clear later, requiring defendants to 
participate in the criminal process necessitates defence rights being set aside. A system 
which endeavours to respect defence rights cannot easily be reconciled with one that also 
penalises defendants for exercising those rights. It is submitted here that, like fairness and 
legitimacy, respecting the rights of the accused is not a process aim in itself, particularly in 
terms of case outcome, as the process does not exist to enforce defence rights. Rather, it is a 
fundamental aspect of criminal procedure and may place necessary constraints on how the 
process pursues its aims. This is not an uncontroversial view as other commentators do 
recognise respecting rights as an aim in itself.66   
 
 
2.5 Rule 1.1(2)(d) Respecting the interests of witnesses, victims and jurors and 
keeping them informed of the progress of the case 
 
The Criminal Procedure Rules explicitly recognise the interests of witnesses, victims and 
jurors. However, there is a distinction between providing support, information, and 
compensation on the one hand (i.e. respecting their interests) and affording them 
procedural rights and influence over key procedural decisions on the other. This heading is 
used to briefly discuss the role of witnesses, particularly the victim, in terms of procedural 
rights. Whilst recent years have seen an increasing concern for the interests of victims and 
other witnesses in the English criminal process, reforms have not gone so far as to grant 
them a set of procedural ‘rights’ along the same lines as the defendant. However, the effect 
of recent case law and legislation makes it difficult to dismiss the notion of procedural rights 
for victims and witnesses altogether.  
 
An important question is whether victims in particular should have procedural rights and 
influence, and whether enforcing this should be seen as an aim of the criminal process.67 
Ashworth and Redmayne argue convincingly that victims should have no such rights as the 
criminal process is concerned with the relationship between the accused and the state, not 
                                                             
66 Ashworth and Redmayne consider respect for rights to be a concomitant aim of the trial process. 
Ashworth and Redmayne (n 1) 48; Ho believe that many of the standards of a fair trial are not side-
constraints; they are, instead, intrinsic to the nature or function of the criminal trial as an exercise of 
calling the executive branch of government to account on its enforcement of the criminal law. Ho ‘The 
Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ (n 5) 269. 
67
 This goes beyond the support and information victims may currently be entitled to through 
measures such as the Victim’s Code of Practice and the Prosecutor’s Pledge.  
34 
 
the accused and the victim or the victim and the state. Essentially, although victims’ should 
be treated with dignity, they should not be enabled to influence decisions in the criminal 
process.68 This argument leads to the conclusion that, when considering the proper aims of 
the system, victim ‘rights’ and interests, in so far as they effect the operation of the process, 
should not be a factor. They will inevitably play an important role by reporting crimes, 
providing information and giving evidence, but victims should not determine or influence 
key decisions. However, some theories of justice do recognise procedural rights for victims. 
For instance, a model of restorative justice would incorporate a great deal of involvement 
for the victim who would have a say in both the outcome of the case and the punishment of 
the offender.69 Furthermore, certain jurisdictions which have more inquisitorial 
characteristics accord a greater role to victims. In Italy, the victim can participate at trial 
through counsel and can seek civil damages from the defendant.70 Likewise, in France, the 
victim may constitute herself as a party to the case and claim compensation directly from 
the criminal court.71  
 
Article 6 makes no mention of victims, but the European Court of Human Rights have 
recognised that the principle of a fair trial requires that the interests of the defence are 
balanced against those of the victims and witnesses who are called to give evidence. An 
example is Doorson v Netherlands72 in which the Court upheld a decision to allow 
prosecution witnesses to remain anonymous and be questioned in the absence of the 
accused. The Court was of the opinion that criminal procedure should be organised so that 
the Convention rights of victims and witnesses (such as privacy, life and liberty) are not 
unjustifiably imperilled.  A further example is R (B) v DPP73 which concerned the decision to 
discontinue a prosecution for wounding with intent and witness intimidation on the basis 
that the victim's mental illness meant he could not be placed before the jury as a credible 
witness. This decision was held to be irrational and in breach of the victims Article 3 rights 
under the ECHR which holds that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
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degrading treatment or punishment. Article 3 carries a positive obligation on the state to 
provide protection through its legal system against a person suffering such ill treatment at 
the hands of others, and the court held that this includes bringing to justice those who 
commit serious acts of violence against others.74 This decision demonstrates the greater 
prevalence being given to victim interests in the running of a case. It seems to imply that the 
victim can influence the decision to prosecute when not doing so would violate his rights.  
 
Dennis has suggested that if a guilty verdict is to have moral authority (one of the conditions 
of a legitimate verdict), it is not necessary that the process should have sole regard for the 
defendant’s claim to fair treatment.75 In relation to moral authority, a fundamental principle 
of political morality underpinning the criminal process is that the defendant, as a citizen of 
the state, should be treated with concern and respect for his liberty and dignity. This 
principle of fair treatment applies to all citizens of the state.76 Thus, while the defendant has 
a unique interest in the factual accuracy of the verdict, victim and witness interests in its 
moral authority and expressive value of the rule of law may require their interests to be 
prioritised, as appeared to have been the case in Doorson.  
 
The increasing recognition of the rights and interests of witnesses is also highlighted by 
Murtagh.77 The Privy Council had to establish, among other concerns, whether the right to a 
fair trial requires the prosecution to disclose to the accused all previous convictions and 
outstanding charges of its witnesses. It was held that the accused’s right to a fair trial 
requires the disclosure only of such previous convictions and outstanding charges as 
materially weaken the prosecution’s case or materially strengthen the case for the defence. 
Furthermore, it was held to be consistent with the accused’s right to a fair trial for the 
prosecution itself to take the initial decision as to what will satisfy the materiality test. The 
court held that information about a witness’s previous convictions and outstanding charges 
falls within the scope of private life, which is protected under Article 8 ECHR, even though it 
relates to proceedings that took place in public. However, the court did acknowledge that a 
generous approach should be taken as to what might be relevant to the accused, and 
therefore must be disclosed to him.78 As a result of cases such as these, the competing rights 
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and interests of defendants, victims and other witnesses, and the conflicts they generate, 
have become an increasing preoccupation in modern law.79 
 
The changing views of victims and other witnesses can impact the rights of defendants. 
Popular discourse about criminal justice is dominated by perceptions of criminal versus 
victim. The offender’s gain is the victim’s loss. Within this a political logic has been 
established wherein being ‘for’ victims means being tough on defendants.80 While many of 
the victim-centred reforms, such as better courtroom facilities, support and information, do 
not affect defendants, reforms such as those concerning the cross-examination of vulnerable 
witnesses can affect defendants. Restrictions have been put on the defendant’s right to 
examine and cross-examine witnesses who are children or complainants of sexual crimes.81 
The use of special measures such as screens or evidence via video link for vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses may also impact the defendant’s right to cross-examination.82 Special 
measures are intended to enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give better 
evidence. In this way they promote factual accuracy, and they also recognise a claim by 
these participants in the criminal process to be treated with appropriate concern and 
respect.83 However, they may act to elevate the interests of witnesses above the procedural 
rights of the defendant. Furthermore, s.100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has restricted 
the admissibility of a witness’s previous bad character whilst s.101 has extended the realm 
of admissible bad character evidence against the accused.  
 
The balancing metaphor between victim and defendant interests is misleading because it 
tends to suggest that victims have an interest in increased conviction rates.84 Yet victims 
have no legitimate interest in seeing defendants falsely convicted, the likelihood of which is 
increased by limiting defence rights. As criminal matters remain an issue between the 
accused and the state, it is not right to consider the position of the victim (or other 
witnesses) in relation to the defendant. The traditional separation between the role of the 
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prosecutor and the position of the victim must be maintained if the system is to remain fair 
to the defendant.85  
 
The judicial and legislative decisions referred to above are not easy to reconcile with a claim 
that victims and other witnesses do not hold rights in the criminal process. As it stands, the 
pre-existing rights of victims and other witnesses have the potential to affect defence rights 
and interests. Furthermore, legislation is being enacted which restricts the defendant’s 
ability to exercise his rights in favour of the interests of victims and witnesses. However, 
neither the European Court, nor the domestic courts or legislators, have gone so far as to 
accord victims or other witnesses with specific procedural or trial rights. A distinction can 
therefore be drawn between respecting the rights that victims and witnesses hold as 
citizens, and the establishment of procedural rights specifically allocated to them. Whilst it is 
important that support and information is available for victims and other witnesses, and that 
their pre-existing rights are respected (at least in as far as they do not interfere with the 
defendant’s fair trial rights), this is clearly not an aim of the criminal process itself. For now 
at least, the relevant measures, case law and statutes make it clear that victims should not 
expect to dictate prosecution decisions nor have their wishes adhered to during the criminal 
process.86  
 
 
2.6 Rules 1.1(2)(e), (f) and (g) 
 
The remainder of the requirements for satisfying the overriding objective of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules are: 
(e) dealing with cases efficiently and expeditiously; 
(f) ensuring that appropriate information is available to the court when bail and sentence 
are considered; 
(g) dealing with the case in ways that take into account – (i) the gravity of the offence 
alleged; (ii) the complexity of what is in issue; (iii) the severity of the consequences for the 
defendant and others affected; and (iv) the needs of other cases. 
 
The first two of these requirements are concerned with efficiency and management. In 
terms of outcome at least, these are not aims in themselves; there must be something which 
needs to be managed and achieved efficiently. They better reflect how the system sets out 
                                                             
85 M Hall ‘The Relationship Between Victim and Prosecutors: Defending Victims Rights?’ [2010] Crim 
LR 31, 38. 
86 Ibid 40.  
38 
 
to pursue its aims and are considered in more detail as a model of criminal procedure in the 
next chapter. The impact of efficiency and managerialist concerns are also referred to in 
various contexts throughout the thesis as they have become a major pre-occupation within 
criminal procedure, and influence the imposition of penalties for non-cooperation as well as 
the participatory role of the defence. Rule 1.1(2)(g) is an important provision for the parties 
and the court. It sets out specific elements of a case which should be taken into account, but 
it is not an aim of the criminal process and therefore is not addressed here.  
 
 
2.7 Conflict resolution 
 
Two key aspects of conflict resolution in terms of the outcome of the criminal process are 
finality and closure. As an aim, conflict resolution is linked to accurate fact finding in that the 
conflict can be resolved through a determination of the true facts. However, conflict 
resolution is also an aim in itself; a case can be brought to a conclusion, and thus closure and 
finality achieved, without necessarily discovering the objective truth. In many jurisdictions, 
including England, if a resolution is reached during the pre-trial stage, either by entry of a 
guilty plea or by the discovery of exculpatory evidence, there will be no need for a trial. An 
innocent defendant may be tempted to plead guilty where, for example, the evidence 
against him appears overwhelming and he feels he would benefit from a sentence reduction 
gained by pleading guilty at an early stage. Guilty pleas can therefore be accepted from 
innocent defendants as determinative of the legal outcome in the case, effectively 
supplanting the role of the court in accurately determining the facts.  
 
Jackson argues that in the absence of a definitive manner for establishing the truth and in 
the face of the uncertainty that attaches to making judgements about past events, the 
strength of the criminal trial has been that it establishes a basis for resolving disputes about 
evidence and justifying the outcome to the community.87 Safeguards such as public hearings, 
together with rules of evidence and fairness requirements, have helped to do this by 
providing defendants with a legitimate means for disputing the accusations made against 
them. The need for final decisions to be reached in conditions of uncertainty about disputed 
claims can impose a number of constraints on procedures for legal truth finding, such as 
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standards of proof setting out when facts will be considered proved.88 This may act to 
protect the defendant’s rights and ensure that the state is held to account. Thus, where 
closure and finality are the main concerns, factors such as fairness and respect for rights can 
be given priority to ensure a legitimate outcome. However, in practice, the aim of conflict 
resolution is pursued together with the aim of accurate fact finding; accurate fact finding 
being the key means of resolving the conflict. There is therefore a compromise between 
objective truth finding on the one hand, and finality and closure on the other.  
 
Although several factors influence the means by which a conflict can be resolved, it seems 
that some procedural styles are more adept than others to achieve this aim. Conflict 
resolution is usually associated with the adversarial model of justice. It is easier to visualise 
criminal proceedings arranged around a dispute between the prosecution and defence as a 
mechanism for resolving conflicts than it is an official inquiry driven by court officials and 
aimed at the truth.  As the system moves away from adversarialism, the aim of conflict 
resolution in the absence of accurate fact finding becomes less pronounced. Damaska has 
put forth a theory of conflict solving as the legitimate function of Anglo-American 
governments.89 He states that the procedural aim of the ‘adversarial’ model (being 
structured as a dispute between two sides) is to settle the conflict stemming from the 
allegation of commission of a crime. The prosecution’s role is to obtain a conviction; the 
defendant’s role is to block this effort.90 For the most part, resolving the conflict is akin to 
establishing the primary facts. However, as in the pursuit of accurate fact finding, evaluative, 
inferential and denotative facts will often be relevant. For example, having concluded that 
the defendant caused another’s death, the issue may become whether he can be held 
responsible given his state of mind at the time. The conflict will then centre on the facts 
surrounding the act rather than the act itself. 
 
Damaska takes the aim of conflict resolution further in his two procedural models based on 
the functions of government. In a reactive state, which is conceived as a ‘conflict-solving’ 
mode of governing, the state’s task is limited to providing a supporting framework within 
which its citizens pursue their chosen goals. This type of government is said to do two things: 
it protects order and provides a forum for dispute resolution. However, to protect order in 
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this type of state is to settle disputes. Therefore, dispute resolution becomes the function of 
government; ‘in the lens of extreme reactive ideology, to administer justice is always to 
engage in dispute resolution’.91 Conversely, where government is conceived as a manager, 
the administration of justice appears devoted to the fulfilment of state programmes and the 
implementation of state policies. Within this ‘policy implementing’ model is an activist state 
in which social problems and social policies are dissolved into state problems and state 
policies.92 The activist state does not rely on disputes between individuals. However, a 
dispute is often a good indication to officials that government intervention is needed. In this 
sense, at least in the cases that arise in the form of a dispute, activist legal process is also 
devoted to dispute resolution.93 Damaska sees these two models as being directed at 
separate ends. However, Markovits argues that the policy implementing/conflict solving 
dichotomy does not outline two clearly distinguishable opposites. The moment the law is 
involved, the element of conflict, which gives rise to the need for law in the first place, is so 
omnipresent that it no longer serves as a device for distinguishing some legal processes that 
resolve conflicts from others that supposedly do not.94 Ultimately, the purpose of the system 
will be conflict solving. 
 
Conflict resolution can become an integral feature of any system of criminal justice, even if it 
is not designed as such. The resolution may or may not be achieved through establishing the 
objective truth, but it can bring finality and closure. How this aim is achieved and the limits 
placed on it will depend on the importance attached to other procedural elements. So far as 
this aim is concerned, requiring defendants to participate may speed up the process of 
finality by uncovering facts which will then lead to a conclusion. However, it seems entirely 
possible that a conflict can be resolved without the active participation of the defendant, 
either through the participation of his legal representatives or by simply putting the 
prosecution to proof. The trend in reforms intended to secure the active participation of the 
defendant and the defence place greater emphasis on the aim of accurate fact finding than 
conflict resolution by any other means. Furthermore, because conflict resolution is a more 
obvious goal of adversarialism, the further English criminal procedure shifts away from 
adversarialism, the less apparent the conflict resolution aim becomes. Nonetheless, due to 
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the nature of law and legal systems, it seems that conflict resolution will always be an 
element of the criminal process.  
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
The main aims of the criminal process are to determine the facts surrounding the 
commission of a criminal offence and to resolve the conflict arising from it through finality 
and closure. To ensure that the criminal law can protect citizens from harm without undue 
or excessive use of state power, the way in which these aims are pursued is fundamental to 
the successful operation of the criminal process. A process that sets out to uncover truth 
and resolve disputes in a fair and legitimate manner is consistent with a normative theory of 
criminal procedure under which the state must account for its accusations against the 
accused and its request for his blame and punishment. The state must show the accuracy of 
its accusations and in so doing, the conflict between the state and the accused can be 
resolved. These aims must be pursued in accordance with the rights of the defendant. The 
need for fairness, legitimacy and respect for rights should act as a constraint on how the 
process achieves its aims and limit the participatory requirements which can be legitimately 
attributed to the accused. However, in practice, the emphasis is shifting away from issues of 
fairness and defence rights. This has led to a participatory style of criminal procedure which 
involves penalising defendants for not cooperating in the criminal process. The aims and 
values identified in this chapter will assist in evaluating the purpose and implications of 
penalising defendant non-cooperation. By penalising defendants, the system is not 
necessarily shifting or changing its aims since the defendant’s cooperation is more likely to 
further them, but may be giving less regard to the important factors which can act as 
constraints on achieving them.  
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3 
Models 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter identified the aims of the criminal process as accurate fact finding and 
conflict resolution subject to constraints of legitimacy, fairness and respect for rights. Once 
the aims and values of the criminal process are accepted, the process itself must be 
structured in a way best equipped to fulfil them. Knowing where a system lies on the 
procedural spectrum can also help to clarify the aims of that system and the primacy 
attached to them. Legal systems are often defined by their belonging to a particular 
procedural model, which are themselves defined by a description of their central features. 
These procedural models may be based on either the historical developments of certain 
legal systems or as fictitious entities, difficult to find in reality, but under certain conditions 
useful for analysing systems and making them intelligible.1  Some aspects of certain 
procedural models are easily identifiable within existing legal systems, whilst others are 
outdated, theoretical or ideal types. Since most individual jurisdictions cannot easily be 
placed within a specific category, the value of identifying particular procedural models in 
relation to existing systems is not always clear. Whilst it is becoming increasingly common 
for writers to emphasise the dangers and oversimplifications which come with categorising 
systems into certain procedural types, they continue to do so. Summers points out that even 
with the recognition that the models are vague and inconsequent, commentators seem 
unable to resist the temptation of relying on them in order to sustain later arguments and 
comments.2 It seems that we need some way to identify common and differing features 
when making comparisons between legal systems. Setting out distinct procedural models 
allows us to do this. 
 
This chapter analyses some of the most commonly referenced models of criminal procedure. 
The adversarial and inquisitorial models are framed as ideal types rather than operating 
systems and are drawn from common themes running through the relevant literature. The 
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hybrid, managerial and European models are based on existing practices, trends and 
possible emerging themes within England and Europe. Identifying these models assists in 
placing England on the procedural spectrum in light of the participatory style which has 
emerged with the imposition of penalties for defence non-cooperation. It also allows us to 
place the normative ideal of the criminal process, in which the state must account for its 
accusations and request for punishment, within the procedural spectrum. Furthermore, this 
chapter provides important explanatory information which is useful for examining 
procedural developments in later chapters, and it helps to bring together the bigger picture 
of aims, values and procedural style in relation to the issue of defendant participation.  
 
 
3.2 Adversarial and inquisitorial models 
 
The adversarial-inquisitorial divide is one of the most common ways of distinguishing 
between different Western legal systems. It is often used to represent the division between 
Anglo-American procedures on the one hand, and continental European procedures on the 
other. This distinction is derived from the historical developments and contrasting features 
of the two legal traditions. Although it has become impossible to identify a purely 
adversarial or inquisitorial model within existing legal systems, much of the literature on 
comparative criminal procedure continues to rely on the distinction. For example, Harding et 
al. describe the Anglo-American and continental systems as being adversarial and 
inquisitorial,3 and Sprack claims that ‘the criminal justice system in this country is essentially 
adversarial’.4 This represents an oversimplified and inaccurate view of modern Western legal 
systems. However, the distinction remains a useful starting point for assessing England’s 
procedural style.  
 
There is sometimes a tendency to use the term ‘accusatorial’ when referring to Anglo-
American or continental procedure. As the term has been used to describe both the 
adversarial and inquisitorial models, it is helpful to know what it means. Jackson explains 
that:  
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Within the Anglo-American tradition, there has been a tendency to use the term 
‘accusatorial’ in an ideological manner to refer to a series of idealised features of 
common law proceedings, including the presumption of innocence, and the use of 
oral testimony. Within the continental tradition, on the other hand, the term has at 
times been used to describe the reformed continental procedures of the nineteenth 
century whereby the separate functions of prosecuting and ascertaining facts were 
severed, with the former entrusted to the prosecutor and the latter to the 
investigating judge.5  
 
Jackson’s definition does not exhaust the possible uses of the term ‘accusatorial’, but it 
makes clear that where it appears in comparative literature it is important to know the 
context in which it is used. To avoid confusion this term will be avoided. What follows is a 
descriptive account of the adversarial and inquisitorial models drawn from the features most 
commonly associated with them.  It is intended to be an idealistic and uncontroversial 
account and is not based on the existing workings of Anglo-American or continental 
jurisdictions. 
 
3.2.1 The adversarial model 
This account of the adversarial model draws on those features most often used to define it.6 
The adversarial trial, which is the centrepiece of the adversarial model, takes the form of a 
contest between two equal sides before an impartial judge. Whilst the judge ordinarily 
settles issues of law, lay people are often used to determine the facts. The prosecution and 
defence are two separate parties in control of the case; they define the issues, gather 
evidence, call witnesses at trial and examine and cross-examine them. Lawyers are an 
essential element of the adversarial system, and the emergence of defence lawyers has 
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been directly linked to the emergence of adversarialism.7 Within this model there is a 
generally negative image of the state and mistrust in officials.8 This is reflected in the judge’s 
passive role and the preference for procedural rules and laws of evidence, including rules 
relating to the admissibility of evidence. Many of the typically adversarial characteristics can 
be traced back to the development of the English criminal trial throughout the eighteenth 
century.9  However, beyond these features, there is little consensus as to what characterises 
an ‘adversarial’ system. 
 
There are several justifications put forward in support of adversarialism. These include the 
preservation of autonomy and dignity.10 The adversarial model is highly individualistic and, 
in theory at least, allows the parties to control their case, but it does not necessarily 
preserve individual dignity. Aggressive public cross-examination could lead a defendant to 
feel far from dignified. Adversarialism has also been defended as a means of accurate fact 
finding; the competitive nature and individuality of adversarialism provides an effective 
forum to ascertain the truth. However, the adversarial system is not structured in such a way 
that accurate fact finding is the obvious or sole aim. As such, the truth finding capacity of the 
adversarial system is viewed as both a justification for and criticism of it.11 Langbein notes 
two striking defects in the adversarial system: the wealth effect and the combat effect.12 The 
combat effect refers to the truth impairing incentives of this model; the job of each 
adversary is to win and this might entail tactics that distort or suppress the truth. The 
structure of the trial as a combat or contest better reflects the aim of conflict resolution. The 
wealth effect refers to the advantage that adversary procedure bestows upon people who 
can afford to hire skilled counsel. Because most persons accused of serious crime are not 
wealthy, the wealth effect is considered to be a profound structural flaw in adversary 
criminal procedure.13 However, the availability of state funded legal representation in many 
modern systems undermines this criticism when applied in practice. Nevertheless, the 
defendant’s wealth can affect certain aspects of the case, such as the ability to conduct 
investigations or commission expert witnesses.  
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The adversarial trial is often perceived as providing an opportunity for defence counsel to 
test the prosecution case.14 The system is structured to take account of numerous variables, 
many of which are related to ensuring reliability, fairness and equality between parties.  It, 
thus, takes account of the difficulty of ensuring fairness between participants when one is 
the state itself.15 As such, it can provide a legitimate framework within which to address 
matters of criminal wrongdoing. The notion of the trial as a forum for testing the 
prosecution’s case also forms a core element of the normative theory of the criminal 
process, as one in which the state must account for the accusations it makes against the 
defendant. Within this, it is not easy to justify requirements being placed on the accused to 
assist or participate in the criminal process. It is therefore hard to reconcile an adversarial 
system with one that is willing to penalise defendant non-cooperation. 
 
3.2.2 The inquisitorial model 
Like the adversarial model, the inquisitorial model has several key features.16 Instead of 
party control, the emphasis lies on official, or bureaucratic, control of the case.17 There is 
much less emphasis on the individual parties, as everyone is seemingly concerned with 
ascertaining the truth. To achieve this, the judge is proactive, taking the lead in questioning 
the defendant and any witnesses while the prosecution and defence take a subsidiary role. 
Within this model the distinction between the judge and prosecutor as separate entities is 
blurred; the prosecution is often thought of as forming part of the judiciary.18 However, 
many features of the inquisitorial model derive from elements of continental European legal 
traditions. Summers traces the European procedural tradition back to the nineteenth 
century when the ‘accusatorial trinity’ was accepted by most European countries, thus 
framing the trial as a two sided enterprise with an impartial judge. 19 It is therefore hard to 
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define the exact nature of the relationship between the prosecution and the judiciary in a 
purely inquisitorial model.  
 
In an inquisitorial system, a member of the judiciary typically investigates the case before a 
trial judge determines the facts.  It may even be the case that, in a pure inquisitorial system, 
a single judge is responsible for investigation, prosecution and trial of the accused.20 The 
broad role of the judiciary as investigator and fact finder practically eliminates the need for 
lay participation and there is a preference for written evidence at trial. The judge is familiar 
with the case prior to the trial through a dossier of evidence gathered during the 
investigation, and is trusted to accord proper weight to the evidence. Consequently, there is 
little need for complicated rules of admissibility. Unlike the adversarial model, the trial is not 
the focal point of the inquisitorial criminal process. Because of the emphasis on pre-trial 
determinations, the trial serves more as a confirmation of what has already been judicially 
established.21   
 
The legitimacy of the inquisitorial model requires a great deal of faith in the integrity of the 
state and its capacity to pursue truth unprompted by partisan pressures or individual self 
interest.  Public interest, not self interest, is key.22 This is in stark contrast to the adversarial 
model which is very much centred on the proposition that the state’s power needs to be 
curtailed in order to protect its citizens. There is a presupposition that the inquisitorial 
system is legitimate because it aims at a version of the truth that will be as nearly objective 
as possible.23 Unlike the adversarial model which welcomes admissions of guilt as conclusive, 
within the inquisitorial model it remains the responsibility of the court to satisfy itself that 
the offence has been fully investigated and that the case against the accused has been 
established.24 This does not necessarily mean that the inquisitorial model is unconcerned 
with other aims, but that it is designed to encourage optimum truth finding. The conflict is 
resolved once the facts have been accurately determined. Inquisitorial jurisdictions may 
therefore emphasise the importance of truth finding at the expense of procedural rights. 
Within a system structured in this way, it is less objectionable to require accused persons to 
participate in the process. By adopting inquisitorial features, the system moves further away 
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from a conception of criminal procedure based on calling the state to account, and it may 
become easier to justify the imposition of penalties for non-compliance. 
 
3.2.3 Assessment 
Although it may not be accurate to describe Anglo-American and continental systems as 
strictly adversarial or inquisitorial, Mirjan Damaska believes that distinct evidentiary styles 
do exist between the two legal traditions. He assembled his ‘hierarchical’ and ‘coordinate’ 
models based on the major features that distinguish the two styles, explaining how such 
divergence can be understood by differences in the structure and nature of state authority.25 
The hierarchical and coordinate models represent the structure of government and the 
character of procedural authority. They correlate with the policy implementing and conflict 
solving characters of government outlined in chapter 2. The hierarchical model is 
characterised by a hierarchical ordering of centralised authority with bureaucratic control of 
litigation, ‘professional’ decision-making, precisely defined standards for decision and 
comprehensive systems of appeal and review.26 The underlying assumption is that the state 
is the benevolent and most powerful promoter and guarantor of public interest.27 Clearly, 
this model shares certain attributes with the inquisitorial model. The Coordinate model, on 
the other hand, is characterised by party control of litigation, a substantial lay element in 
decision-making, and a limited system of appeal and review. Judges preserve their 
independence and identity, and there are high degrees of complexity in the law 
accompanied by low degrees of order in structure. Like the adversarial model, the trial is the 
centrepiece of the legal process as a whole. Damaska links the hierarchical model to the 
policy implementing administration of justice and the coordinate model to the conflict 
solving administration of justice; the former reflects continental systems and the latter 
Anglo-American ones.  
 
Damaska’s models appear to have much in common with adversarialism and inquisitorialism 
whilst providing an alternative way of organising and classifying individual systems. Yet, they 
both remain unrealistic constructs. Jorg et al. have gone as far as to describe the adversarial 
and inquisitorial models as ‘ridiculous’ when applied to modern criminal justice.28 However, 
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as  Nijboer suggests, concluding that the ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ models are 
inadequate for the purpose of grouping existing systems together does not imply that it is 
always inadequate to point out that some aspects of existing systems can be described or 
analysed in terms of being either inquisitorial or adversarial.29 To a large extent, the 
differences between the models reflect the different fundamental assumptions underlying 
them, and these are also common to the hierarchical and coordinate models. In the 
inquisitorial model, the state is seen as the most powerful protector of public interests, so 
that it can be trusted to police itself, whereas the adversarial model holds a negative image 
of the state and a minimalist view of its functions.30 An adversarial system is less adept at 
requiring the defendant’s cooperation and penalising his failure to comply. 
 
 
3.3 Hybrid systems 
 
As well as the inquisitorial and adversarial divide, Anglo-American jurisdictions are often 
referred to as ‘common law’, whilst continental jurisdictions are referred to as ‘civil law’.  
This distinction is a reflection of the different sources of law used within the individual legal 
systems which make up these groupings, with the term ‘common law’ describing judge 
made law, and ‘civil law’ describing coded law. These labels avoid some of the 
misconceptions and generalisations inherent in grouping systems, some as adversarial and 
others as inquisitorial. Nonetheless, they maintain the categorisation of several conceptually 
different legal systems under one procedural umbrella. Nijboer notes that, although it is very 
attractive to look to continental European legal systems as one group with basic common 
features, the political history of each country has produced national autonomy and, 
therefore, international divergence.31 He points to the differing use of lay people in serious 
criminal cases which range from the Belgian jury to the mixed panel of judicial and lay 
decision makers in Germany to the absence of lay participation in the Netherlands.32 In 
reality, elements of adversarialism and inquisitorialism can be found in all Western legal 
systems, with some jurisdictions leaning more closely to one model than the other, and 
some jurisdictions not easily identifiable as correlating more closely to either.  
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Both continental and Anglo-American jurisdictions are more appropriately referred to as 
hybrids or mixed systems. The term ‘hybrid’ is a generic term covering any system which 
applies the characteristics of at least two procedural models. Whilst some hybrid systems 
may find it easy to justify requiring defendant participation and penalising non-cooperation, 
others may not. What follows is a brief outline of two continental European jurisdictions 
which might be categorised as ‘inquisitorial’ but are, in fact, hybrids. They demonstrate the 
variance within continental systems and highlight the inadequacy of grouping individual 
states together under the umbrella of a very specific, outdated or theoretical model. 
 
3.3.1 France 
France is often considered one of the more inquisitorial systems within continental Europe. 
In England, both prosecution and defence share the same professional status. In France, on 
the other hand, judges and prosecutors are part of the professional career trained judiciary, 
the magistrature. Historically, the functions of investigation, prosecution and trial were 
dominated by a single individual. Although these functions have been separated out 
gradually, they remain bound together structurally and ideologically through the 
professional training and status of the magitrat.33  The judiciary is therefore a broadly 
defined concept, encompassing the trial judge, the investigating judge and the prosecutor. 
However, in reality, the investigative process is now dominated by the police, rather than by 
magistrats, and supervised from a distance by the prosecutor.34 Less than five per cent of 
cases consisting of the most serious and complex are investigated by judges, or juge 
d’instruction, who are personally responsible for conducting the case enquiry.35 
 
Within the French system, the pre-trial investigation is the principal source of fact finding, 
and there is a heavy reliance placed upon written evidence at trial. These aspects contribute 
towards a structural exclusion of the accused and his ability to shape the case.36 At trial, the 
defendant is expected to contribute to the truth finding process and is questioned directly 
by the judge. Unlike English trials, where the defendant does not testify until the close of the 
prosecution case, the French defendant is addressed by the court at the outset. He is asked 
to comment on the accusations before any witnesses have been heard. The defendant has 
the right to remain silent, but, psychologically, this becomes almost impossible to maintain. 
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The trial remains a procedure dominated by the magistrats trying the case, rather than 
lawyers representing those prosecuting and defending.37 The defence lawyer is considered 
to have little effect upon the case outcome.38 
 
During the pre-trial investigation, a suspect may be held in garde à vue (police detention and 
interrogation) when there is reasonable suspicion that he has committed or attempted to 
commit an offence, and the police consider detention necessary to investigate. Hodgson 
found that for the police and most prosecutors, the principal function of the garde à vue is 
to obtain a confession. She also found that prosecutors are generally tolerant of police 
pressure exerted on suspects to make them tell ‘the truth’.39 The suspect can consult a 
lawyer for just thirty minutes at the start of the garde à vue. The lawyer is not permitted to 
be present during interrogation and usually has no access to the case dossier. The 
introduction of active defence lawyers is seen as an adversarial element which will create 
unfairness and undermine the ideology of judicial supervision conducted by a public interest 
oriented magistrat.40 The subsidiary role of the defence lawyer creates a large gap between 
French procedure and adversarialiasm. It also puts the French system at odds with the 
European Court of Human Rights who have held that access to a lawyer should be provided 
from the start of detention in order to allow the effective exercise of the rights of the 
defence. 41 In July 2010 the French constitutional court declared the legal framework of the 
garde à vue as contrary to the French Constitution and considered that the suspect was not 
allowed the effective assistance of a lawyer.42  It is now for the French government to 
remedy this,43 creating scope for the adoption of more ‘adversarial’ elements.  
 
Inquisitorial type systems generally have less regard for defence rights, as they may interfere 
with the truth seeking purpose of the criminal process. Prior to reforms enacted in 2000, the 
French system lacked many basic procedural safeguards, such as informing the suspect of 
the charges for which he is detained; allowing prompt access to legal advice; providing a 
translator; and the right to appeal from the trial court. The 2000 reforms rectified these 
shortcomings and, amongst other developments, included an obligation on the police to 
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inform the suspect of his right to silence. This provision was later repealed. There was 
scepticism about invoking procedures that might be regarded as moving towards an 
adversarial system.44  By creating provisions, such as access to a defence lawyer throughout 
police detention and interrogation, it is believed that the suspect will gain an unfair 
advantage that will promote his interests above that of an effective investigation.  
 
The central notion of French procedure remains inquisitorial; there is no battle between the 
prosecution and the accused, rather there is a neutral investigator, who examines all aspects 
of the case and acts in the public interest to ascertain the truth. However, it has 
incorporated a number of adversarial features: a jury sits in more serious cases; there are 
provisions for accepting guilty pleas as determinate; in the majority of cases, the police carry 
out the pre-trial investigation; and, in serious cases, defence lawyers have access to the 
dossier. Furthermore, the recent decision of the constitutional court may see a greater role 
for defence lawyers.  
 
There is a tension within French criminal procedure between maintaining what are 
essentially inquisitorial ideologies and ensuring due process and respect for the rights of the 
defence. It is therefore more appropriately referred to as a hybrid or mixed model. 
Nevertheless, the obvious reluctance to accept procedural developments which challenge 
the traditional notions of French criminal procedure is likely to keep it on the inquisitorial 
side of the spectrum, and make it easier to require defendant participation. The normative 
idea of calling the state to account may not be consistent with strict inquisitorial ideology, 
particularly the primacy of truth finding above due process concerns. However, the theory 
could be usefully applied in France as it is underlined by values which are important in any 
liberal democracy, including rights which the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
seeks to protect. 
 
3.3.2 Italy 
Italy’s procedural style is less clearly identifiable than that of France. It is unique in that it 
once had strong inquisitorial roots, but owing to recent reforms, it is assuming a more 
adversarial character. Prior to the 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure, there were many 
typically inquisitorial elements: judges carried out investigations; the defence played a minor 
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role in the investigation; trial judges decided which witnesses should be called, and 
undertook initial questioning of each witness; counsel could not cross-examine witnesses at 
trial; admissibility rules did not take precedence over the search for truth; and the trial often 
did little more than serve as a repetition of the investigative phase. Although investigation 
and trial were conducted by separate judges, the trial had been likened to a formal exercise 
used to legitimise the investigation and decision to charge the defendant.45  
 
The 1988 Code marked an obvious departure from the inquisitorial tradition.46 It set out a 
clear distinction between the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process. The individual 
parties now conduct their own investigations; also the role of the investigative judge has 
been effectively abolished.47 The Italian judiciary, like the French, includes prosecutors, 
judges who supervise the investigatory stage and trial judges. Under the new code, the 
prosecutor conducts investigations to determine whether to file a formal charge against the 
defendant. Since public prosecutors constitute part of the judiciary, pre-trial investigations 
may still be conceived of as judicially supervised. At trial, the reforms shifted the emphasis 
from written evidence to oral evidence and, rather than the court relying on pre-trial 
statements, the parties have become responsible for calling, examining and cross-examining 
witnesses. The Code limits the influence of the written dossier by demanding the production 
of evidence anew, and trial judges are denied access to most of the material gathered during 
the investigation. The intention is to limit the judge’s prior knowledge of the case, thereby 
guaranteeing that only the evidence produced during the trial will influence his decision.48  
The structure of the Italian criminal process and the trial in particular has, therefore, shifted 
away from an official inquest towards a competition reflecting a more adversarial style.  
 
Since the Italian criminal process is notoriously slow, with trials often commencing years 
after the alleged crime, it was felt necessary to introduce expedited procedures.  These 
include the ‘abbreviated trial’ whereby the parties agree to a judgment on the investigative 
file, and the ‘proceeding by penal decree’ whereby the accused is charged on the 
prosecutor’s request, based on the records of the investigative dossier. He may then receive 
a sentence reduction of up to a half for having been deprived of any chance of being heard 
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or introducing evidence.49 There is also now a mechanism for plea bargaining. However, plea 
bargaining in Italy does not operate as it might in a typically adversarial system. The 
prosecutor and defence may agree on a sentence to be imposed and ask the judge to 
impose that sentence. However, the judge is expected to scrutinise the agreement to a 
much greater degree than in Anglo-American jurisdictions.50 Furthermore, a plea bargain 
may only take place where a sentence would ordinarily be seven and a half years or less, 
there is no provision for ‘charge bargaining’, and, where the prosecutor does not agree to 
the reduced sentence, the defendant may apply to the judge directly.51  
 
Despite the significant changes brought about by the Code, some of Italy’s ‘inquisitorial’ 
features remain. These include compulsory prosecution, victim participation and judicial fact 
finding (with the exception of the court of assise which handles the most serious crimes and 
is comprised of judges and laymen).52 There remains also scope for trial judges to introduce 
new evidence and question witnesses directly, and they must justify their decisions in 
writing.53 In addition, some of the expedited procedures, such as the proceeding by penal 
decree, reflect a more inquisitorial nature. The reforms were not intended to be an exact 
model of adversarialism. Rather, they were intended to adopt an adversarial system to the 
extent that power over the control of the criminal trial was to be shifted from the trial 
judges to the prosecutors and defence lawyers.54  The focus of the reforms was, therefore, 
at the trial stage of the criminal process.  
 
Although the goal of the 1988 Code was to create a trial system that was fair and open, 
whilst increasing efficiency in a system renowned for its slow pace,55 laws require a certain 
amount of acceptance from the governed. This was not forthcoming in Italy. There seemed 
to be a conflict in priorities between the courts and parliament. The former was determined 
to preserve the inquisitorial ideology of truth finding, and the latter was concerned with the 
adversarial ideals of due process and proof. As in France, a tension could be identified 
between maintaining an inquisitorial foundation and ensuring fairness and legitimacy 
through adversarial means. Prosecutors and judges submitted a large number of provisions 
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to the Italian Constitutional Court for review, particularly those which supported a sharp 
distinction between the pre-trial and trial stages and which sought to give the trial judge a 
more passive role.56 The Constitutional Court agreed with the complaints and declared 
several important aspects of the Code unconstitutional.  
 
By mid-1992, the new adversarial inspired model had been definitively weakened.57 
Parliament felt that the adversarial elements were worthwhile and, in 1999, the Italian 
Constitution was amended to reflect this. The ‘due process reform’58 strengthened defence 
rights at trial. They are similar in nature to the rights contained in Article 6 ECHR. These 
rights grant the defendant the right to offer contradictory evidence, the right to an impartial 
judge, the right to a trial of a reasonable length, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to due process of law.59 They also emphasise the preference for live 
oral evidence.  These provisions put less pressure on the defendant to participate directly, 
and are more consistent with the normative theory of calling the state to account than many 
other jurisdictions which attract the ‘inquisitorial’ label. However, the battle over the future 
direction of Italian criminal procedure continues, as the heavy case load and backlog 
necessitates more shifts in procedural style.60 Italy wants to protect adversarial values and 
diminish the importance of the dossier on the issue of guilt, whilst retaining features of its 
inquisitorial heritage.61 It, therefore, provides a unique example of the differences among 
those jurisdictions grouped together as ‘inquisitorial’, whilst highlighting the difficulties of 
implanting a procedural model into a particular set of pre-existing historical and cultural 
norms. 
 
3.3.3 Assessment 
This account of hybrid systems is brief, but it demonstrates the varying degrees of 
‘inquisitorialism’ within a group of jurisdictions often described as such. Even the 
Netherlands, which might be described as corresponding most closely to the inquisitorial 
model,62  is more appropriately labelled as a hybrid. The Dutch judiciary are responsible for 
investigation and adjudication; there is no system of plea bargaining; decision-making is the 
responsibility of professional judges; and most cases are decided on the basis of a written 
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dossier without hearing witnesses at trial. However, the Dutch courts do adhere to some 
exclusionary and evidentiary rules, such as a rule requiring corroborative evidence in certain 
circumstances and, unlike many other ‘inquisitorial’ type jurisdictions, Dutch prosecutors 
have a broad discretion in deciding whether to pursue a case. In practice, although many 
continental, or ‘inquisitorial’, jurisdictions are assumed to have a judge or prosecutor leading 
the criminal investigation, the police often have significant investigative powers, particularly 
for less serious cases. This is true of France, Italy and the Netherlands.63 In this respect, 
practice is similar to that in common law, or ‘adversarial’, jurisdictions in which investigation 
and interrogation are understood as a police function.64  Conversely, in England, prosecutors 
are increasingly advising police on the course of investigations and taking the decision to 
commence criminal proceedings,65 thus assuming an inquisitorial role.  
 
Variance can also be found within Anglo-American jurisdictions which are frequently 
categorised as ‘adversarial’ or ‘common law’. Pizzi is hesitant to describe the US as 
adversarial, stating that, at times, it appears to be highly inquisitorial.66 American judges 
have it within their discretion to take on a more active role, for example, by calling and 
questioning witnesses, suggesting defences, commenting on the evidence and issuing 
warrants. These elements make it difficult to sustain a claim that American judges are 
passive. Goldstein claims that, due to its proactive nature, American criminal procedure has 
developed strong inquisitorial elements which are rarely noted because, ‘Americans tend to 
equate inquisitorial systems with coercive interrogation, unbridled search, and unduly 
efficient crime control’.67 Nor can England correctly be described as purely adversarial. There 
remain strong adversarial characteristics within the English criminal process. These include a 
clear distinction between the prosecution and the judiciary; party control of the case;68 a 
relatively inactive judiciary; and the use of lay fact finders. However, the increasing weight 
put on accurate fact finding above issues of fairness and respect for rights has influenced it 
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to adopt what appear to be inquisitorial aspects. There is now more emphasis on defence 
and defendant participation.  
 
Beyond the remits of criminal procedure, there are some clear inquisitorial elements of the 
English legal system. An example is Coroner’s inquiries which aim to establish how, when 
and where a death occurred.69 These are factual inquiries and determinations should not be 
framed in such a way as to appear to determine any questions of criminal liability.70 Certain 
administrative investigations also take on a more inquisitorial role, and can require 
information to be provided under compulsion. For example, the Serious Fraud Office has 
compulsory powers to require people to answer questions and provide information with the 
threat of criminal sanction for non-compliance. However, information obtained in this way 
cannot subsequently be used against a person in criminal proceedings.71  
 
The normative theory of the criminal process as one in which the state should account for its 
accusations against the accused is developed in this thesis to apply within the context of 
England’s ‘adversarial’ or ‘common law’ type of criminal procedure. However, because it is 
founded on the relationship between citizen and state in a liberal democracy, as well as the 
presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial, it may be transferable to all liberal 
democracies which claim to give effect to defence rights. It is thus applicable to other hybrid 
systems, including France which currently prioritises inquisitorial ideology, and Italy which is 
now in a better position to accept it. The process of hybridisation and the changing nature of 
criminal procedure is an important aspect of this thesis. Later chapters demonstrate how 
requiring defendant participation and penalising non-cooperation has shifted the English 
system towards a participatory style. 
 
 
3.4 Efficiency and managerialism  
 
Efficiency and managerial concerns have had a significant impact on English criminal 
procedure. Efficiency in this context refers to time and cost of the criminal process; reaching 
outcomes by achieving process aims as time and cost effectively as possible. Many relatively 
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recent reforms to the law have been aimed at creating an efficient criminal justice process.  
In 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice arrived at their important proposals 
through practical considerations intended to make the system better capable of serving the 
interests of both justice and efficiency.72 More recently, there have been demands for 
judicial case management as a means of controlling the increasing cost and length of 
proceedings. 73 Managerialism is thus one way of creating an efficient model of criminal 
procedure. The Criminal Procedure Rules have helped to spearhead a shift towards a 
managerial view of criminal procedure. Judges are now required to intervene proactively in 
the management of criminal cases, before and during trial, to encourage agreement where 
possible and to ensure that trials begin promptly, are as narrowly focussed as possible, and 
do not last longer than necessary.74 Judges were themselves primary movers in this, even 
before the Rules formalised their case management role.75 Duff et al. note that judges are 
now expected to combine impartiality with an understanding of their managerial role within 
a criminal justice system increasingly oriented towards securing convictions.76  
 
The Criminal Procedure Rules expressly state that meeting the overriding objective of justice 
requires ‘dealing with cases efficiently and expeditiously’.77 Part 3 of the Rules deals 
specifically with case management. Rule 3.2 places a duty on the court to further the 
overriding objective by actively managing the case, whilst Rule 3.3 requires the parties to 
actively assist the court in fulfilling this duty. Rule 3.2 assigns the court an activist role far 
removed from the passive adversarial role that English judges have become associated with. 
This is furthered by Rule 3.5 which grants power to the court to take any steps to actively 
manage the case unless that step would be inconsistent with legislation. Furthermore, Rule 
3.10 allows the court to place participatory requirements on the parties in its role as case 
manager. These requirements include identifying whether the parties intend to raise any 
points of law that could affect the conduct of the trial or appeal, and identifying information 
about witnesses and the order of their evidence. Granting judges with a more active 
managerial role is something usually associated with inquisitorialism. However, in this case, 
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it has stemmed from the desire to create a more efficient system rather than a focus on 
truth finding.  
 
As originally drafted, the Criminal Procedure Rules said little about sanctions for non 
compliance with case management directions. However, Rule 3.5(6) now allows the court to: 
fix, postpone, bring forward, extend, cancel or adjourn a hearing; exercise its powers to 
make a costs order; and impose such other sanctions as may be appropriate. Sanctioning 
non-compliance with pre-trial orders, or failure to serve appropriate notices within time, 
provides an example of the increasing emphasis on defence cooperation as well as the 
state’s willingness to impose penalties where this is not forthcoming. As such, the desire for 
efficiency may be a driver behind the shifts in procedural style which allow penalties to be 
imposed for non-cooperation, particularly those related to pre-trial defence disclosure.78 In 
the recent case of SVS Solicitors,79 a wasted costs order was upheld against a solicitors firm 
who had opposed a prosecution application to adduce hearsay evidence without setting out 
their grounds for doing so, in contravention of Rule 34.3(2)(d). This led to the unnecessary 
expense of a prosecution witness being flown in from Australia. The court held that, if their 
client would not allow them to comply with the Rules, the solicitors should have withdrawn 
from the case. They owed a duty to the court and were not entitled to break the Rules in 
order to act on their client’s instructions. This case has raised important questions about 
where the balance lies between the duties of defence lawyers to their clients and their 
duties to the courts. It seems now that defence lawyers are expected to act in the interests 
of the administration of justice rather than the interests of their clients. This is inconsistent 
with an adversarial role. 
 
Although it has been argued that non-compliance with the Rules rarely leads to any 
meaningful sanction in practice, 80 they have been used to exclude relevant evidence. In 
Musone,81 the trial judge was held to have been entitled to exclude evidence of an alleged 
confession where the defendant attempted to ambush his co-defendant. There had been a 
breach of Rule 35(5) as the defendant had not given notice of intention to introduce the 
evidence. However, Rule 35 contains no express provision dealing with a sanction for non-
compliance, and the Court acknowledged that the circumstances in which a breach of the 
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Rules would entitle a court to exclude evidence of substantive probative value would be 
rare.82 The Court were of the view that the power to make rules requiring a co-defendant to 
serve notice of evidence of another defendant’s bad character, under s.111 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (CJA), confers power on a court to exclude such evidence in circumstances 
where there has been a breach of a prescribed requirement (in this case giving notice under 
Rule 35). They also felt that, in order to further the overriding objective of the Rules, the 
courts must have power to prevent a deliberate manipulation of the rules by refusing to 
admit evidence which it is sought to adduce in deliberate breach of those rules.83  
 
This decision was largely framed in terms of ensuring fairness to the co-defendant and 
prosecution. However, it does demonstrate a willingness to sanction defence non-
cooperation where efficiency and managerialism are at stake.  The need for efficiency can 
also impact the admissibility of other types of evidence. For example, under s.126 of the CJA 
2003, a judge can refuse to admit a hearsay statement on grounds which include undue 
waste of time, weighed against the value of the evidence. In the recent Review of Disclosure 
in Criminal Proceedings, undertaken for the Judiciary of England and Wales, it has been 
anticipated that, subject to the interests of justice, late disclosure of material by any party 
may be capable of resulting in the exclusion of such material from trial.84 
 
Langer has proposed a theory of managerial judging as a procedural model in itself within 
which the court, with the parties’ assistance, uses procedure to expedite the criminal 
process. 85 Unlike the adversarial model, the managerial court gets information about the 
case very early in the process, in order to exert pressure on the parties to reach factual and 
legal agreements and accelerate the case. It dislikes party control over the process, with 
power transferred to the court. It also differs from the inquisitorial model, in that the court 
does not actively investigate the truth; it is active to make sure that the parties do not delay 
proceedings.86 The aims of this model include conflict resolution and truth determination, 
but the goal of processing cases swiftly is particularly important.87 Within this model, the 
parties are still responsible for pre-trial investigation and, so, retain control of their case, 
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while the court is in charge of expediting the case. Elements of this model can be observed 
in English criminal procedure, as a result of provisions such as those in the Criminal 
Procedure Rules, as well as the judicial approach to their case management role.88 However, 
it is important to note that transfer of power to the court, represented by a move towards a 
case management model, can preserve due process only for as long as judges remain 
informed and objective.89 
 
There is concern that a managerial model of procedure does not accord due respect to rights 
and fairness. Although the essential principles of due process are not exclusive to adversarial 
proceedings, replacement of an adversarial system with a managerial one that lacks the 
protection for fair trial rights does threaten fundamental due process values.90 McEwan 
argues that the emergence of a managerialist system of criminal justice in England has not 
been accompanied by profound consideration of the values that underpinned traditional 
structures in England and Wales. Rather, it has evolved through independent and ad hoc 
measures that fundamentally change the criminal process in the absence of any normative 
underpinning.91 This affects the commitment of adversarialism to the fundamental 
importance of protecting the parties by allowing them, rather than the state, to direct 
proceedings. Managerialism per se is indifferent to fair trial rights. Conversely, Richardson 
suggests that the ‘case management’ label has been used to dress up the movement away 
from the adversarial model in England towards a more inquisitorial form of trial, that the 
authors of the Criminal Procedure Rules lost sight of the proper purpose of such rules, and 
that, in consequence, a culture has emerged according to which it is acceptable to 
subordinate procedure to substance.92 
 
Aside from the creation of management duties, efficiency concerns have led to other 
practices which disadvantage those who fail to cooperate. For example, s.144 of the CJA 
2003 gives legislative authority for a reduction in sentence for guilty pleas. This reduction, or 
‘discount’, can range from one third to one tenth, and can influence the decision between a 
custodial and non-custodial sentence. As such, it places enormous pressure on the accused 
to cooperate. The Sentencing Guidelines Council felt this to be appropriate because: 
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A guilty plea avoids the need for a trial (thus enabling other cases to be disposed of 
more expeditiously), shortens the gap between charge and sentence, saves 
considerable cost, and, in the case of an early plea, saves victims and witnesses from 
the concern about having to give evidence. The reduction principle derives from the 
need for the effective administration of justice and not as an aspect of mitigation.93 
 
Sentence discounts are thus framed as an incentive to plead guilty in order to save the 
system time and money. However, the effect is to significantly disadvantage those who do 
not cooperate; an inevitable consequence of the discount for pleading guilty is that a plea of 
not guilty has its price for defendants.94 In this regard, the lack of sentence reduction 
constitutes a sort of indirect penalty for non-compliance. The ‘incentive’ to cooperate is also 
contentious because it affects principles which the criminal justice system ought to protect. 
Ashworth argues that, as a consequence of the presumption of innocence, it is the accused’s 
right to have the case against him proved beyond a reasonable doubt.95 It is not then proper 
to insist that a person who exercises this right should be treated more severely, and it is a 
weak response to maintain that pleading not guilty is not an aggravating factor.96  Likewise, 
Bridges argues that the guidelines on sentence reductions have led to, if not an 
abandonment of the principle of the presumption of innocence, then, at least, to its further 
subordination to other political and administrative priorities.97  
 
Sentence discounts may also have a discriminatory effect contrary to Article 14 of the 
ECHR.98 Since black defendants tend to plead not guilty more often than white defendants, 
and tend to receive longer sentences, partly due to having forfeited their discount,99 
sentence reductions operates as a form of indirect racial discrimination. The general 
principle of a sentence reduction has a disproportionate impact on members of ethnic 
minorities simply because they more frequently exercise their right to be presumed 
innocent.100 At the very least, the formalisation and systematisation of the sentence 
discount has introduced a more explicit and, arguably, stronger constraint on the voluntary 
                                                             
93 Sentencing Guidelines Council Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea (Sentencing Guidelines 
Secretariat: London, 2007) para 2.2. 
94 A Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice 5th edn (Cambridge University Press:  Cambridge, 2010) 
179. 
95
 Ibid. 
96 Ibid 178. 
97 L Bridges ‘The Ethics of Representation on Guilty Pleas’ (2006) 9 Legal Ethics 80, 85. 
98 Ashworth (n 94) 179. 
99
 R Hood Race and Sentencing (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992) 125. 
100 Ashworth (n 94) 179. 
63 
 
nature of the guilty plea.101 Blake and Ashworth have stated that it ‘militates against the 
“free choice” of the defendant.’102 This sits uneasily with the concept of the criminal process 
based on calling the state to account; the pursuit of efficiency has taken precedence over 
the accused’s ability to test the case against him, and interferes with his autonomy and 
freedom of choice.  
 
A model based on efficiency and managerialism has much in common with the inquisitorial 
model which prefers professionalisation of the legal process. The similarities between 
managerialism and inquisitorial procedure can lead to confusion regarding the hybridisation 
of English criminal procedure. Although it appears to be taking on an ‘inquisitorial’ nature, 
this may simply be the result of reforms aimed at creating efficiency in the system. Both are 
equipped to accept a requirement for the defendant to cooperate in order to achieve their 
respective aims of accurate fact finding and conflict resolution. However, the dual focus on 
efficiency and accurate fact finding in English criminal procedure pushes it towards a 
participatory style of criminal procedure. Later chapters will show how the drive to secure 
accurate fact finding as efficiently as possible has resulted in requirements of defence 
participation backed by penalties for non-cooperation. Within a system based on calling the 
state to account, there is a place for efficiency so long as it does not interfere with fairness, 
legitimacy and respect for rights. Unfortunately, the reforms which encourage efficiency and 
managerialism in England have often been at the expense of these important concerns.  
 
 
3.5 European model 
 
It has already been noted that categorising European legal systems into groups, such as 
adversarial and inquisitorial, fails to recognise the diverse nature of individual jurisdictions. 
However, the differences between the individual systems appear to be diminishing. This 
section explores two possible explanations for this. On the one hand, European systems may 
be adopting so many of each other’s characteristics that they are converging into a single 
procedural model. On the other hand, a unique European model might be emerging as a 
result of the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Both possibilities have implications for English criminal procedure. 
                                                             
101
 Bridges (n 97) 85. 
102 M Blake and A Ashworth ‘Ethics and the Criminal Defence Lawyer’ (2004) 7 Legal Ethics 168, 182. 
64 
 
 
3.5.1 Convergence 
It is important to note, at the outset, that the convergence debate is often based on the 
proposition that European countries can be categorised according to whether they are 
inquisitorial or adversarial, or as civil or common law. These groups are considered to be 
merging. However, as discussed above, each legal system is unique and a product of its own 
distinctive history and culture. The convergence debate should therefore be approached 
with a recognition of procedural differences within certain jurisdictional groupings,  and with 
a rejection of the possibility of ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ procedural models existing in reality.  
 
The perception of convergence may originate from the desire of individual states to adopt 
procedural laws and rules from other legal traditions. However, since each system depends 
on its own historically evolved institutions, there are risks in taking this approach. The 
criminal justice system is not self-contained; it is affected by external elements such as 
politics, media and technology. Attempts to import foreign practices often lead to their 
being translated in different ways. This can result in fragmentation and divergence rather 
than convergence. It leads to a paradox in which evidentiary processes are said to be 
converging, yet may also be diverging through attempts at convergence.103 An example is 
Italy, where attempts to implant adversarial elements into a traditionally ‘inquisitorial’ 
system has resulted in a unique hybrid. Damaska notes that even textually identical rules 
acquire a different meaning and produce different consequences in the changed 
institutional setting. He writes: ‘The music of the law changes, so to speak, when the musical 
instruments and the players are no longer the same.’104 Legrand sees serious problems with 
an approach that focuses on posited law in order to draw conclusions regarding the 
convergence of legal systems.105 He argues that neither rules nor concepts reveal as much 
about a legal system as appears to be assumed, and submits that the comparativist should 
be focusing on the mentality of a given system rather than its rules. In doing so, one will find 
that European systems are not converging. He further argues that convergence is impossible 
on account of the fact that the relationship between a law and a society is always to be 
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regarded as culture-specific.106 Convergence into a single European model as a result of 
adopting foreign procedures and ideologies may therefore be unfeasible.  
 
Despite this, it is clear that very real shifts have occurred in both common and civil law 
jurisdictions. Jorg et al. are among those who believe that changes occurring in Europe point 
to a convergence.107 Whilst countries which assume civil law procedure appear to be 
increasingly influenced by the necessity for fairness in truth finding at the trial stage, the 
common law systems are beginning to take on direct truth finding characteristics. For 
example, the logic of the English ‘adversarial’ type trial has been substantially qualified by 
duties of disclosure of evidence between parties.108 Other trends away from adversarialism 
in England include greater judicial management over the criminal process, curtailing the 
right to silence, and limiting the privilege against self-incrimination. Converging trends that 
have been identified in civil law countries include increasing party control, the diminishing 
authority of professional judges, a shift from the pre-trial to trial phase of adjudication, and 
greater importance being attached to oral evidence and the right to confrontation. There 
has also been less reliance on the accused as a source of testimonial evidence.109  
 
Sharing a common, hybrid model by European polities, which brings rules of evidence closer 
together, would allow greater cooperation across Europe, for example, by bringing offenders 
to trial and sharing evidence between jurisdictions.110 However, McEwan believes that the 
alterations in England’s criminal justice system are not towards civil law models, but towards 
one which prioritises efficiency.111 She argues that those jurisdictions associated with the 
inquisitorial model are similarly dispensing with some of their own traditional features to 
replace them, not so much according to adversarial ideals, but for the sake of economy and 
expediency. Provisions for guilty pleas and plea bargaining are one way continental 
countries may be moving towards an efficiency model. Thus, convergence is not towards a 
centre ground between the two kinds of system, but possibly towards a new model which 
shares elements of both.112 This reflects the desire for efficiency and managerialism 
discussed above. However, given the difficulties in adopting and implementing foreign 
procedures, in order to attain a specific desired end, many of the changes that appear to 
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bring individual European jurisdictions closer together may be attributable more to the ECHR 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court, and less to a natural harmonisation of the 
legal systems, or a common drive for efficiency. 
 
3.5.2 Influence of the ECHR 
There are several EU-wide criminal justice initiatives. The majority of these, such as the 
European Arrest Warrant, are concerned with law enforcement.113 However, in 2003, the 
European Commission issued a Green Paper with a view to setting minimum safeguards for 
suspects and defendants in the EU.114 The key concerns were legal advice and assistance; 
provision of interpreters; protection for vulnerable suspects; consular assistance; and 
knowledge of the existence of rights. Individual governments objected to this on the 
grounds that it breached the principle of subsidiarity, could result in the lowering of 
minimum standards, and that implementing common standards would be technically 
difficult.115 A draft framework on procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the 
EU, issued by the Commission in 2004, also faced government objections.116 These concerns 
reflect the fact that individual criminal justice systems within the EU are very diverse, and so 
too are the ways in which they consider themselves to have satisfied their obligations to 
guarantee fair trials and protect those accused of criminal wrongdoing.117 Nevertheless, 
even in the absence of a framework of procedural rights, a distinct European rule of law may 
be emerging as a result of the ECHR.  
 
Harding et al. believe that the process of ‘Europeanisation’ is not just irreversible, it ‘affects 
national systems of criminal justice more deeply and in more varied ways than is commonly 
realised.’118 Summers argues that letting go of the adversarial/inquisitorial typology and 
devoting more consideration to the European procedural tradition will facilitate the 
development of a more coherent and consistent vision of the rights set out in Article 6 by 
the European Court.119 Similarly, Jackson contends that the continuing use of the terms 
‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ have obscured the transformative nature of the European 
Court’s jurisprudence. He goes further in stating that the Court has been developing a new 
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procedural model best characterised as ‘participatory’ because it seeks to enable all those 
capable of giving relevant evidence to do so in as least a coercive manner as possible.120 
Jackson advanced this argument largely in the light of the Court’s recognition of a right to 
adversarial procedure which has affected the procedural nature of individual jurisdictions 
across Europe.  
 
Reference to ‘adversarial procedure’ began to appear in European Court judgments in the 
late 1980s, often in relation to the equality of arms principle.121 Given the debate 
surrounding procedural models within comparative law scholarship, the use of the term 
‘adversarial’ might have been expected to prove controversial, yet it has received little 
attention.122 This may reflect the Court’s use of the terminology; the right to adversarial 
procedure in this context only refers to the requirement that the accused be present at trial 
and that the defence be able to challenge the submissions and observations of the 
prosecution and to lead its own evidence.123 Yet, the notion of adversarial procedure has 
had a significant impact on the procedural traditions of some member states, particularly 
those countries with strong inquisitorial roots where the defence has traditionally played a 
subsidiary role. For example, it seems to be contrary to the attitude within French criminal 
procedure to equip suspects and defendants with workable defence rights, such as silence 
and access to lawyers, since it potentially undermines the search for the truth, and gives 
them an unfair advantage.124  
 
The ECHR’s biggest impact, in terms of creating a distinct European procedural identity, has 
been through Article 6(3) which includes those rights to ‘adversarial’ proceedings. Article 
6(3) sets out the right to confrontation and the role of the parties in presenting their own 
evidence. The emphasis given to equal participation by the parties has underlined the need 
to distinguish those responsible for prosecuting and those responsible for judging and, in 
doing so, has broken with old continental practices which tended to blur the distinction.125 
This result has not been welcomed by all of the member states. The translation of 
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Convention rights into the French ‘inquisitorial’ context has been problematic, creating 
tensions within prevailing legal cultures.126 This is evident from the high level of 
condemnation by the European Court for faults which seemed endemic to the French 
system, such as police brutality, disregard for defence rights and excessive periods of 
detention before trial.127 France has even been held to have violated Article 3 in a case 
involving the torture of a suspect in police custody.128 Legislation enacted in 1993 and 2000 
sought explicitly to bring French criminal procedure into line with the ECHR. However, 
Hodgson identifies two faces of French criminal justice which have emerged as a result. On 
the one hand, there is a claim to embrace the ECHR and to incorporate it through formal 
legal mechanisms. On the other hand, there is a parallel domestic discourse which seeks to 
downplay the impact of the ECHR on criminal procedure, reassuring those responsible for its 
implementation that police powers are not significantly curbed, and that any change in 
procedure is minimal.129 In practice, therefore, the influence of the ECHR in creating a 
distinct European model may not be as stark as it appears.  
 
Within England, the domestic courts have made it clear that Europe does not have the final 
say in the determination of fairness. In Horncastle,130 the Supreme Court stated that there 
would be rare occasions where the Court had concerns as to whether a decision in 
Strasbourg sufficiently appreciated or accommodated particular aspects of the domestic 
process. In such circumstances it was open to the Supreme Court to decline to follow the 
Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course.131 In this particular case, the 
Court found that the European Court’s rule against admitting hearsay evidence which 
formed the ‘sole or decisive’ evidence against the accused did not apply, as England had 
sufficient safeguards to ensure fairness in cases where such evidence was relied upon.  
Dennis has found that there has been a tendency for the English courts to treat Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as a resource to be drawn upon when useful, in contrast to treating it in all 
cases as authoritative on the meaning and application of Convention rights.132 Recently Lord 
Irvine, architect of the Human Rights Act 1998 which gave the ECHR domestic force, called 
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for a more critical approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence. He argues that it is the 
constitutional duty of judges to reject Strasbourg decisions they feel are flawed in favour of 
their own judgments.133  
 
A centralised European procedure, if it can be accepted that there is such a thing, does not 
dictate what individual jurisdictions aim to achieve, but it can influence how they achieve it. 
The formulation of defence rights within Article 6, and the adversary ideologies they impose, 
suggests that restrictions apply and these may affect a state’s ability to legitimately penalise 
a defendant for not cooperating in the criminal process. For example, Article 6 includes the 
fundamental right not to participate through the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination.134 However, as will be shown in later chapters, internationally recognised 
defence rights have failed to protect the accused from penalties for non-compliance. On the 
one hand, the ECHR has undoubtedly had an impact on many European jurisdictions, in 
attempting to bring standards and practices closer together. On the other hand, the 
significance and impact of the deeply engrained traditions of different legal systems within 
Europe, and concerns about national subsidiarity, will affect the ECHR’s ability to create a 
single procedural model. Shifts in English criminal procedure away from concerns for 
fairness and respect for rights may also signal a reluctance to adopt a procedural model 
based on the ECHR, rather than an acceptance of it. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Most procedural systems try to find a balance between what Packer describes as the Due 
Process and Crime Control models.135 Packer’s models are unique, as they are intended to 
represent two separate value systems that compete for priority in the operation of the 
criminal process, rather than being separate models representing different jurisdictions. The 
crime control system is underlined by values ‘based on the proposition that the repression 
of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal 
process.’ 136 This model must produce a high rate of apprehension and conviction with a 
premium on speed and finality. It, thus, has links to the managerial model and is more 
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consistent with inquisitorial ideologies than adversarial ones. The due process model, on the 
other hand, insists on ‘formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes in which the 
factual case against the accused is publicly heard by an impartial tribunal and is evaluated 
only after the accused has had a full opportunity to discredit the case against him.’137 It uses 
the criminal process to police itself and, so, corresponds more closely to adversarialism and 
theories of procedure based on fairness, procedural regularity and testing the prosecution’s 
case. Because England is more closely associated with adversarialism than any other single 
procedural style, it might be concluded that it gives more weight to due process values. As 
such, the defendant’s rights should not be violated, for example, by requiring his 
participation and penalising his non-cooperation. 
 
McEwan argues that, rather than occupying a position along the continuum between the 
Crime Control and Due Process models, a new value choice may reflect the view that both 
models are too costly. In an era where criminal processes must be viewed as much through 
the lenses of cooperation and management as from the perspective of the ‘battle’ premise 
on which Packer’s models are founded, she submits that his classic linear representation 
must be replaced by a triangular one; because either crime control or due process 
requirements may be diluted according to managerialist ends, as may inquisitorial or 
adversarial characteristics.138 It is true that concerns for efficiency, demonstrated through a 
managerial emphasis, have had an effect on the nature of English criminal procedure and 
the way it pursues its aims of accurate fact finding and conflict resolution. However, the 
remaining chapters uncover the development of a participatory model of procedure which 
requires defence and defendant participation in order to achieve its aims as efficiently as 
possible. The emergence of this participatory model has caused a shift away from 
adversarialism. Although accurate fact finding and conflict resolution can be pursued within 
all of the models discussed above, it is the necessary constraints which fairness, legitimacy 
and respect for rights can impose which should keep England on the adversarial side of the 
spectrum. Adversarial ideologies provide a good forum for testing the prosecution’s case 
and requiring the state to justify the accusations and request for condemnation and 
punishment it brings against the accused.  
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4 
Defendant Participation 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The defendant’s participation throughout the criminal process may assist in efficiently 
furthering the process aims and justifying the outcome. Yet, requiring the defendant to 
participate remains controversial. It can involve breach of established procedural rights and 
norms, thus disregarding the necessary constraints which should be imposed on the criminal 
process. In this chapter, it is argued that, to respect the defendant’s rights and uphold the 
fundamental features of English criminal procedure, participation should be a choice rather 
than a requirement.1 This approach rests on the idea that it is for the prosecution to prove 
the case against the accused, whilst the defence may test the prosecution’s case. This is an 
essential aspect of the normative theory of the criminal process in which the state should be 
held to account for its accusations and request for condemnation and punishment of the 
accused. However, there is an alternative school of thought which holds that the 
participation of, and communication with, the defendant should be central to the criminal 
trial whose aim should be to call the defendant to account.  
 
This chapter begins with an assessment of Anthony Duff’s normative theory of calling the 
accused to account. Duff’s theory raises important issues surrounding defendant 
participation, and helps to develop the theory of criminal procedure based on calling the 
state to account. The chapter then traces the historical development of defendant 
participation through the emergence of the adversarial system in England. Developments 
during this time shaped many of the norms which now govern matters of fairness and 
legitimacy, and these norms should limit the extent to which a defendant can be expected to 
participate in the criminal process. It then analyses the accused’s current position as a 
participant in the criminal process, particularly at trial, and highlights the trend towards an 
                                                             
1 Features which are considered fundamental in this context are those rights and norms, including the 
presumption of innocence and burden of proof, which have become well established in domestic law 
and internationally through provisions such as Article 6 ECHR. Ho describes human rights as 
fundamental in the sense that they protect essential aspects of human dignity and secure crucial 
human interests. HL Ho ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in P Roberts and J Hunter 
Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Hart: Oxford, 
2012) 261. 
72 
 
obligation to participate, irrespective of fundamental rights not to do so. Finally, the 
definition and rationale behind the presumption of innocence is briefly explored, since it 
forms a key element of the argument against requiring participation, and underpins the 
normative theory of criminal procedure based on calling the state to account. This chapter 
provides a basis for the following chapters to examine specific examples of the way in which 
defendants are now penalised for their non-cooperation. The idea of defendant 
participation is approached as both a normative concept and in terms of actual practice.  
 
 
4.2 Calling to account  
 
In The Trial on Trial book series, Duff et al. develop a theory of the criminal trial aimed at 
calling the defendant to account for his criminal wrongdoing.2 It builds on Duff’s previous 
work which envisages the criminal process as one in which the defendant is called to 
participate as a rational moral agent.3 The core argument of the theory is that the criminal 
trial is a process through which defendants are called to answer a charge of criminal 
wrongdoing and, if they are proved to have committed the offence charged, to answer for 
their conduct. The defendant answers for his conduct by offering a defence, if the 
commission of the offence is admitted or proved; or by accepting guilt.4  If the defendant is 
found not only to have committed the offence, but also to have no defence, he is 
condemned through a guilty verdict which holds him to account for his wrongdoing.5 The 
author’s argue that calling defendants to account accords them the respect they are due as 
responsible agents and citizens. In a separate work Duff writes: ‘We are criminally 
responsible, in a liberal democracy, to our fellow citizens: we must answer to them, through 
the criminal courts, for our alleged criminal wrongs.’6 We are thus held responsible, or called 
to account, by and in the criminal courts on behalf of, and in the name of, the polity as a 
whole.7 Much emphasis is put on the communicative nature of the trial; to call a person to 
account for wrongdoing through a communicative judgment involves an attempt to 
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persuade her to accept the judgment that she did wrong, and make it her own.8 Within this 
view of the trial, the court does not presuppose responsibility or liability for the commission 
of the criminal wrongdoing, but does presuppose responsibility to answer to the charge.9 
 
Duff et al. reject the traditional instrumentalist, or standard, approach which sees the trial 
process as geared towards aims identified in chapter 2 (namely ensuring the accuracy of the 
verdict subject to constraints such as fairness and respect for rights). They see this as not 
completely wrong, but suggest that it is too simplistic.10 Calling to account, on the other 
hand, is: 
‘To give the defendant a central, and at least ideally an active, role in the trial - as 
the person to whom the criminal charge is addressed; who is summoned to answer 
that charge; and to answer for his conduct if proved to be criminal; and who is 
expected to accept responsibility for what he has done, and to accept the 
condemnation that a conviction expresses if his guilt is proved.’11  
 
Although Duff et al. suggest that there is reciprocity in the practice of calling to account, as 
in the defendant can also call the prosecution and court to account,12 they concentrate so 
much on calling the defendant to account that this seems to be the primary purpose of the 
trial. A distinction should be made at this point between the substance and the form of the 
trial. The form of the existing criminal trial may, on the face of it, appear to lend support to 
Duff et al.’s normative conception, whereby the prosecution present a case against the 
defendant and, if the court is satisfied that there is a case to answer, the defence have the 
opportunity to present their own case or test the prosecution’s evidence. However, in 
substance the trial does not operate in the way suggested by Duff et al. It is not assumed 
that the defendant has anything to ‘answer’ for until a guilty verdict has been reached. Thus, 
it does not call, or require, the defendant to ‘answer’ for his conduct in the way proposed by 
Duff et al. There is a difference between finding that there is a case to answer for the 
defence, and the normative account put forward by Duff et al. which seems to imply that the 
defendant should answer for his alleged conduct during the trial, ahead of a verdict having 
been reached.   
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As a general principle, if a defendant pleads ‘not guilty’, then, given the presumption of 
innocence, it is for the prosecution to prove his guilt. Conversely, as Duff et al. see it, a 
criminal trial in which guilt is contested consists of three stages.13 The first stage of proving 
guilt is to prove that the defendant committed the offence charged. Until that is proved, 
there is nothing for which the defendant has to answer. If the prosecution succeeds in 
proving guilt, the second stage is for the defendant to answer by offering a defence.14 
Finally, if the prosecution completes its whole task, both proving that the defendant did 
commit the offence charged, and disproving any defence for which evidence is adduced, it is 
then for the fact finder to convict the defendant. This account is flawed both in terms of the 
substance of existing trials and from a normative standpoint. Deciding whether the defence 
have a case to answer at the close of the prosecution case is not tantamount to finding that 
it is proved that the defendant has committed the offence charged.15 It simply means that 
there is sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict, but not that they will 
or must do so.16  
 
The decision as to whether the prosecution has proved its case comes at the close of the 
trial, after all of the evidence has been heard, including that of the defence. In the landmark 
case of Woolmington v DPP, Viscount Sankey stated that ‘it is not till the end of the evidence 
that a verdict can properly be found and that at the end of the evidence it is not for the 
prisoner to establish his innocence, but for the prosecution to establish his guilt.’17 
Furthermore, if the defence choose not to ‘answer’ the prosecution case, a conviction does 
not automatically follow. A judge may direct a jury to acquit a defendant where there is no 
evidence that could justify a conviction, but there are no circumstances in which a judge is 
entitled to direct a jury to return a verdict of guilty.18 The right to challenge the 
prosecution’s case does not imply a requirement to account for oneself. The latter is difficult 
to justify in terms of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. 
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It is not completely clear what is required by stating that the defendant is ‘called to answer’ 
a charge. In Wang, the House of Lords confirmed the defendant’s right to a jury verdict.19 
This applies even if he makes no attempt to address the prosecution’s case. If the defendant 
should not be required to provide any answers to the prosecution’s case, then how plausible 
is it to construe the trial as having the point of calling him to answer to the charge?20 Duff et 
al.’s theory seems strained when it tries to accommodate the defendant’s choice not to 
participate. In their view, the right to silence and the right to participate are not on an equal 
footing. The right to participate and be heard is a feature of the trial’s positive aims which 
are fully achieved only if that right is exercised, whereas the right to silence flows from 
constraints which should be placed on the pursuit of that end: ‘A trial in which the right [to 
silence] is exercised is a legitimate trial, but its positive purpose is frustrated.’21 The theory is 
so focused on defendant participation that any right not to participate becomes difficult to 
accommodate. Within a criminal process based on calling the state to account, on the other 
hand, use of the right to silence may constrain and delay the aims of accurate fact finding 
and conflict resolution, but the purpose of the trial cannot be said to be frustrated, as the 
trial provides a forum to test the prosecution’s case. This can be done by a silent defendant 
putting the prosecution to proof.  
 
Duff et al. acknowledge that, within their model, there would ideally be a civic duty, and 
even a legal duty, to participate in one’s own trial.22 From this, Ho suggests, it also follows 
that the defendant should carry the legal burden of proving any defence he wishes to 
claim,23 and that ‘the heavy emphasis on calling the defendant to account is likely to lack 
appeal in liberal democracies.’24 There may be means of enforcing a legal duty to participate, 
aside from the imposition of legal burdens, for example through an offence of contempt for 
failure to participate.25 Yet, any such legal duty would undermine the relationship between 
citizen and state in a liberal democracy.  Duff et al. incorrectly perceive the defendant’s role 
in the trial as one in which he is responsible for disproving the case against him. Prior to 
1935, there was considerable authority to show that the defendant carried a legal burden of 
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proving any common law defence he wished to raise.26 However, in Woolmington, the 
House of Lords stated that, ‘No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that 
the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England 
and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.’27 This principle reinforces a 
conception of the criminal process as one in which the state must account for the 
accusations it makes against the accused. Whilst Duff et al. claim that the defendant is 
merely invited to answer the charge and account for his alleged wrongdoing, if the central 
purpose of the criminal trial is for the defendant to provide an account, the most obvious 
and effective method of achieving this would be to require him to do so.  
 
Viewing the trial as part of the process of calling the state to account is a more logical 
approach than calling the defendant to account, at least in terms of fairness, legitimacy, and 
respect for rights. The state has powerful resources for the detection, investigation and 
prosecution of crimes that may be wrongfully used against citizens. On this basis, and in 
accordance with due process values, the trial provides a safeguard against abuses of state 
resources. It helps to ensure that the state is justified in using its powers against the 
accused. It also protects the accused from being wrongly stigmatised as a criminal. The trial 
should therefore be construed as a means of calling the state to account for its request for 
blame and punishment of the accused and not, as Duff et al. argue, calling the defendant to 
account for why he is undeserving of the same. Where the accused chooses to plead guilty 
or enter into a plea bargain without being coerced, the purpose of the trial is not frustrated, 
as he is effectively waiving his right to a trial and is forfeiting the opportunity to test the 
prosecution’s case. In this situation, the criminal process has achieved conflict resolution 
and, assuming the defendant is in fact guilty, accurate fact finding. Ho believes that the 
central point of the criminal trial is the provision by the state of their justification for the 
conviction they seek from the court, and critical scrutiny by the court of the justification that 
is provided by the state.28 This can be achieved even if the defendant declines to answer the 
charge or give an account of his conduct.  
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In order to better determine who is (or should be) called to account, one may look at 
existing procedural practices. A convincing normative theory of the criminal process needs 
to be properly connected to facts about actual criminal processes.29 As both potential 
victims and defendants, the general public have an interest in the criminal process as a 
whole. As such, the requirement that trials be public can support both theories. The public 
nature of the trial stage of the criminal process is a well recognised requirement, but is not 
easy to justify.30 One reason frequently offered in support of the rule is that public justice is 
accountable and that it promotes confidence in the courts. On this basis, the public nature 
of the trial may assist in ensuring that the aims of the criminal process are subject to the 
constraints of fairness and respect for rights which help secure legitimacy. This is particularly 
important when the trial is viewed as a means of ensuring the state’s accusations are 
justified and that its powers are not unduly applied. The public nature allows the credibility 
and reliability of prosecution evidence to be tested, and helps to safeguard the defendant’s 
rights, particularly those allowing confrontation.31 Early common law writers, such as 
Bentham, were proponents of the claim that the trial must be public in order to limit the 
power of the state and discourage perjury. Bentham criticised the secrecy of European 
inquisitorial procedures as leaving the door wide open to ‘mendacity, falsehood, and 
partiality.’32 Blackstone also supported public justice, believing that the examination of 
witnesses in public would deter perjury and be more conductive of truth finding.33  
 
The public nature of the criminal trial may also be accounted for on the basis that, since 
crimes are public wrongs, from which the criminal law seeks to protect citizens, the public 
have an interest in the trial of those accused of committing them. Duff et al. rely on this idea 
of public interest, believing that the value of holding trials in public lies in the critical scrutiny 
that it allows. They argue that there is a clear connection to be found in the idea that 
breaches of criminal law constitute public wrongdoing for which members of the community 
are publicly called to account and through which members of the criminal justice system can 
themselves be held accountable. In this sense, public justice must be seen as a core element 
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of the process of calling to account.34 However, this concept of public justice can be viewed 
in terms of the defendant’s ability to call the state to account, since the public have an 
interest in ensuring that the state is acting within its powers, that innocent people are not 
convicted, and that there is accountability in the enforcement of the criminal law. Ho sees 
openness as an intrinsic feature of the liberal conception of the trial: a trial is a process of 
public justification. The insistence on an open trial is an insistence on a condition for the 
exercise of public liberty. The citizenry can examine and evaluate the grounds for the 
exercise by the state of its coercive powers only if those grounds are presented for public 
scrutiny.35  
 
These justifications for public justice do not explain why it is framed as a defence right. 
According to Duff et al., the defendant’s right to a public trial should be seen as a right to 
have his trial subject to critical scrutiny.36 However, the defendant has no choice but to have 
his verdict open to scrutiny. Furthermore, public scrutiny appears to be in the interest of the 
public rather than the defendant. Indeed, the defendant may be put at a substantial 
disadvantage by having his trial open to scrutiny, principally because of the stigma and social 
consequences that often follow an association with crime. Jaconelli questions the ‘right’ to a 
public trial in a way which casts doubt on both the ‘right’ in general and Duff et al.’s account 
of it. He argues that whereas most rights claims are capable of being analysed in terms of 
the will and interest theories, neither can accommodate the right to a public trial.37 The 
defendant can neither exercise a choice over the operation of the right nor necessarily 
benefit from it. Other commentators also find the ‘right’ to a public trial difficult to 
comprehend. For instance, Trechsel believes that it is something of a hybrid right and that 
the public interest in it is so strong that it almost outweighs that of the accused.38 Despite 
the difficulties encountered in labelling the public trial requirement as a ‘right’, it does 
provide a means of ensuring that the state can be held accountable for the accusations and 
request for condemnation it brings against the accused. Dennis notes that, when a liberal 
polity seeks to enforce the criminal law against a citizen, it is required to demonstrate to the 
defendant and to the public at large how and why conviction and punishment is justified.39 
The defendant has an interest in publicity as a means of potentially increasing the factual 
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accuracy of adjudication.40 By achieving factual accuracy and fairness, the state can account 
for its accusations. Thus, while the public trial is not always in the defendant’s personal 
interest, it may be in his greater interest to ensure that the state can account for the 
allegations it makes against him. 
 
Another practice which appears to lend support to Duff et al.’s theory is the requirement 
that the defendant be fit to plead. Whilst it might be contended that the defendant must be 
fit to plead in order to be held accountable as a rational moral agent, this requirement can 
also be seen as a way of ensuring that the defendant is capable of participating if he chooses 
to, and not that he must participate. Although existing practices can support both the 
assertion that the defendant is being called to account as well as the assertion that the state 
is being called to account, it is important to note that they are being called to account in 
different ways. Whereas, by Duff’s reasoning, the trial offers a forum for the defendant to be 
called to account for his alleged wrongdoing, the normative theory put forward here uses 
the criminal process to call the state to account for the accusations it makes against the 
defendant and, in doing so, to justify its request for condemnation and punishment of the 
defendant.  
 
A critique of Duff et al.’s theory of the criminal trial is not reliant on an opposing theory 
purporting that the trial should be part of the process of calling the state to account. 
Although many of the criticisms expressed above are largely based on existing norms and 
practices, whereas the theory itself is a normative one, Duff et al. do not give enough 
consideration to the constraints which fundamental norms, such as the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof, can have on the defendant’s participatory role in the 
trial. Other criticisms stem from the strain that the theory sometimes seems to be under. 
This has already been mentioned in terms of trying to accommodate the defendant’s choice 
not to participate and in relation to the right to a public trial. However, Peter Duff, who 
contributed to the first volume of the Trial on Trial series, adds to this by claiming that Duff 
et al. sometimes overstate the importance of the communicative aspect of the trial. An 
example is their argument that the presumption against admitting bad character evidence 
arises from the need to address the accused as a ‘reasonable agent’ rather than from 
‘instrumental’ due process concerns.41 Duff et al. support constraints being placed on the 
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admission of bad character evidence primarily on the basis that a defendant, viewed as a 
responsible agent, should not be judged on his past behaviour. They frame bad character 
evidence as a bar to communication rather than as potentially prejudicial and unfair. 
Redmayne is sceptical of the view that using such evidence against the accused is 
inconsistent with respect for his ability to change.42 He claims that Duff et al.’s argument, 
which objects to treating the defendant as if his past determined his future, ‘loses its pull if 
expressed in terms of influence’.43 We can treat a person’s conduct as being influenced by 
the past without assuming he is unable to change. Duff et al. are at pains to accommodate 
existing practices which can be more easily explained from other perspectives which 
emphasise due process values.  
 
The theory may also be critiqued on the basis that it seems incomplete, as it does not 
account for the pre-trial or sentencing stages of the criminal process. Duff et al. justify this 
by claiming that the trial is the centre point of the criminal process and that covering the 
other stages would increase their book’s density.44 However, in order for their theory to be 
fully developed and taken forward, it may need to be incorporated into the larger criminal 
process picture. Omitting the sentencing stage is particularly problematic because not only 
do the potential consequences of a guilty verdict hang over the trial, but also it is where the 
communicative nature of the process is most prevalent, especially given the role of 
mitigating and aggravating factors, and victim impact statements. The communication 
between the court and those involved in the offence is not as constrained at this stage by 
procedural and evidential rules as the trial itself. It is where the wrongness of the act, as well 
as its consequences, can be communicated to the defendant and the public. Furthermore, 
since the defendant cannot truly be called to account for his criminal conduct until his guilt 
has been established through a guilty verdict at the end of the trial, it is not until the 
sentencing stage that the defendant can really begin to account, or answer, for that conduct.  
As such, it is surprising that Duff et al. failed to give it due consideration.  
 
Duff et al.’s theory was developed in the ‘social and historical context that is particular to 
the modern adversarial trial’,45 but they state that it will be ‘relevant to any polity that 
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claims to be a liberal democracy.’46 They believe that their model of communicative 
participation favours neither an adversarial nor an inquisitorial system.47 However, the 
success of a trial or process aim will have something to do with its institutional setting. Not 
only does the theory offend liberal ideals, but also the emphasis on partisanship in the 
adversarial system hardly seems as well placed to accommodate it as does the truth seeking 
inquisitorial system that already places greater emphasis on the defendant’s participation. It 
may be more successful in jurisdictions, such as France, where, according to Hodgson, the 
accused is required to take responsibility for his actions, to reflect on the consequences of 
what he has done and to participate in the process.48 This is played out in practice by 
defendants being questioned directly by the judge in court; there is already a sense in which 
they are held to account as erring citizens.49  
 
The theory of calling the state to account, on the other hand, could be applied more readily 
within an adversarial type system, though it is founded upon factors which should be upheld 
in any liberal democracy, regardless of its procedural form. The following section will 
illustrate why the notion of calling the accused to account fits uncomfortably within the 
adversarial model which views the trial as a forum for testing the prosecution case rather 
than communicating with the defendant. Although English criminal procedure has become 
pre-occupied with efficient fact finding, and cannot be accurately described as adversarial, 
some of the values and rights associated with the adversarial system remain relevant. So 
much so that a theory of calling the defendant to account is not only unrealistic in practice, 
but also at odds with established norms necessary to ensure a fair trial.  
 
 
4.3 Defendant participation in the development of the adversarial trial  
 
Examining the development of the modern criminal trial provides a key to understanding 
some of the values which underpin the criminal process, and the nature of the participatory 
role of the defendant and the defence. An account of the history of the English criminal 
process and the development of adversarialism is unavoidably messy, as important 
developments occurred gradually and inconsistently throughout the whole realm of criminal 
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law and procedure. As such, it can easily become oversimplified or overly complicated and 
drawn-out. What is significant for present purposes is the shift in the role of the defendant 
from active participant to potentially passive observer. The following examination is 
intended to focus on this narrow aspect of adversarial history and draw out those elements 
that are most relevant to it. It will highlight the important link between rights and 
participation and help to build on the foundations of the normative theory of calling the 
state to account. 
 
Although the adversarial system primarily took shape throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, many of its components had been developing for centuries. These 
include the rise of the jury and the idea of party participation. The pre-adversarial legal 
institutions which paved the way for the adversarial system largely arose between 1200 and 
1700.50 Immediately before the emergence of the adversarial trial, the defendant was an 
active participant who played a central role. The underlying model, according to Duff et al., 
treated ‘participation and deliberation’ as ‘central to the idea of the political community’.51 
The trial, during this period, is often referred to as the ‘altercation trial’. However, Langbein 
describes it as the ‘accused speaks’ trial because the defendant was effectively forced to 
speak in order to defend himself. 52  The altercation trial emerged at the end of the Middle 
Ages, when older methods of proof, such as trial by wager and ordeal, phased out and the 
shifting population made it difficult to have a self-informing, active jury. The purpose of the 
altercation trial was to give the defendant the opportunity to respond to accusing evidence, 
hence the image of the ‘accused speaks’ trial.53 It was based on the active participation of 
those involved, and was much less structured than the adversarial trial. Because of the 
private nature of the majority of prosecutions, in some sense, the trial was comparable to 
civil cases, thus creating an expectation that the defendant would participate. The criminal 
law’s apparent focus on protecting property also supports this assertion,54 as do the 
similarities between the laws of evidence applied in civil and criminal trials at the time.55  
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Securing the defendant as an informational resource was a central preoccupation of the 
altercation trial.56 Contemporaries seemed to have believed that subjecting the accused to 
the pressures and hardships of having to defend himself unprepared and unaided was 
actually truth promoting. The defendant had no access to the indictment and would usually 
enter court completely ignorant of the case against him. Facing the defendant with the 
evidence in court for the first time was thought to help the judge and jury ascertain the 
sincerity of his denials.57 Accurate fact finding was thus a key aim of the process. This formed 
a primary justification for the rule denying defence counsel in felony cases; the accused was 
better suited than counsel to respond to questions of fact. However, the reality was seldom 
so straight forward. Beattie sums up the situation: 
Under this system of prosecution, which lasted well into the eighteenth century, the 
accused had few rights. He or she was to be committed to trial without knowing the 
exact nature of the charge as it would appear on the indictment, or without having 
access to the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. Virtually all accused felons 
were held in jail to await trial, and in conditions that made preparation difficult. It 
had been the magistrate’s duty to bind over the prosecution witnesses in 
recognizances to appear in court to give their evidence. The accused could not 
compel the attendance of witnesses. At the trial itself, accused felons had to speak 
in their own defence and to respond to prosecution evidence as it was given, and as 
they heard it for the first time. If they did not or could not defend themselves, no 
one would do it for them.58 
 
This system allowed no room for a workable privilege against self-incrimination or right to 
silence. In fact, the defendant effectively had no trial or pre-trial rights, making the ‘accused 
speaks’ trial the ultimate way of calling the defendant to account. There is an important link 
here between holding rights and having a choice to participate which will be returned to 
later. When a defendant has rights he has a protection against the power of the state, 
irrespective of the role he plays at trial. It then becomes harder to hold him to account and 
easier for him to demand that the case against him be proven. 
 
Not only did the accused have to speak in order to mount a defence, but also a lack of 
participation could have serious consequences given the wide spread use of capital 
punishment in felony cases.  This was especially true at the end of the eighteenth century, 
when ‘capital punishment overshadowed the whole of the criminal law.’59 Beattie has 
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examined the fluctuating level of capital punishment throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. He attributes its decline to the development of alternative sanctions 
for serious crime, most notably imprisonment and transportation to the colonies.60 The 
pattern of capital punishment was also largely shaped by the prosecution of property 
crimes. However, by 1861, for all practical purposes, the only offence to carry the death 
penalty was murder.61 For much of the period up to the mid-nineteenth century, the threat 
of capital punishment hung over many, if not most, felony trials. Langbein claims that 
contemporaries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were willing to tolerate 
the truth-defeating consequences of the emerging adversary procedure because in the 
realm of the criminal trial ‘too much truth brought too much death.’62 Although a powerful 
phrase, this may be overstating the situation, as roughly half of those condemned to death 
during the eighteenth century did not go to the gallows.63 It was felt that the law over-
threatened the use of capital punishment and jurors and judges would use techniques, such 
as down charging and clemency, to avoid it.64 Nevertheless, the defendant’s participation 
remained a crucial factor in his fate. 
 
The assumption that denying defence counsel promoted truthful outcomes was undermined 
in the celebrated treason trials of the late 1600s.65 These trials often involved perjured 
evidence which resulted in the execution of innocent persons. Public revulsion at this led to 
the Treason Trials Act 1696, a momentous step in the emergence of the adversarial system. 
The Act granted the defendant a right to a copy of the indictment, pre-trial assistance of 
counsel, full assistance of counsel at trial and the ability to compel the attendance of 
defence witnesses. It also allowed the defendant’s witnesses to testify on oath.66 Even 
though the central purpose of the criminal trial was to hear the accused speak, he spoke un-
sworn until the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. The 1696 Act allowed counsel only to 
defendants accused of high treason.  
 
In the 1730s, lawyers began to appear for defendants in ordinary felony trials, but it was not 
until the Prisoner’s Counsel Act of 1836 that legislation provided for this. When defence 
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lawyers first entered the felony trial they were permitted only to do what judges had 
previously done for the defendant: cross-examine witnesses and speak to issues of law. They 
could not speak to the jury or offer a defence against the facts put in evidence. It was 
essential that the judge and jury hear the defendant’s account.67 The rule against defence 
counsel did not apply to misdemeanour trials. There is no clear account of why this was, but 
the thinking at the time may have been that it was particularly important to avoid counsel 
interfering with the court’s access to the accused as an informational resource in cases of 
serious crime.68 That concern would have been less acute for misdemeanour offences, 
where lesser sanctions were at stake.  
 
The reason for the increase in defence counsel activity is unknown. However, it is thought to 
be a result of the judge’s perception that the balance in the courtroom had been shifting 
further to the detriment of the defendant.69 Most prosecutions in the early eighteenth 
century were initiated by victims, giving them the power to make the law serve their own 
purpose.70 They could also hire counsel to run their whole case without the restrictions 
faced by defence counsel. The apparent equality and appearance of balance that existed in 
the altercation trial courtroom arising from the confrontation between the victim and 
accused, was breaking down.71 This was exacerbated by government efforts to increase the 
level of prosecution by offering monetary rewards for the successful prosecution of 
offenders who committed certain crimes. Those who took on this task were known as 
thieftakers. The reward system (which also operated privately) was fraught with incentives 
for false accusations and perjured witnesses, something of which judges were very aware.72 
The judicial concern about these factors contributed to the introduction of defence counsel. 
The presence of defence counsel in ordinary felony trials has largely been inferred from 
information within the Old Bailey Sessions Papers which were in existence from the 1670s 
into the nineteenth century with varying degrees of detail and consistency. The number of 
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counsel employed cannot be known for sure, but there was a definite increase from the mid-
eighteenth century, even though the majority of defendants remained unrepresented. 73   
 
In the 1780s, there was not merely an increase in the number of lawyers involved in felony 
trials, but also an apparent change in their attitudes and behaviours, especially those acting 
for the defence.74 Even though their role remained restricted, counsel became more 
aggressive and actively committed to the defendant’s interest. They found ways to 
effectively speak to the jury through clever cross-examination and by disguising the remarks 
as comments to the judge on points of law.75 They would cast doubt on the truth of 
prosecution evidence and the credibility of prosecution witnesses, leading to a more 
sceptical view of the prosecution than previously.76 At the same time, there were changing 
ideas about the rights of defendants, including the development of the presumption of 
innocence and the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof. According to Langbein, 
‘defence counsel would ultimately end the altercation trial, silence the accused, marginalise 
the judge, and break up the working relationship of judge and jury.’77 The role of defence 
counsel that developed at this time is observable in England’s current system; they are 
expected to use their special knowledge of the law and criminal procedure to manage and 
win cases on behalf of their clients. In so doing, it may become necessary, or at least 
beneficial, for the defendant to take a passive role. Langbein attributes the development of 
the adversarial system to the development of the role of defence counsel.78 Thus, a model of 
justice within which the defendant can play a passive role may be attributable to the role 
played by his advocate.  
 
The emergence of the adversarial system also impacted defendant participation through the 
development of defence rights. One example is the burden of proof. As with present 
practices, in the early adversarial trial, the court could dismiss a case if the prosecution did 
not present sufficient evidence against the accused. Allowing defence counsel had the effect 
of separating the tasks of probing for whether the prosecution had presented its case, and 
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offering defensive evidence.79 Defence counsel insisted on asking the judge whether the 
prosecution had discharged its burden. Where they were successful, the accused was 
completely silenced.  Accordingly, ‘the recognition of the prosecution’s burden, combined 
with the use of defence counsel to test whether that burden had been met, materially 
reduced the amount of speaking that the accused had to do in order to defend effectively.’80 
However, the burden of proof was not fully established until the early twentieth century.81 
Another important factor which helped to stifle the defendant’s participation was the 
formulation and acceptance of the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof which was 
crystallised in the later eighteenth century. Setting a high standard of proof encouraged the 
jury to probe the prosecution case, rather than focusing on whether or how the defendant 
gave evidence.82  
 
Unlike the burden and standard of proof, the underlying presumption of innocence is 
ancient and can be traced to Classical Roman law.83 However, our modern understanding of 
the principle as a statement of the prosecution’s burden and as a direction to officials on 
how to treat the accused arose towards the end of the seventeenth century. Beattie states 
that, within the old altercation trial, the assumption ‘was not that [the defendant] was 
innocent until the case against him was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but that if he 
were innocent he ought to be able to demonstrate it for the jury by the quality and 
character of his reply to the prosecutor’s evidence.’84 It was only when the trial could be 
conceived as a contest between two parties, rather than between two individuals, that the 
defendant could remain silent and the trial could be organised around the presumption of 
innocence.85 As a consequence of the presumption of innocence, even in a narrow, trial-
centred sense, it is the accused’s right to have the case against him proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. This right provides one reason for viewing the trial as a means of holding 
the state to account for its accusations and request for punishment.  
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of European countries had accepted an 
understanding of criminal proceedings as based on two opposing parties and an 
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independent judge. Summers notes that it was the rights of the defence as a party and not 
of the accused as an individual that were seen as important in the works of the nineteenth 
century writers.86 Only through the assistance of counsel would those accused of criminal 
offences be able to engage with legal formalities and make proper use of the guarantees 
afforded to them in presenting their defence.87 There is, thus, a distinction between the 
institutional rights of the defence and the personal rights of the defendant which he can 
insist on exercising himself. This distinction between the defendant as a person and the 
defence as a party remains an important aspect of criminal procedure. For example, while 
the defendant is prohibited from cross-examining certain witnesses in person, his counsel 
remains able to do so on his behalf.88 In many situations, as long as the defence is conceived 
of as a party that can exercise rights, the defendant can choose whether to participate and 
successfully put the prosecution to proof.   
 
Important defence rights became workable within a system which effectively discouraged 
defendant participation, and it was these rights which, in turn, facilitated that lack of 
participation. The burden and standard of proof on the prosecution meant that the 
defendant did not have to prove his case, and that the presumption of innocence could be 
given much greater force, again, turning the attention of the court on the prosecution. Two 
other significant participatory factors which emerged during the rise of adversarialism were 
the defendant’s right to silence and his privilege against self-incrimination. Langbein believes 
that the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence became a workable part 
of the common law criminal procedure when defence counsel succeeded in restructuring 
the criminal trial in the way described above, and made it possible to defend a silent 
accused.89 Through an examination of the Old Bailey Session Papers from 1670, Langbein did 
not find one instance of an accused remaining silent on the grounds of a right to do so until 
the late 1780s, when defence counsel had become a regular trial feature and had alleviated 
the accused of his participatory burden.90  
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The privilege against self-incrimination has become an integral element of many legal 
systems. It now exists as an implicit part of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights;91 it is also expressly catered for in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The presumption of innocence is also acknowledged in these 
international documents and its international status can be traced back to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1948. Although these documents stem from the mid-twentieth century, they are a 
restatement of what was already recognised in a significant number of legal systems. Thus, 
what emerged in response to, and which now facilitates, the defendant’s ability to choose 
whether to cooperate in the criminal process has a significant link to the development of the 
adversarial system as a means of protecting the defendant from the potentially oppressive 
power of the state which had previously seen defendants face the allegations against them, 
unprepared and unaided. 
 
Following the development of the adversarial system, defendants did not need to be active 
participants in the criminal process. Strengthening their rights and allowing counsel to run 
their case meant that they did not even have to speak. The onus was firmly on the 
prosecution. By the 1820s, the defendant’s participation was so limited that the French 
observer, Cottu, commented that ‘his hat stuck on a pole might without inconvenience be 
his substitute at the trial.’92 The emphasis had shifted from the ‘accused speaks’ trial, in 
which the defendant was truly called to account, to one which allowed the state’s powers to 
be limited and the prosecution’s case to be tested. Concern for legitimacy, fairness and 
respect for rights became necessary constraints on the achievement of accurate fact finding 
and conflict resolution. Langbein asserts that with the development of the adversarial trial 
came a new theory of the purpose of the trial, which endures into our day, that it is primarily 
an opportunity for the defence to probe the prosecution case.93 The concept of 
adversarialism has become so well entrenched in criminal procedure that the European 
Court have recognised a right to adversarial proceedings in so far as ‘both prosecution and 
defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the 
observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party.’94  
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A criminal process operating on an adversarial basis cannot easily be reconciled with the 
idea of requiring defendant participation and penalising disobliging defendants. Although an 
assessment of the history of adversarialism does not in itself uncover a normative theory of 
the criminal process, it does highlight the developments that led to the rights and 
procedures which underpin the normative theory of the criminal process in which the state 
is called to account for its accusations and request for condemnation and punishment of the 
accused. In order to respect those rights which we have come to accept as fundamental, a 
defendant must be given a choice to participate and should not be required to do so. 
 
 
4.4 Defendant participation in today’s criminal process  
 
The participatory role of the accused declined throughout the development of the 
adversarial system, as a result of defence counsel and workable defence rights. Although the 
English criminal process can no longer be labelled as strictly adversarial, many of the values 
that developed within it constitute fundamental aspects of criminal procedure which govern 
issues of fairness and legitimacy. Furthermore, the criminal trial remains structured largely 
on an adversarial basis. As described in chapter 3, the adversarial trial consists of a 
competition between two equal sides that are responsible for organising and presenting 
their case in front of a passive judge and, often, lay decision-makers. However, inquisitorial 
and European influences, along with efficiency concerns, have influenced criminal 
procedure, and England now appears to have a participatory model. What follows is a 
general examination of the defendant’s current position as a participant in the criminal 
process, particularly at the trial stage. It outlines the right to participate as well as some of 
the requirements and pressures put on defendants to do so. The focus is on the participation 
of the defendant rather than the defence as a party. It is often the existence of the defence 
party which allows the defendant to exercise his rights not to participate. The defendant is a 
participant where he is actively involved as an individual through such means as responding 
to questioning, providing information and giving evidence. For present purposes, the 
defence party are active participants when they raise a defence, call witnesses and adduce 
evidence to further that defence, but not when they simply dispute or test the prosecution’s 
case through, for example, cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.  
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Beyond requirements to be present at one’s trial, participation is an option; there are no 
prima facie legal obligations on the defendant to participate.  However, the presence of the 
accused is both a requirement and a right. Whilst it is recognised in the ECHR, there can be 
consequences for absent defendants. Summers sees the right to be present at trial as a main 
facet of adversarial procedure as it is understood under the ECHR.95 In Colozza v Italy, it was 
held that the object and purpose of Article 6 taken as a whole ‘show that a person “charged 
with an offence” is entitled to take part in the hearing.’96 Yet, his absence is not, in principle, 
incompatible with the Convention. Within England, there are different procedures for 
dealing with the absence of an accused at summary trials and trials on indictment.  
 
In trials on indictment, the accused should normally be present to plead and remain present 
throughout his trial. The rationale behind this general rule might be to promote fairness by 
allowing the defendant to hear the evidence against him and by ensuring that he has an 
opportunity to participate, if he chooses to participate. He may wish to respond to 
unforeseen arguments or evidence that emerges during the trial. The fact that he is 
required, rather than given a choice, to be present might be thought to undercut this 
rationale. Like the public trial requirement, it is difficult to reconcile the defendant’s duty to 
be present with the fact that it is a right and therefore presumably for his benefit. Duff et al., 
however, may find this duty easier to justify as a means of calling the accused to account. 
Notwithstanding, the requirement to be present does not infer a requirement to participate 
or to ‘account for oneself’. Like the public trial requirement, the duty to be present may be 
in the defendant’s greater interest by ensuring that he has the opportunity to hold the state 
to account and test the prosecution’s case. It may also be more easily accepted by both the 
defendant and the general public that the state has, or has not, accounted for its 
accusations, if the defendant is present during the process. Nevertheless, although the 
defendant may benefit from being present, the requirement makes it difficult to justify as a 
right.  
 
The conflicting justifications for the right-requirement might be a matter of history. 
Historically, the trial was a very quick process, averaging about half an hour by the mid-
eighteenth century.97 The accused was virtually always the most efficient potential witness, 
and so his presence and participation would have contributed to the brevity of the trial. 
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Furthermore, the defendant was sentenced immediately following conviction;98 his presence 
may have been necessary to ensure that punishment was carried out. Today, if the accused 
fails to appear in the Crown Court, the judge will normally have to adjourn the case and, 
depending on the circumstances, issue a warrant for his arrest.99 However, a trial may 
proceed in the defendant’s absence. In Haywood,100 the Court of Appeal held that the right 
to be present can be waived if the defendant deliberately and voluntarily absents himself or 
if he behaves in such a way as to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. In Jones,101 
the House of Lords held that the court have a discretion to commence a trial in the absence 
of the defendant and that the priority is to ensure that the trial is as fair as circumstances 
permit and that justice is achieved. The focus on fairness suggests the importance of the 
defendant’s choice to participate; it does not imply that he must take part in the 
proceedings. Summary trials can, and often do, take place in the defendant’s absence.102 
Section 12 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (MCA) allows the defendant to plead guilty by 
post, and sections 11 and 13 set out the options open to the magistrates when an accused, 
who has not pleaded guilty by post, fails to appear at the trial.  
 
Section 11(1) of the MCA grants magistrates with discretion to proceed in the accused’s 
absence, unless the court considers that there is an acceptable reason for his failure to 
appear. However, if the accused had been summoned to be at the trial the case cannot be 
tried without proof that he knew of the hearing. If proceedings begin with an arrest rather 
than summons, no proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the proceedings is needed. The 
court shall not in a person’s absence sentence him to imprisonment, but where 
imprisonment is imposed, he must be brought before the court before being taken to begin 
serving his sentence.103 Where the accused fails to appear in answer to a summons, a 
warrant for arrest can only be issued if there is proof of service of the summons, and the 
offence to which the warrant relates is punishable with imprisonment, or the court, having 
convicted the accused, proposes to impose a disqualification on him.104 Where the court, 
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instead of proceeding in the absence of the accused, adjourns or further adjourns the trial, 
the court may issue a warrant for his arrest.105  
 
The fact that the defendant must ordinarily be present when he is faced with imprisonment 
is consistent with the suggestion that the presence requirement may stem from the 
historical continuation of the trial into sentencing and punishment.  An important provision 
in magistrates’ court trials is that if an accused does not physically attend but his legal 
representative does, he is for most purposes deemed to be present.106 In this situation the 
distinction between the defendant as a participant and the defence participating as a party 
is broken down. The defendant’s presence may make little difference in the exercise of 
holding the state to account if the defence are able to participate as a party.107 Although 
there is no general requirement for the defendant to be present at a summary trial, and a 
trial can proceed in his absence at the Crown Court, if a defendant has been granted bail and 
fails to surrender to custody he may be charged with absconding under the Bail Act 1976.  
 
Besides these rules relating to the presence of the defendant, he is not formally required to 
actively participate in the pre-trial or trial process. A legal culture which discourages 
participation developed in England over a long period of time, and there are many bars to 
effective communication within the existing system. Duff et al. believe that calling the 
defendant to account is a reason to create the legal and cultural conditions whereby 
participation is facilitated. This includes altering the formality of the trial, the conduct of 
professionals, and the passivity of judge and jury. In many ways, changing these aspects 
would reflect the old, pre-adversarial trial in which counsel played a minimal role and the 
defendant, judge and jury were active participants. However, the conditions which 
facilitated this type of trial were built on a lack of rights and resources for the defendant 
and, so, would not withstand scrutiny under most constitutional documents, including the 
European Convention on Human Rights. For instance, the presumption of innocence, the 
prosecution’s burden of proof, the right to silence, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the right to a lawyer and effective representation, and the recognition of the defence as a 
                                                             
105 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980,  s.13(1) 
106 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s.122(2) 
107
 In R v Kepple [2007] EWCA Crim 1339, the court held that defence counsel for an absent defendant 
can ask questions of prosecution witnesses in as much detail as they wish based on their instructions, 
but without indicating what the defendant’s evidence might have been and in the knowledge that he 
cannot call evidence to contradict the answers given. They may do this in the hope of either showing 
that the defendant’s account is accepted by the witnesses or to cast doubt on the coherence or 
accuracy of their accounts.  
94 
 
party rather than as an individual would need to be set aside or at least substantially 
weakened.   
 
Duff et al. state that in England and Wales, ‘it is regarded as a central principle of criminal 
trials that the defendant can sit back and wait for the prosecution to prove the case against 
him.’108 In some respects, this is true, but the defendant is now often faced with detrimental 
consequences for his failure to participate in the criminal process. Before the trial has even 
begun, the defence are expected to participate by disclosing their case to the prosecution. 
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
extended the realm of defence participation by requiring the defendant to provide a 
statement setting out, inter alia, the nature of his defence and any points of law on which he 
wishes to rely. Failure to issue a defence statement, or departing from it, can result in 
adverse inferences of guilt being drawn against the defendant.109 Pressure on the accused to 
actively participate also stems from provisions which allow adverse inferences to be drawn 
from the defendant’s silence under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This is 
dealt with in detail in chapter 6, but it is important to note that these provisions, along with 
other reforms designed to secure the defendant’s cooperation, have created a tension 
between adversarial ideologies and efficient truth finding. The increasing emphasis on 
efficient truth finding at the expense of adversarial ideologies is affecting the defendant’s 
capacity to choose whether or not to participate in the criminal process.  
 
Until relatively recently, the accused could tell his side of the story by making an unsworn 
statement from the dock. He was not then subject to questioning from his own counsel, 
prosecuting counsel or anybody else. This practice, which was abolished by s.72 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1972, offered a compromise between remaining silent and being subject 
to the sometimes harsh risks inherent in cross-examination. The accused now has to choose 
between saying nothing and being subject to possible adverse inferences of guilt, or giving 
evidence and being subject to cross-examination.  It also seems that the defendant is now 
expected to participate constructively in his cooperation with the criminal process. Recent 
legislation, including the disclosure requirements and the case management regime set out 
in the Criminal Procedure Rules, as well as increasing concern for accurate fact finding, has 
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rendered ambush defences unacceptable.110 There have been several recent cases 
upholding convictions where the defence had attempted to ambush the prosecution (or co-
defendant) with late defences or purposely failed to point out prosecution errors until too 
late to rectify them.111 From an adversarial standpoint, in which the trial takes the form of a 
competition between two equal sides, a failure to mention or rectify a mistake made by the 
prosecution is not ordinarily objectionable. Nor is it objectionable within a conception of the 
trial as a means of calling the state to account for the accusations it makes, as the defence 
should not be expected to assist the state in its duty to prove guilt. However, there may be a 
distinction between passive and active obstruction of the opponent’s case. Whilst failing to 
point out mistakes made by the opposing side, particularly by the prosecution, would seem 
unobjectionable, deliberately sabotaging the opponent through, for example, tampering 
with evidence and, therefore, perverting the course of justice, distorts the appearance of 
fairness and undermines the process’ legitimacy. The expectation of constructive 
participation which now seems to exist is further shifting the procedural arena away from an 
adversarial style contest in which the prosecution can be put to proof without the 
participation or assistance of the defence.  
 
The defendant’s participatory rights are evident in Article 6(3) ECHR which gives the accused 
the rights to be informed promptly, and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him; to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence; to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance; to examine or have examined 
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; and to have the free assistance 
of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court. Article 6 has 
been interpreted to also recognise the right not to participate in the form of the right to 
silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.112 The right not to participate is therefore 
an implicit part of Article 6 and must be considered alongside the right to participate, and 
not as a bar to it. Duff et al. suggest that it is difficult to justify both the defendant’s rights to 
participate and his right not to participate.113 But, if one considers that the right to 
participate is a choice which does not have to be exercised, then both can easily be 
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accommodated. If participation were an obligation that could not be waived, like the public 
trial requirement, it would be hard to recognise it as a ‘right’. However, unlike the public 
trial requirement, a participatory obligation would be unjustifiable on other grounds, such as 
ensuring fairness and legitimacy, since it is concern for these factors which allows the 
defendant to choose whether or not to participate.  
 
Duff et al. find difficulty in accepting both a defendant’s right to be heard and his right to 
silence. They believe that there is a normative expectation that the defendant should take 
part, and that the right to be heard is intrinsic to the proper purpose of the trial.114 However, 
when the trial is viewed as part of the process of calling the state to account for its 
accusations and request for punishment, and as a forum to test the prosecution’s case, or 
when it is seen in the light of the development and cultural resonance of the adversarial 
system, there should be no such normative expectation for the defendant to participate. The 
defendant’s participation may be beneficial for accurate fact finding, but having an interest 
in the outcome of the case cannot justify a disregard for legitimacy, fairness and respect for 
rights. Within a democratically liberal polity which accords importance to individual dignity 
and autonomy, and in which the state holds vast resources and criminal convictions come 
with far-reaching consequences, defendants should not be required or expected to 
participate in the criminal process. Citizens should be entitled to see that the state properly 
proves its accusations against them before subjecting them to condemnation and 
punishment. An important mechanism to ensure this is the presumption of innocence.  
When the emphasis is on the defendant’s participation, the presumption becomes less 
pronounced. This was the case during the altercation trial in which the court effectively 
assumed guilt and called upon the defendant to offer an explanation, and it also seems to 
hold less influence in Duff et al.’s normative concept of the trial.  
 
 
4.5 The presumption of innocence and legal burdens 
 
As set out in chapter 1, the presumption of innocence provides an argument against 
requiring defendant participation. It also underpins the normative theory of criminal 
procedure based on calling the state to account. It is enshrined in every international human 
rights document, including Article 6(2) of the ECHR which provides that, ‘Everyone charged 
                                                             
114 Ibid 101. 
97 
 
with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.’ In 
its narrow sense, the presumption, as a reflection of the prosecution’s burden of proof at 
trial, is widely accepted as a fundamental principle. Its importance was endorsed by Viscount 
Sankey in Woolmington v DPP, when the duty of the prosecution to prove the defendant’s 
guilt was declared a ‘golden thread’ of the English criminal law.115  Within the wider human 
rights conception of the presumption of innocence, the state has a duty to recognise the 
defendant’s legal status of innocence at all stages prior to conviction and after acquittal. 
Trechsel identifies this as a ‘reputation-related’ aspect of the presumption.116 It should 
protect the accused from any official insinuation that he is guilty and can be infringed by 
public figures as well as by judges and courts. European human rights law supports a wider 
approach to the presumption in so far as Article 6 applies to both the pre-trial and trial 
stages of the criminal process.117 Pre-trial procedures should therefore be conducted, so far 
as possible, as if the defendant were innocent. This can act as a restraint on the various 
compulsory measures that may be taken against suspects in the period before trial,118 
including requirements to cooperate with the police and prosecution.  
 
Although the presumption of innocence is internationally recognised as a fundamental right, 
it is important to identify the reasons behind it. These rationales largely correspond to those 
supporting the normative account of criminal procedure based on calling the state to 
account. They also help to present the basis on which the presumption provides a good 
reason not to penalise those who fail to cooperate. One rationale for the presumption of 
innocence is its role as a procedural protection against wrongful convictions. At the very 
least, criminal justice systems must strive to ensure that the public censure of a conviction, 
and the ensuing sentence, should not be imposed on an innocent defendant.119  Ashworth 
notes that, ‘It is because the criminal conviction constitutes public censure and leads to 
liability to punishment, both invasions of what are normally rights, that the presumption of 
innocence becomes a vital protection.’120 Stumer believes that this rationale is of such 
importance that it cannot, in general, be subjugated to other interests.121 He identifies three 
ways in which the presumption of innocence, in its narrow sense, reduces the risk of 
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wrongful convictions: it allocates the burden of proof to the party with the greater 
resources; it acts to counter a tendency in criminal trials to assume guilt of the defendant 
and to discount the defendant’s evidence; and it allocates the risk of non-persuasion to the 
prosecution.122 Penalising those who fail to participate, particularly through inferences that 
link the failure directly to guilt, weakens the presumption of innocence and puts innocent 
defendants at risk of wrongful conviction.  
 
Dennis notes that while the presumption has a vital epistemic dimension in requiring the 
prosecution to prove the truth of its allegation that the defendant committed the offence 
charged, it also has a non-epistemic dimension. It gives effect to a claim to fair treatment by 
the state. The claim being that, as a matter of principle, a liberal polity should treat all its 
citizens as law-abiding until it proves otherwise.123 Similarly, Ashworth believes that there 
are good reasons for arguing that the presumption of innocence is inherent in any proper 
conception of the relationship between citizen and state in an ‘open and democratic 
society’.124 It is not a statement of probability but a statement of political belief. It allows 
citizens to challenge the state and hold it to account before it can exert its powers of 
condemnation and punishment. It thus provides a strong reason against requiring the 
accused to participate in the criminal process or to assist the state in discharging its burden.  
 
The examples of penalising non-cooperation explored in the following chapters operate so 
as to weaken the effect of the presumption of innocence. However, it is important to note 
that, in practice, there is disagreement as to the proper scope and implications of the 
presumption. Whereas, for the normative theory presented here, it seems implicit in the 
presumption that the accused has no obligation to assist the state and, so, should not be 
required to do so, in reality, the presumption is not so absolute.125 For example, it is open to 
debate whether, as an implication of the presumption of innocence, the accused should 
have no role in assisting the prosecution through the imposition of legal burdens on the 
defence. In practice, there are many exceptions to the general principle that the defendant 
need not ordinarily establish an excuse or justification for his conduct. This occurs where 
there is a defence or an element of an offence which specifies a reverse legal burden, 
requiring the defendant to prove, or disprove, the defence or element of the offence on a 
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balance of probabilities. In order to do this, it is likely that the defendant will need to 
actively participate.  
 
Legal burdens must be distinguished from evidential burdens which require the defendant 
to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue, but do not require the defendant to assume 
a risk of conviction, as the prosecution will carry the legal burden of disproving the issue. If 
the evidential burden is not discharged, the fact finder need not consider that issue. The 
mechanism of an evidential burden has been described as ‘a convenient and efficient 
method of narrowing the matters in issue in a criminal trial.’126 The evidential burden is, 
therefore, simply a burden of adducing sufficient evidence to support a case. It is not a 
burden of proof.127 However, in order to satisfy an evidential burden, the defendant may 
have to testify. In Lambert,128 Lord Hope suggested that discharging the evidential burden 
would require evidence of a degree little short of that necessary to discharge the legal 
burden. He felt that, ‘an evidential burden is not to be thought of as a burden which is 
illusory. What the accused must do is put evidence before the court which, if believed, could 
be taken by a reasonable jury to support his defence.’129 He went on to state that, ‘the 
practical effect of imposing an evidential burden only on the accused and not a persuasive 
burden is likely to be minimal’.130   
 
However, an evidential burden does not necessarily require the accused to participate 
directly. For example, it may be discharged by the testimony of other witnesses or through 
expert evidence, or by pointing to some evidence already adduced by the prosecution. There 
is no universally accepted formula to describe how much evidence is needed to satisfy the 
burden, and much will depend on the nature of the issue to which the burden relates.131 
There exists an important distinction between evidential and legal burdens in terms of the 
defendant’s position as a participant since, in theory at least, the burden of adducing 
evidence places less pressure on the defendant to participate. It is sufficient to raise an issue 
which the prosecution must then disprove beyond reasonable doubt. As Ashworth points 
out, discharging the evidential burden does place an obligation on the defendant, and, for 
that reason, it requires justification and should not be casually imposed. But the burden is 
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much lighter than the onus of proving an issue on the balance of probabilities, and hence is 
less objectionable.132  
 
Reverse legal, or persuasive, burdens require proof of innocence and can be a determinative 
factor in the outcome of the case. With the exception of the common law defence of 
insanity, all reverse legal burdens are either expressed or implied in statutes. They are highly 
controversial as they prima facie violate the presumption of innocence. Despite this, in 1996, 
Ashworth and Blake determined that no fewer than 40 per cent of offences triable in the 
Crown Court appear to impose a legal burden on the defence.133 In summary trials, s.101 of 
the MCA 1980 places the legal burden of proof on the defendant when he relies on any 
statutory exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, and in Edwards,134 the 
Court of Appeal held that this is a restatement of the common law position which applies to 
the interpretation of indictable offences. However, where a linguistic construction does not 
indicate clearly on whom the burden of proof should lie, the court might look to other 
considerations to determine the intention of Parliament, such as the mischief at which the 
provision was aimed, and practical considerations such as the ease or difficulty for the 
respective parties of discharging the burden.135  
 
The European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts have held reverse legal 
burdens to be a justifiable exception to Article 6(2). In what Ashworth and Redmayne have 
described as ‘one of the loosest and least convincing judgments of the Strasbourg Court’,136 
it was held that Article 6 is not absolute and that legal burdens on the defence can be upheld 
where they are proportionate to a legitimate aim.137 As explained in chapter 2, Article 6 is 
what Ashworth and Redmayne refer to as a ‘strong right’ because it is not qualified in the 
way that some other Convention rights are.138 As such, it should not be so readily interfered 
with, and particularly not on the same basis as qualified rights. Nevertheless, the domestic 
courts have also focused on proportionality to a legitimate aim as a means of determining 
the legitimacy of legal burdens on the defence. Dennis points out that this has led to an 
uncertain and inconsistent approach to the application of criteria to determine compatibility 
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with Article 6.139 He notes six relevant factors judges have used in determining the 
justifiability of reverse onuses. These are: judicial deference and the weight the courts 
should give to the decisions of the legislature; classification of offence and whether the 
offence is ‘truly criminal’ or ‘regulatory’; construction of criminal liability and whether the 
matter to be proven is an essential element of the offence or an exculpatory defence; the 
maximum penalty for the offence; ease of proof and peculiar knowledge; and the 
significance of the presumption of innocence.140 Each one of these factors is problematic, 
and do not offer a consistent approach.  
 
Although the issue seems to come down to one of proportionality, the inconsistency and 
lack of clarity in determining the operation of the presumption of innocence is concerning. 
Notwithstanding, it remains the approach of the courts. In Chargot,141 a case concerning the 
death of an employee, the House of Lords followed the proportionality path. It was held that 
sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 impose a duty on employers 
to ensure the health and safety at work of all employees and persons employed by them, 
and that a legal burden on them to prove that it was not ‘reasonably practicable’ to do so 
was not disproportionate to the aim of creating an environment free of material risks to 
health and safety. As a result, where employers fail to prove their innocence, simply on the 
basis that an accident has occurred, they will be liable to pay an unlimited fine and face up 
to two years imprisonment. Imprisonment in such cases is a recent punitive measure 
imposed by Parliament which did not seem to affect the Court’s conclusions. It has been 
noted that, ‘What is punished is no longer negligent conduct in the running of your business, 
but the fact of being an employer or director in an organisation where an industrial accident 
has happened.’142 
 
Duff offers a different account of the justifiability of reverse legal burdens. He identifies 
three possible responses to them. The first is to reject them as inconsistent with a 
substantive presumption of innocence; the second is to admit that they are inconsistent 
with the presumption, but argue that at least some of them constitute justified 
infringements (this is the position of the European and domestic courts); and the third is to 
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argue that they are sometimes consistent with the presumption by identifying what counts 
as a reasonable doubt to be raised by the defendant in order to avoid conviction.143 In taking 
this third approach, Duff believes that presumptions which the defendant must disprove are 
specifications of what is to count as proof beyond reasonable doubt and a reconstruction of 
the meaning of reasonable doubt is justified because it stems from citizens’ responsibilities 
to account for themselves. For instance, added responsibility can be imposed where there is 
a special risk, such as the responsibility that a factory owner has in ensuring the health and 
safety of his employees who operate machinery.144 This is similar to the ‘classification of 
offence’ and ‘ease of proof’ factors discussed by Dennis, but instead of accepting that the 
burden violates the presumption of innocence, Duff frames it as a way of working within the 
presumption by extending the meaning of reasonable doubt in such cases.   
 
Stumer has also explored the relationship between the presumption of innocence and 
reverse burdens. He believes that the dual rationale of the presumption of innocence in its 
narrow form, as an expression of the prosecution’s burden, is protecting the innocent from 
wrongful conviction and promoting the rule of law.145 Only when the first rationale is not 
called into play or is called into play in an attenuated sense should the court consider 
limiting the presumption of innocence through the use of reverse burdens. The rationale of 
protecting the innocent may be attenuated either because there is a low risk of wrongful 
conviction, or because the consequences of conviction are minimal.146 In cases where the 
rationale of protecting the innocent is attenuated, the courts can take account of the 
community interest in obtaining convictions by applying a proportionality analysis within 
which the courts must give weight to the continually applicable rationale of promoting the 
rule of law. Stumer believes the proportionality enquiry should focus upon ‘necessity’ of a 
reverse burden, and not upon its ‘reasonableness’ or ‘balance’.147 The necessity test asks 
whether the less restrictive measure of an evidential burden would suffice to meet the 
problems of proof faced by the prosecution.148 Because discharging the evidential burden in 
practice often requires evidence of a degree little short of that necessary to discharge the 
legal burden, the necessity test would result in many less reverse burdens than presently 
imposed on the defendant. However, this approach still applies a proportionality test and 
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prevents the state from having to account for its accusations against the accused in certain 
circumstances.  
 
Within a conception of criminal procedure based on calling the state to account, reverse 
legal burdens should be rejected as inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. This 
was the approach taken by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in 1972 who 
recommended that the defence should never bear more than an evidential burden.149 It is 
also consistent with Roberts’ suggestion that familiarity with the presumption of innocence 
may breed contempt or at least complacency.150 Roberts concludes that the current 
legislative practices of placing the legal burden on the defendant are unjustifiable, and that 
the ‘legal rules relating to the burden and standard of proof in criminal trials promote 
individual freedom and are bulwarks against oppression. They are not to be dispensed with, 
either directly or by more circuitous means, whenever they happen to inconvenience 
prosecutors or police officers.’151 Giving the presumption of innocence the weight it 
warrants, as such a fundamental aspect of criminal justice, strengthens the assertion that 
the defendant should not be expected to participate. Violating the presumption and limiting 
its operation, on the other hand, shifts English criminal procedure further away from 
adversarial ideologies and rights based accounts of the criminal process, and helps open the 
door to practices which require the participation of the defendant.   
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out Duff et al.’s communicative theory of the criminal trial and, in so 
doing, has further developed the normative theory of the criminal process in which the state 
should be called to account for its accusations and request for condemnation and 
punishment of the accused. It has also examined the development of the adversarial system 
which provided many of the legal norms which underpin this theory, and which create an 
important link between the existence of workable rights and the accused’s ability to choose 
whether to participate. It has set out the current position of the defendant in terms of his 
participatory rights and obligations, and identified an increasing emphasis on defence 
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participation. Lastly, it has discussed the importance of the presumption of innocence in 
forming an argument against requiring cooperation.  It has been argued that, in line with the 
normative account of the criminal process, the defendant should not be required, or even 
expected, to participate, regardless of how useful this may be in advancing the aims of the 
criminal process. Placing the emphasis on the accused’s cooperation, and providing 
incentives and penalties to secure it, is part of the participatory model of criminal procedure 
which has developed. It has resulted from greater concern for accurate fact finding, 
something more akin to inquisitorial systems, as well as a desire to ensure efficiency in 
criminal justice. This has occurred at the expense of England’s adversarial history and some 
of the important legal norms it entails. The following chapters will examine the ways in 
which the participatory model has developed through specific examples of how defendants 
can now be penalised for their non-cooperation.  
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5 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous three chapters examined the aims and values of the criminal process, identified 
several models of criminal procedure, and explored the role of the defendant as a 
participant in the criminal process. It has been established that whilst the emergence of 
adversarialism in England led to many procedural norms which grant the accused the right 
to choose whether or not to participate, current legislative and judicial trends are rather 
concerned with defence cooperation. As a result, a participatory model of procedure has 
emerged. This move emphasises efficiency and accurate fact finding at the expense of 
fairness, legitimacy and respect for defence rights. Whilst the previous three chapters 
provided a theoretical framework, the remaining chapters will assess specific examples of 
the ways in which defendants are now penalised for their non-cooperation. The first 
example is through the limitations placed on the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination is an important aspect of criminal procedure and is 
widely regarded as fundamental to human liberty. The European Court of Human Rights has 
described it as one of the ‘generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart 
of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6.’1 Subject to interpretation of its scope, the 
privilege means that a suspect cannot be required to provide the authorities with 
information that might be used against him in a criminal trial.2 As a principle under which 
the state should not place a suspect under a duty to cooperate with a prosecution which is 
being brought against him,3 limits placed on the privilege often lead to requirements to 
cooperate. Sanctions imposed for breach of such requirements constitute a penalty for non-
cooperation. This forms one of the most striking examples of penalising those who do not 
cooperate in the criminal process. The fact that the privilege applies during the investigative 
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stage, before the prosecution process (from charge to verdict) has begun, makes the 
prospect of being penalised for non-cooperation even more apparent.  
 
The privilege against self-incrimination is often considered together with the right to silence, 
since both are concerned with the legal significance of silence. However, the privilege can 
extend to potentially incriminating information beyond speech. For instance, it may apply to 
documents, material objects and bodily samples. In practice, the scope of the privilege has 
been restricted in such a way that it does not apply to material which has an existence 
independent of the will of the accused. Nevertheless, it remains a broader concept than the 
right to silence and can extend to a refusal to participate in administrative investigations 
where that information may be used in future criminal proceedings. The sanctions for non-
cooperation by way of exercising the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-
incrimination also differ. Whereas silence can lead to what may be called the ‘indirect’ 
penalty of adverse inferences, reliance on the privilege can lead to the ‘direct’ penalty of 
criminal prosecution for non-cooperation. The latter therefore provides a more substantive 
example of penalising the accused for not cooperating in the criminal process.  
 
This area of procedural law is complicated. In order to understand its current position in the 
criminal process, the effect it has on the values and style of criminal procedure, and the way 
in which defendants are penalised for their non-cooperation, it is important to try and make 
some sense of it. This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the origins of the privilege 
before critically examining the justifications often put forth for it. It will then consider the 
current scope of the privilege. This has not been clearly defined by the authorities and has 
been increasingly restricted. The lack of a consistent scope for the privilege, and the 
willingness to limit it through penalising non-cooperation, may be attributable to the lack of 
a coherent rationale for it, in particular a failure to appreciate its role in reinforcing the 
relationship between the individual and the state. As a result, developments in this area are 
shifting English criminal procedure further away from concerns for defence rights and 
fairness.  
 
 
5.2 Origins of the modern privilege against self-incrimination 
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Two main theories of the origins of the privilege against self-incrimination have emerged 
from the literature. Under the first theory the privilege became part of the common law 
criminal procedure as a result of the abolition of the courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission in 1641.4 However, more contemporary commentators believe that the 
privilege became an enforceable and recognisable right in the late eighteenth century, as a 
result of the emerging adversary system.5  The maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, 
loosely translated to mean ‘no one is obliged to accuse himself’, is ancient; it has been 
traced to the medieval Roman and Canon laws. It served as a guarantee that people would 
not become the source of their own prosecution.6 Having been associated with the modern 
common law privilege, this maxim has become a source of confusion in deciphering the 
privilege’s origins.7 Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum influenced practices in the ecclesiastical 
courts and was later used by Puritans to resist being punished for failing to cooperate with 
the ex officio oath procedure. This procedure required defendants in the ecclesiastical courts 
to take an oath to answer all questions put to them on pain of punishment. Commentators 
subscribing to the first theory of the privilege’s origins believe that it became internalised in 
criminal procedure with the abolition of the ex officio oath procedure along with the courts 
of Star Chamber and High Commission in 1641. However, the modern privilege, as we 
understand it today, seems to have derived instead from the rise of adversarialism and as an 
extension of the privilege provided to witnesses.  
 
The witness privilege meant that witnesses were not required to answer questions that 
might later incriminate them or even damage their reputation. It did not apply to parties to 
the proceedings, did not allow for selective answering, and did not carry any exclusionary 
remedy for its breach until the mid-nineteenth century.8 It was engaged primarily from the 
second half of the eighteenth century to limit the scope of cross-examination of prosecution 
witnesses at a time when cross-examination was one of few tools for defence counsel.9 
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Smith, in particular, attributes the origins of the defendant’s privilege in the mid-nineteenth 
century to an extension of the witness privilege.10 He recognises that this would not have 
been possible without the significant procedural changes that were made during the 
establishment of the adversarial system from the seventeenth century onwards, particularly 
the use of defence counsel from the later eighteenth century.11 Once defence counsel were 
able to address the jury and speak to issues of both law and fact, and once the presumption 
of innocence had been crystallised as a workable principle, the defendant was able to 
effectively claim a privilege against self-incrimination at trial.  It was at this point that the 
‘altercation’, or ‘accused speaks’, trial gave way to the adversarial trial.  
 
Prior to the emergence of the adversary system, as discussed in the previous chapter, any 
privilege that may have existed for the defendant would have had little practical effect. 
Langbein believes that the privilege against self-incrimination entered common law 
procedure as part of the profound reordering of the trial, under the influence of defence 
counsel, into an opportunity for the defendant’s lawyer to test the prosecution case.12 Smith 
submits that the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 effectively codified the privilege against self-
incrimination by providing that a person charged with an offence should not be called as a 
witness except upon his own application.13 This account of the origins of the modern 
privilege holds more ground than the first, as it was not until this time that defendants were 
able to form a defence without actively participating. Furthermore, it was not until the late 
1780s that sources show the privilege being claimed by, or on behalf of, defendants in 
ordinary criminal trials. 14 However, it is important to note that the defendant could not 
testify on oath, and thus was not a competent witness, until the 1898 Act. Prior to this, he 
could give an unsworn statement. Although there had historically been a general mistrust in 
the evidence of the parties to the case,15 one reason why the defendant was not a 
competent witness was to protect him. There was concern that it would put pressure on the 
accused to give evidence, and fear that some defendants, coerced into the witness box, 
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would be susceptible to tricky cross-examination from prosecution counsel, which would 
lead to false self-incrimination.16 To address this, the 1898 Act originally included a section 
(s.1(b)) which stated that the failure of an accused person to give evidence could not be 
made the subject of any comment by the prosecution. 
 
This brief overview of the origins of the privilege against self-incrimination has focused on a 
very narrow area of developments which occurred over the course of hundreds of years. 
However, it establishes a link between the privilege and adversarialism. As suggested in 
chapter 4, the ability of the defendant to exercise a right not to participate was dependent 
upon having someone to speak on his behalf. The safeguards and procedural norms which 
developed in the adversarial system made this possible. A departure from these norms 
signals a serious shift away from a model of criminal procedure based on adversarialism and 
testing the prosecution case. What follows examines the extent to which the privilege 
against self-incrimination has been undermined as a result of penalising defendant non-
cooperation, and the implications this has for criminal procedure. However, in order to 
critically assess the current scope of the privilege, it is important to seek a rationale for it. 
 
 
5.3 Justifying the privilege against self-incrimination 
 
Despite being widely recognised as a fundamental right, the privilege against self-
incrimination remains controversial. It is difficult to explain coherently why the state should 
not compel us to incriminate ourselves, and the privilege seems to be as widely criticised as 
it is defended. Jeremy Bentham, one of the privilege’s most prominent critics, felt that it was 
a product of irrational prejudice, for which no convincing justification could be advanced.17 
He believed that an accurate verdict was likely to result from a consideration of all the 
relevant evidence including self-incriminatory evidence. However, Bentham’s views were 
expressed during the early nineteenth century, at a time when English criminal procedure 
was settling into the still developing adversarial model and adjusting to the rights that came 
with it. They do not necessarily reflect or translate into the modern understanding of the 
privilege or the problems surrounding it. Also, Bentham gave little consideration to the 
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advantages which might accrue from an adversarial scheme of justice.18 He dismissed 
assertions that the privilege ensures fairness as an ‘old woman’s’ argument, and dismissed 
what he called the ‘fox hunters argument’ under which the fox hunter regards criminals as 
sporting prey that must be given a run for their money.19  
 
Bentham’s views of the privilege against self-incrimination were part of a broader argument 
aimed at liberating evidence.20  The privilege has the potential to impede the discovery and 
gathering of reliable evidence. This impediment may interfere with the aims of the criminal 
process, particularly its quest for accurate fact finding. If the privilege is not qualified, then 
the state may be denied access to much relevant and reliable evidence. However, as a 
defence right, the privilege acts as a necessary constraint on the aims of the criminal process 
for the sake of fairness and legitimacy. It was explained in chapter 2 that the criminal 
process is legitimised not only through accurate verdicts, but also through respect for 
individual rights, due process and fair procedures. In the absence of these latter 
considerations, even a factually accurate verdict should not be accepted as legitimate. The 
way in which the process aims are achieved is fundamental to its successful operation and, 
so, we should accept that a loss of evidence may be a necessary consequence of exercising 
the privilege.  
 
The privilege against self-incrimination might also be criticised for impacting the efficiency of 
the investigation of crimes. It may be argued that, because the privilege can deprive the 
court of reliable evidence of guilt, it is an unjustified obstruction to the efficient investigation 
and prosecution of criminals.21 This concern lends itself to a procedural model based on 
‘crime control’ as opposed to ‘due process’.22 Eradicating the privilege would be a positive 
step towards attaining a procedural model based on efficiency and managerialsm, as 
discussed in chapter 3. However, whilst efficiency has become a major concern within 
criminal procedure, the privilege is not generally restricted on this basis, and any attempt to 
do so can be opposed on the same grounds as the claim that the privilege acts as a bar to 
accurate fact finding; legitimacy of the process must take precedence over efficiency 
concerns.  
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Despite criticisms of the privilege, compelling suspects to provide evidence against 
themselves is generally considered wrong. Yet, it has been difficult for courts and 
commentators to articulate exactly why with any degree of consistency.  In Saunders v UK,23 
the European Court of Human Rights attempted to rationalise the privilege: 
The rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper 
compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages 
of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6. The right not to incriminate 
oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to 
prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through 
methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this 
sense the right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence.24 
 
This important passage highlights a number of possible justifications for the privilege. Not 
least, it suggests that it can protect the innocent and uphold the presumption of innocence.  
These process values are considered below along with the substantive value the privilege 
may have as a means of preventing cruelty and protecting privacy. The way in which the 
privilege can reinforce and regulate the relationship between the citizen and the state is 
then considered. The nature of this relationship is also an important element of the 
normative theory of calling the state to account. Gerstein suggests that any defence of the 
privilege against self-incrimination should provide a solid basis for its core as we know it, 
while offering criteria for a sound and rationalised scope for its applicability.25 As will 
become apparent, such a defence is difficult, if not impossible, to decipher. However, within 
a liberal democracy and on the basis of a normative theory of criminal procedure in which 
the state is called to account, the privilege holds significant value. 
 
 
5.3.1 Process values 
The two process values explored here link the privilege to certain due process concerns. This 
section explores whether the presumption of innocence and the avoidance of miscarriages 
of justice can justify the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
The presumption of innocence  
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The link between the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence 
was expressly stated in Saunders. The interest in not being obliged to incriminate oneself has 
links to the values attached to the freedom and dignity of the individual, and is said to be 
embodied in the fundamental procedural principle that it is for the prosecution to prove the 
accused’s guilt, and not for the accused to prove his innocence.26 If the accused is presumed 
to be innocent, it is wrong, in principle, to compel him to be a source of incriminating 
information. He must be given the privilege of declining to cooperate in procedures 
designed to establish his guilt.27 However, the strength of the link between the privilege and 
the presumption of innocence depends on one’s interpretation of the presumption. For 
instance, if it is interpreted broadly as requiring the state to make its case without any help 
from the accused, then the privilege can uphold the presumption by ensuring that the 
accused is not required to assist in the case against himself. On the other hand, if the 
presumption is understood only in a very narrow sense, in terms of the prosecution’s burden 
at trial to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, then a no assistance interpretation of the 
privilege lacks a connection to the presumption of innocence.28 The standard of proof 
remains the same, although it may become easier for the prosecution to reach that 
standard. 
 
Redmayne notes another way to link the presumption and the privilege. When the 
presumption is understood as a rule about how the state should treat citizens, it may be 
connected to the privilege. The state should treat citizens as innocent unless it has good 
reason to think otherwise and, therefore, one should not be expected to respond to 
accusations, unless they are backed up with evidence.29  This argument is derived from 
Greenawalt’s account of the right to silence which recognises a principle under which we 
should not be expected to respond to accusations unless they are supported with 
evidence.30 However, from the perspective of a criminal process based on calling the state to 
account, it should not even be necessary for the citizen to respond when the accusations 
against him are backed up with evidence. Until guilt is proven, the state should treat citizens 
as if they had nothing to account for, since it is the state that must justify the accusations 
that it has made. This is consistent with a broad definition of the presumption of innocence, 
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as set out in chapter 4, which operates at trial by requiring the prosecution to prove the 
defendant’s guilt, and operates beyond the trial as a direction to officials to treat the suspect 
as if he were innocent at all stages, until guilt is proven. Normatively, the accused should not 
have to play an active role in the state’s obligation to account for its accusations. A broad 
notion of the privilege against self-incrimination reinforces this position. Limiting the scope 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, therefore, operates so as to weaken the effect of 
the presumption of innocence. 
 
Dennis finds the justification of the privilege based on the presumption of innocence to be 
over-inclusive.31 It has the potential to account for all manner of evidence that the suspect 
may be in a position to disclose, including confessions, fingerprints, breath or blood samples, 
documents and other real evidence. In practice, though, the scope of the privilege is not so 
encompassing. For example, it does not ordinarily apply to the collection of fingerprints, 
breath or blood samples. Even in the US, where the privilege has express constitutional 
force, it has been limited to testimonial evidence.32 This evidence must result from 
compulsion and must lead to self-incrimination.33 Dennis’s criticism of the presumption of 
innocence as a justification for the privilege is dependent on a restrictive scope of the 
privilege, as it currently exists. If we look at it from a normative perspective, there is no 
reason why the presumption of innocence should not prevent the privilege from allowing 
suspects to withhold any evidence that may incriminate them.34 Therefore, from a 
normative perspective, the presumption of innocence offers a sound justification for the 
privilege and an argument against penalising those who rely on it.  Given the reluctance to 
interpret the privilege broadly, however, the presumption of innocence justification will 
remain over-inclusive in practice.  
 
Protecting the innocent 
The Saunders Court stated that the privilege against self-incrimination helps prevent 
miscarriages of justice. It is unlikely that the privilege will assist in securing accurate 
convictions, as it acts to prevent the gathering of potentially relevant information, but it may 
have value in its ability to secure the acquittal of innocent suspects through the prevention 
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of disclosure of false information. This is most relevant in the context of police questioning, 
where the privilege can act as an inhibitor on over-zealous police officers. A requirement to 
answer questions or provide other evidence can put undue pressure on suspects, 
particularly vulnerable ones. This concern can often be addressed through other measures, 
such as those found in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), including the 
recording of interviews and the provision of legal advice. Furthermore, s.76 of PACE provides 
for the exclusion of unreliable confessions, and s.78 allows judges to exclude prosecution 
evidence that would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. Dennis sees 
the value in the use of these other available safeguards, since they do not carry the costs 
associated with the privilege (i.e. loss of reliable evidence).35 Adopting alternative safeguards 
may have the same effect in the individual cases in which they can be relied on, but they do 
not render the privilege against self-incrimination as a potential means of protection 
redundant. The privilege has the benefit of offering a blanket protection, and its application 
does not rely on the discretion of any individual.  
 
Dennis believes that an account of the privilege based on its protection of the innocent is 
plainly under-inclusive. He suggests that the privilege is probably ineffective in preventing 
compelled false incrimination from innocent suspects in the peculiar environment of police 
interrogation, and that such limited protection as it may offer is unnecessary where the 
custodial regime is closely regulated by legislation and the willingness of courts to use 
exclusionary principles in the interest of securing legitimate verdicts.36 He concludes that the 
most likely beneficiaries of the privilege under this theory are the hardened, but innocent 
suspects who currently take advantage of the right to silence and who are at risk from 
increased pressure if it is removed.37  Likewise, Dolinko believes that the instances in which 
the privilege prevents conviction of the innocent are likely to constitute so small a 
proportion of all its uses that it is difficult to take seriously the notion that the privilege is 
justified as a safeguard for the innocent.38 However, some commentators see real value in 
the privilege as a means of protecting the innocent. For instance, Seidmann and Stein claim 
that allowing suspects to remain silent and not incriminate themselves discourages guilty 
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defendants from giving false accounts.39 With fewer false accounts being given, the claims of 
innocent suspects will be taken more seriously. This is linked to the specific application of 
the privilege to remaining silent. The effect of silence during questioning, as well as the 
pressures put on suspects to speak, is a prominent issue in debates on the right to silence. 
This is addressed in the following chapter.   
 
Schulhofer also proposes that it is possible to defend the privilege on the grounds that it 
offers some protection to the innocent, particularly during police interrogation.40 He argues 
that it is difficult to know when an innocent suspect has actually been protected by the 
privilege, and so the absence of obvious examples in which the privilege has protected the 
innocent, hardly shows that real cases involving harm to innocent suspects would not occur 
if the privilege were abolished.41 Schulhofer does not claim that the privilege is essential for 
most innocent defendants, but that acquitting the innocent defendants whom it may help is 
more important than convicting an equal or larger number of guilty defendants.42 Again, 
these arguments are largely based on the application of the right to silence during police 
questioning; it remains the case that the broader conception of the privilege as a means of 
protecting the innocent is a weak justification.  
 
5.3.2 Substantive values 
The substantive values of the privilege against self-incrimination are concerned with the 
instrumental protection of certain interests of the suspect. This section examines whether 
the privilege can be defended on the grounds that it protects the accused’s privacy and 
prevents him from facing a cruel choice imposed on him by the state.   
 
Preventing cruel choices 
The privilege against self-incrimination may be rationalised on the basis that it prevents 
suspects and defendants from facing the ‘cruel trilemma’ of having to choose between being 
penalised for non-cooperation, providing the authorities with incriminating evidence, or 
lying and risking prosecution for perjury. Redmayne has referred to this as the most intuitive 
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defence for the privilege.43 However, not all commentators agree. Bentham was a critic of 
this rationale. He labelled those who object to such harshness as ‘old women’.44 One 
problem with defending this justification is that it is only the guilty who suffer from the 
trilemma. It is, thus, inconsistent with the presumption of innocence because the underlying 
premise assumes that the suspect is guilty and, therefore, the privilege operates to protect 
the guilty, not the innocent. It may seem hard to comprehend the appearance of the state 
prioritising the interests of guilty suspects over those of their victims.45 However, one must 
recall that, despite the ‘balancing’ rhetoric and the increasing recognition of the interests of 
victims discussed in chapter 2, the criminal process is about the relationship between citizen 
and state, and the privilege is concerned with what the state can legitimately require of 
suspects, irrespective of their guilt. Nevertheless, the limited applicability of this 
justification, and its incompatibility with a broad interpretation of the presumption of 
innocence, makes it difficult to advance.  
 
It may be argued that the cruel choices justification is applicable to all accused persons, 
because innocent people can face a similar trilemma. For instance, innocent suspects in road 
traffic cases who are required to disclose the driver of their vehicle at a particular place or 
time may have a difficult choice in deciding whether to face sanctions for non-cooperation 
or incriminate a close friend or family member. Redmayne finds this duty to ‘other-
incriminate’ disturbing, as it does not recognise affective bonds and may undermine a 
person’s feelings of personal integrity.46 It is not just an issue in regard to close relationships, 
but may also pose a difficult situation for a witness to a crime they believe is justified.  
 
Proponents of the cruelty justification may also assert that it does more than face the 
accused with a difficult choice; it requires him to inflict harm on himself by increasing the 
likelihood of conviction and punishment, as well as subjection to community condemnation 
and ridicule. However, Dolinko explains that conviction, punishment and condemnation are 
often the desired end results of the criminal justice system and, so, should not be labelled 
‘cruel’.47 So long as we accept that the general practice of punishment is not inherently 
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cruel, we are deprived of one possible basis for thinking it cruel to compel someone to help 
bring punishment on himself.48 From a normative perspective, what matters is that the state 
has accounted for its accusations before punishment is imposed. But the cruelty does not 
necessarily lie in the consequence; it may lie in the circumstances that lead the suspect to 
face that consequence. Self-incrimination (or other-incrimination) might be considered cruel 
because it forces people to make an exceptionally difficult choice. It is contrary to basic 
human instinct of self-preservation that few of us could conform to.49 For this reason, it is 
wrong to punish people for failing to disclose self-incriminatory information when almost all 
of us would do the same. Dolinko gets around this by noting that we punish people for other 
forms of ‘self-preservation’, such as destroying evidence or committing perjury.50 It is 
interesting to note, however, that this latter type of ‘self-preservation’ requires the active 
involvement of the suspect, whereas refusing to incriminate oneself (particularly in the face 
of direct questioning) is ordinarily a passive activity for which punishment for non-
cooperation may seem particularly harsh. Nevertheless, the guilty suspect puts himself in 
that position by committing the crime. Dolinko finds no cruelty or hypocrisy in this.51  
 
The prevention of cruelty does not offer a solid rationale for the privilege. The purpose of 
compelling self-incrimination is not in itself to inflict cruelty onto the suspect, but rather to 
further the aims of the criminal process, and it is difficult to maintain that the trilemma 
which the accused faces is actually ‘cruel’.  
 
Protection of privacy  
The witness privilege of the eighteenth and nineteenth century could be used as a safeguard 
of privacy, saving the witness from answering questions that may harm his reputation.52 The 
modern privilege afforded to suspects and defendants has also been justified on privacy 
grounds. Galligan claims that, in principle, there is no difference between requiring the 
suspect to provide incriminating information through speech and plugging him into a mind-
reading machine.53 Beyond questioning, physical searches and the requirement to provide 
real evidence may also impede privacy. However, whereas the privilege is said to concern 
the use made of the evidence obtained rather than the nature of the disclosure, issues of 
                                                             
48
 Ibid 1104. 
49 Ibid 1095. 
50 Ibid 1106. 
51 Ibid 1100. 
52
 Smith (n 8) 158. 
53 DJ Galligan ‘The Right to Silence Reconsidered’ (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 69, 89. 
118 
 
privacy will inevitably arise from the nature of the disclosure.54 As a result, the privacy 
justification runs into difficulties. 
 
There are two other immediate problems with a justification for the privilege based on 
privacy. These are that, the privilege protects only against self-incrimination and not the 
disclosure of private information by others, and that the privilege can only ensure the 
privacy of potentially incriminating information and not other potentially harmful 
information.55 Even when the notion of privacy is limited to the suspect’s consciousness, it is 
still possible to gather information about the suspect’s thoughts, beliefs and feelings 
through other means, such as physical evidence or through questioning other people.56 
Gerstein tries to develop a good reason for retaining the privilege based on privacy by 
showing that it is a necessary part of a system of criminal law which is based on a respect for 
individual dignity.57 He links the idea of privacy to the control that we have over information 
about ourselves, with any compulsory self-incrimination being an obvious involuntary 
relinquishment of control over information.58 Gerstein sees self-incriminatory information as 
particularly important for the individual to be able to control because a confession involves 
the admission of wrongdoing, self-condemnation and the revelation of remorse. He argues 
that a man ought to have absolute control over the making of such revelations as these.59  
 
Although this theory seems to solve the problem of why the privilege only protects 
incriminating information obtained from the suspect himself, it is open to criticism because 
the disclosure of incriminating information has no direct nor necessary link to feelings of 
wrongdoing, self-condemnation or remorse. Confessing to what one has done is not 
tantamount to confessing how one feels about these actions, even if the offender considers 
himself part of the same moral community as those whom he has harmed. It is entirely 
possible to rationalise and justify one’s conduct in such a way that a confession or other 
means of self-incrimination does not express feelings of wrongdoing, self-condemnation or 
remorse. Furthermore, what interests the police and prosecution in the first instance is not 
the accused’s personal feelings about the offence committed, but the bare facts of the 
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crime.60 Gerstein’s approach protects against a very narrow range of intrusions upon privacy, 
not enough to claim the protection of privacy as a general justification for the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The protection of privacy justification is thus flawed by its narrow 
applicability. It would allow penalties to be imposed against suspects for not cooperating in 
ways that do not engage their privacy and, so, does little to advance the argument for a 
criminal process based on calling the state to account for its accusations against the accused.  
 
 
5.3.3 The relationship between citizen and state 
With the exception of the presumption of innocence, the justifications discussed above 
suffer as self-contained accounts of the privilege against self-incrimination. However, whilst 
the presumption offers a rationale consistent with the normative theory put forward in this 
thesis, it is hampered when applied to the privilege in practice. Like the presumption of 
innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination expresses some pivotal principles about 
the relationship between the citizen and the state. More needs to be said about the nature 
of this relationship, as it forms an important basis for the normative theory of calling the 
state to account and provides an argument against requiring participation.  
 
Normatively, the state ought to treat each citizen as if he or she were innocent until 
convicted of a criminal offence, and the accused should not be required or expected to assist 
the state in accounting for its allegations or proving guilt. This is because, in a liberal 
democratic society, the state’s powers in relation to the detection and prosecution of crime 
should be exercised according to certain standards that show respect for the dignity and 
autonomy of each individual.61 Autonomy is respected by allowing freedom of choice, 
exhibited in many legal rights and norms, including the privilege against self-incrimination. It 
affords the accused with a choice of whether to participate in criminal proceedings. The 
state’s power can be kept in check by placing limitations on what it can legitimately require 
of the accused.  The privilege against self-incrimination offers one means of doing so and 
helps ensure that the state can be held to account without the active participation or 
assistance of the accused. 
 
It is clear that one key reason to reinforce this relationship between citizen and state stems 
from the need to regulate the use of state power and protect those accused of criminal 
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wrongdoing from abuses of that power. Dennis argues that the best justification for the 
privilege is to be found in the idea that it is necessary to prevent the abuse of state power.62 
This is, in turn, referable to the overall aim of the law of evidence to safeguard the 
legitimacy of criminal proceedings and its outcome.63 As explained in chapter 2, Dennis’s 
notion of a legitimate verdict has three qualities: it should be factually accurate; it should be 
morally authoritative; and it should be founded on respect for the rule of law.64 In an 
adversary system of criminal adjudication based on formal equality of parties, there is an 
inherent danger of unfairness in the state exploiting its enforcement power to place an 
individual in a vulnerable position.65 Dennis points to the risk that either investigative 
powers may be used to obtain evidence that is factually unreliable or they may be misused 
to compel the production of incriminating evidence by means inconsistent with the 
fundamental values of criminal law. If either of the risks materialises, the legitimacy of the 
criminal verdict may be compromised.66 The benefit of the privilege in this regard is not 
limited to Dennis’s conception of the legitimate verdict. By protecting suspects from abuse 
of state power, the privilege may also uphold a more general conception of legitimacy based 
on accurate fact finding, respect for rights, due process and fair procedures. The role that 
the privilege plays in restricting the abuse of state power is particularly apparent in the 
context of police interrogation where there is also the most potential for the privilege to 
protect innocent suspects.  
 
The privilege against self-incrimination may also regulate and reinforce the relationship 
between the citizen and the state by acting as what Redmayne has described as a ‘distancing 
mechanism’.67 On this basis, no distinction should be drawn between requirements to speak 
and requirements to provide real evidence.68 A duty to cooperate creates a requirement to 
help, or assist the state, suggesting identification with the state’s goals. Although one can 
give evidence reluctantly or defiantly, and the state cannot force us to agree with it, the fact 
remains that one is helping the state, and it then becomes difficult to distance oneself from 
the assistance. In this respect the privilege operates as a distancing mechanism, allowing us 
to disassociate ourselves from, or disavow, particular criminal prosecutions. This ability to 
keep some distance between us and the state is valuable when assisting a prosecution 
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would conflict with deeply held commitments.69  The privilege allows citizens to avoid what 
will often be a significant personal sacrifice.70 Such sacrifices could interfere with the 
citizen’s autonomy and dignity which should be maintained in a liberal democracy. The 
interest of all suspects in not being obliged to incriminate themselves derives from the 
values attached to freedom and dignity of the individual.71 A justification for the privilege 
based on the relationship between citizen and state and the citizen’s ability to distance 
himself from the state, therefore, applies equally to guilty and innocent suspects.  
 
As Redmayne notes, arguments surrounding the privilege are closely connected to difficult 
questions of political morality and liberalism.72 These questions are about the ways in which 
we can demand that citizens support state institutions, about when it is legitimate to 
sanction conduct, and about how we can preserve a degree of citizen autonomy while 
maintaining a functioning state.73 This makes it hard to coherently articulate the purpose of 
the privilege. Jackson argues that it would seem to be difficult to justify the privilege against 
self-incrimination in terms of a self-standing right that should exist independently of the 
absolute right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and the 
qualified rights to privacy and the general right of silence.74 He contends that if it is difficult 
to make out a convincing case for such a substantive right on its own ground, it is equally 
difficult to make a convincing case for the need for such a privilege in order to safeguard 
other principles.75 At the end of his detailed analysis on the subject, Dolinko concludes that 
leading contemporary efforts to justify the privilege as more than a historical relic are 
uniformly unsatisfactory and that no efforts along similar lines are likely to succeed.76 
However, he goes on to acknowledge that a rule that lacks any principled justification may 
nevertheless come to serve important functions in the legal system as a whole.77  
 
Despite Jackson and Dolinko’s conclusions, there is a case to submit that the privilege 
against self-incrimination is useful in its own right as a way of defining and reinforcing our 
relationship as individuals with the state, as well as reinforcing the role of the criminal 
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process as calling the state to account for its accusations and request for condemnation and 
punishment of the accused. When we recognise these reasons for respecting the decision of 
defendants not to cooperate, we have a reason to recognise a privilege against self-
incrimination. This can support a wide interpretation of the privilege which does not impose 
sanctions on those who rely on it. When we limit the privilege by using state powers to 
require defendant participation and by sanctioning those who do not cooperate, we are 
transforming the relationship of the state and the citizen as well as the nature of criminal 
procedure. The privilege against self-incrimination operates as a restraint on the state’s 
power, as a distancing mechanism, and as a means of protecting the accused’s autonomy 
and dignity. Even a limited scope for the privilege can go some way to protecting the 
relationship between citizen and state. However, because the precise purpose of the 
privilege lacks clarity, its scope cannot readily be defined and, as discussed in the following 
section, this has led to confusion and inconsistency. Nonetheless, recognising it as a 
reinforcement of the relationship between citizen and state in a liberal democracy can offer 
a reason for adopting a broad scope.  
 
 
5.4 The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination 
 
Most commentators accept that even if valuable, we should be prepared to recognise 
exceptions to the privilege against self-incrimination.78 However, since the privilege is 
concerned with preventing the state from requiring the cooperation of the accused, 
recognising exceptions may in practice result in requirements for the accused to cooperate 
and the imposition of penalties for failure to comply. These penalties currently include 
prosecution for specific offences of non-compliance. This has significant implications for a 
procedural model affiliated with adversarialism, and even greater implications for a theory 
of the criminal process based on calling the state to account. This section examines the 
existing scope of the privilege and its ramifications. 
 
Because the scope of the privilege is not spelt out in the constitutional documents in which 
it is found, it becomes a matter of interpretation for the courts. The extent to which 
suspects and defendants can currently rely on the privilege against self-incrimination is 
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unclear. This is largely due to confusing and inconsistent judgments from both the domestic 
courts and European Court of Human Rights. In order to gain some understanding of the 
current scope of the privilege, and when it is considered acceptable to penalise non-
cooperation, it is necessary to evaluate the significant cases.  
 
5.4.1 The case law 
The privilege against self-incrimination was first recognised by the European Court of Human 
Rights as an implicit fair trial guarantee under Article 6 in Funke v France.79 The applicant had 
been suspected of tax evasion and required to provide customs authorities with statements 
of his overseas bank accounts. He was fined for not complying with this requirement. The 
European Court held that the special features of customs law could not justify an 
infringement of the rights of anyone charged with a criminal offence to remain silent and 
not to contribute to incriminating themselves. This case was significant not only because it 
recognised the privilege as a fundamental right, but also because the privilege’s ability to 
obstruct the role of the suspect as an informational resource is at odds with the inquisitorial 
tendencies of many of the contracting states. However, the decision did not specify whether 
the implied right to the privilege was absolute and, thus, did little to set out a 
comprehensive scope for it. 
 
The potentially broad recognition of the privilege in Funke was refined in a less than 
satisfactory way in Saunders v UK.80 This case involved an administrative as opposed to 
criminal inquiry which in itself does not engage Article 6. However, the applicant’s refusal to 
cooperate with the investigation under the Companies Act 1985 could have led to a finding 
of contempt of court and the imposition of a fine or committal to prison for up to two years. 
It was no defence to such refusal that the questions were of an incriminating nature.81 
Furthermore, any information gained from the inquiry could be used against the applicant in 
criminal proceedings.  Although the Court found that there had been a violation of the 
privilege, it held that: 
As commonly understood in the legal systems of the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention and elsewhere, [the privilege against self-incrimination] does not extend 
to the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the 
accused through use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent 
of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a 
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warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purposes of DNA 
testing.82 
 
In placing these restrictions on the breadth of the privilege the Court made three 
distinctions with regard to its application. These concerned: the type of material sought to 
be obtained; the use made of that material; and the existence of criminal proceedings 
against the suspect. Confusingly, the type of material covered by the privilege explicitly 
excluded pre-existing documents which were held to fall within the privilege in Funke. This 
has subsequently led to uncertainty regarding when, and in relation to what, the privilege 
applies. It is also curious why there should be a distinction between answers to questions 
(which are dependent on the will of the suspect) and other evidence. In the later Privy 
Council case of Brown v Stott,83 Lord Bingham noted that the distinction between answering 
questions and providing physical samples should not be pushed too far. He maintained that 
while it is true that the respondent’s answer to a question would create new evidence which 
did not exist previously, it may also be acknowledged that, although the percentage of 
alcohol in one’s blood is a fact existing before being tested, the whole purpose of requiring a 
person to blow into a breathalyser is to obtain evidence not available until that has been 
done.84 Furthermore, providing physical samples can be much more invasive than requiring 
answers to questions. It is thus not easy to comprehend why a requirement to answer a 
question is objectionable, whereas a requirement to undergo a breath test is not.  
 
What concerned the Court in Saunders was not the requirement to provide information, but 
the use made of that information in a subsequent criminal trial.85 The decision gave rise to 
the concept of ‘use immunity’ whereby information can be obtained under compulsion, but 
not subsequently used against a person in criminal proceedings. This is important in relation 
to the apparent exception to the privilege that arises during administrative investigations. 
For example, the Serious Fraud Office and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
have compulsory powers to require people to answer questions and provide information 
with the threat of criminal sanction for non-compliance. The existence of such powers is 
generally argued to be essential for establishing how relevant enterprises were managed 
and for tracing the whereabouts of missing assets.86 The inquisitorial nature of these powers 
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is thought to impliedly remove the privilege.87 Although the legitimate use of such evidence 
has varied, as a result of Saunders, information obtained in this way cannot subsequently be 
used in criminal proceedings against those required to disclose it. Section 59 and Schedule 3 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 inserted use immunity provisions into a 
large number of the statutory powers concerned with fraudulent investigations. An 
important caveat of use immunity is that it protects answers and statements, but not pre-
existing documents disclosed under compulsion. 
 
Despite the confusion created by the judgment in Saunders, Ward and Gardner claim to 
have found logic in it. They believe that the Court had made an important distinction; the 
privilege would serve to prevent the use at trial of material obtained through the active 
cooperation of the accused.88 This would seem to tally with a criminal process based on 
calling the state to account, in which the accused’s cooperation should be a choice rather 
than a requirement. However, Saunders does not provide for this. The taking of bodily 
samples and the handing over of pre-existing documents might require the suspect to take 
positive steps, or at least cooperate with procedures for obtaining the evidence.89 In order 
for this interpretation of the privilege to be consistent with a ‘no assistance’ approach, the 
material would need to be taken by force. This poses other legal problems. Not only has the 
European Court found a violation of the privilege in circumstances where evidence was 
forcibly obtained from a suspect, but they also held that this violated Article 3.90 The same 
problem occurs for a conception of the privilege suggested by Redmayne: If we interpret the 
scope of the privilege broadly it protects us from a requirement to cooperate and so must 
apply to all manner of information including that which has an existence independent of our 
will. 91 The privilege is thus means, not material based. It applies to a certain means of 
obtaining information, a means that requires cooperation, and not to a particular type of 
information.92 If real evidence and physical samples are forcibly taken then the privilege is 
not breached. If this interpretation is correct then the privilege is breached when material is 
obtained by threatening suspects with prosecution for non-cooperation, and not when that 
material can be obtained without cooperation. Although this is normatively consistent, as 
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already noted, it is not the practical reality and post-Saunders cases have required the 
‘active cooperation’ of the suspect in providing both pre-existing material and material 
dependent on his will.  
 
In Brown v Stott93 the Privy Council found that it was difficult to obtain clear guidance from 
the European jurisprudence and that there had been a ‘defect in the reasoning’ of 
Saunders.94 However, the court’s ratio decidendi in Brown is also unconvincing. The applicant 
had been compelled to incriminate herself by telling the police who had been driving her car 
before having to provide a breath sample which proved positive for alcohol. In finding no 
violation of Article 6, the court relied on the fact that the compulsion involved answering 
one single, simple question, and found that the pursuit of road safety outbalanced the 
suspect’s individual right to a privilege against self-incrimination.95 Lord Bingham was of the 
opinion that the single, simple answer to the question of who was driving the car could not 
of itself incriminate the suspect, since it is not without more an offence to drive the car. It 
may however provide proof of a fact necessary to convict. Yet, it is obvious that in certain 
circumstances, for an individual to state he was the driver of a car will be tantamount to a 
confession of an offence.  The court limited the privilege on the same proportionality basis 
as qualified Convention rights; namely that the single, simple question was proportionate to 
the legitimate aim of road safety. This public interest argument had already been dismissed 
by Strasbourg in Funke and in Saunders where it was unconvinced by the government’s 
argument that the public interest in the investigation of corporate fraud could justify a 
departure from the privilege.96 By diverging from the European jurisprudence, this case 
signals a rejection of a European model of criminal procedure based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
 
Despite the Privy Council’s more restrictive approach, Strasbourg initially continued to 
follow its own jurisprudence. In Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland the European Court held 
that any interference with the privilege must not destroy its ‘very essence’.97 The applicants 
were suspected of involvement in a terrorist bombing which resulted in several deaths and 
injuries. They had been required to account for their movements during a specific twenty-
four hour period. Failure to meet this requirement was in itself a criminal offence of which 
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the applicants were convicted. The European Court followed its previous rejection of 
proportionality arguments and held that the requirement to provide the information could 
not be justified on security and public order grounds. There was thus an infringement of 
Article 6. The fact that this was a particularly serious case, which could have had a strong 
public interest, strengthens the argument against limiting the privilege on proportionality 
and public interest grounds.  
 
JB v Switzerland98 is another European Court case which involved requirements to produce 
documents and declare a source of income. The applicant, who had been the subject of tax 
evasion proceedings, was fined for non-compliance with those requirements. The tax 
evasion proceedings against him were themselves criminal proceedings and the court found 
that the procedure by which the applicant was fined for non-compliance was also the 
determination of a criminal charge. The Court therefore found a breach of the privilege. 
However, this was another poorly reasoned judgment. Despite relying on Saunders and 
citing the distinction between material having an existence independent of the suspect and 
material obtained through defiance of the suspect’s will, the court held that the pre-existing 
documents were within the realm of the privilege. 
  
The decision in Allen v UK99 suggests that the existence of a criminal prosecution for failure 
to comply with a requirement to provide information may be the decisive factor in 
determining whether there has been a breach of the privilege. The European Court found no 
violation of the privilege, as the applicant had been prosecuted for providing false 
information, not for refusing to provide information. The case was distinguished from Funke, 
Heaney and JB on the basis that the applicant was not prosecuted for failing to provide 
information which might have incriminated him in pending or anticipated criminal 
proceedings.100 However, had he refused to provide information there would have been a 
penalty attached. The defining feature was therefore the existence of an actual, not 
potential, prosecution. The court noted that there was no pending or anticipated criminal 
proceeding against the applicant and that he might have provided false information to 
prevent the revenue authorities from uncovering conduct which could have led to a 
prosecution. This did not suffice to bring the privilege into play. 
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King v UK101 followed the distinction drawn in Saunders between criminal and administrative 
investigations. Here, the Court held that there was no infringement of Article 6, partly 
because any criminal proceedings the applicant faced were from a refusal to provide 
information to the tax authorities so that tax liability could be calculated, and not from a 
refusal to cooperate with a prosecution. A similar distinction was drawn in Weh v Austria102 
in which the applicant was fined for providing inaccurate information regarding the driver of 
his car. As criminal proceedings had not been initiated against the applicant for the initial 
driving offence, he could not claim the protection of the privilege. The court found no links 
between the criminal proceedings which had been initiated against persons unknown for the 
driving offence and the proceedings in which the applicant was fined for giving inaccurate 
information. However, three dissenting judges felt that the applicant had been effectively 
charged with a criminal offence at the time he was asked to provide information and that 
there was thus a breach of Article 6. These last four cases in particular (JB, Allen, King, and 
Weh) highlight the distinction between administrative and criminal investigations. Where 
the investigation is administrative in nature, criminal proceedings against the suspect in 
relation to the required information seem necessary in order to engage the privilege. This 
was also the case in Saunders where refusal to cooperate with the Department of Trade and 
Industry inspectors was punishable as an offence. Even when the requirement to provide 
information in an administrative investigation is held to fall outside the scope of the 
privilege, the use of the information in any subsequent prosecution may violate Article 6.  
 
Jalloh v Germany103 differed from the cases concerning administrative investigations. 
Instead, it concerned the use of evidence obtained through the forcible administration of 
emetics. The relevant evidence was a bag of cocaine swallowed by the applicant. This case 
demonstrates the potential difficulties in gathering incriminating evidence from the suspect 
which, on the face of it, exists independent of his will. The court found that the bag of 
cocaine could fall into the category of material having an existence independent of the will 
of the suspect, the use of which is generally not prohibited in criminal proceedings. 
However, there were several elements held to distinguish it from the examples of such 
material given in Saunders. These were: that the administration of emetics were used to 
retrieve real evidence in defiance of the applicant’s will; that the degree of force used to 
obtain the evidence differed significantly from that normally required to obtain the types of 
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material referred to in Saunders which can usually be produced through the normal 
functioning of the body; and that the evidence was obtained through a procedure which 
violated the applicant’s right not to be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
under Article 3.104 The Court thus found a violation of the privilege.  
 
Whilst it was settled that incriminating evidence obtained through torture should never be 
relied on as proof of guilt, the Jalloh court left open the question of whether the use of real 
evidence obtained through inhuman or degrading treatment always rendered a trial unfair. 
In Gafgen v Germany,105 the European Court followed Jalloh in so far as it held that obtaining 
a confession in violation of Article 3 can impact the fairness of criminal proceedings under 
Article 6. In this case, the defendant, who was accused of kidnap and murder, had been 
subjected to real and immediate threats of torture by the police in order to gain a confession 
and acquire the location of the victim. This amounted to inhuman treatment. However, the 
Court held that the fairness of the trial was only compromised by inhuman treatment if the 
admission of the impugned evidence had a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings 
against the defendant. In this case it did not, hence there was no violation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.   
 
Jalloh is also significant for adopting what appears to be a wholly new approach to 
determining the applicability of the privilege. Four factors were set out to determine 
violations of the right: the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence; the 
weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence in question; 
the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure; and the use to which any material 
so obtained is put.106 Most significant here is the reference to the public interest in the 
investigation and punishment of the offence. It contradicts the decisions in Funke, Saunders, 
and Heaney, but it does follow Lord Bingham’s approach to the issue in Brown v Stott. Taken 
together, the factors presented in Jalloh draw significant parallels with the Brown v Stott 
judgment, and show that the European Court is leaning towards a restrictive scope for the 
privilege based on proportionality.  
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This new proportionality approach was evident in O’Halloran and Francis v UK.107 This case 
involved the same provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as Brown v Stott. Under s.172 of 
the Act, failure of a car owner to declare who was driving their car at a specific time is a 
criminal offence punishable by a fine and penalty points. Similarly, sections 6 and 7 make it 
an offence to refuse to provide breath or blood samples if one is suspected of drunk driving. 
The Road Traffic Act thus provides one of the more striking examples of imposing penalties 
for non-cooperation in the criminal process. The vehicles registered to the two applicants in 
O’Halloran had been caught speeding. They were each asked to provide the name and 
address of the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time and were informed that failure to 
comply was a criminal offence under s.172. Mr O’Halloran named himself as the driver and, 
as a result, was convicted of the driving offence. Mr Francis, on the other hand, refused to 
supply the information and was convicted for his failure to comply. As this was a case of 
direct compulsion in a criminal investigation to provide information dependent on the will of 
the suspect, and was subject to criminal prosecution for non-compliance, it should have 
fallen directly within the scope of the privilege as set out in Saunders.  
 
In finding that the privilege had not been breached, the court considered three of the factors 
set out in Jalloh: the nature and degree of compulsion; the existence of relevant safeguards; 
and the use to which the information was put. They did not have explicit regard for the 
public interest. However, the approach seems to be one of proportionality in all but name, 
being based on a weighting of various factors in the particular context.108 They followed a 
line of argument presented in Brown v Stott, namely that although there was direct 
compulsion, this flowed from the regulatory regime to which car owners and drivers are 
subject. Those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be assumed to have accepted 
certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime relating to ownership 
of a motor vehicle. This includes the obligation to inform authorities of the identity of the 
driver in the event of suspected commission of a road traffic offence.109 This argument 
parallels the more general approach of the criminal law in regards to the imposition of 
positive duties, such duties being most common in regulatory areas like health and safety 
legislation.110 As discussed in chapter 4, the regulatory nature of certain activities has been 
used to justify legal burdens on the defence. Reverse burdens have themselves been held to 
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be a justifiable infringement of Article 6 when they are a proportionate response.111 As such, 
Article 6 is not absolute; possibly making limitations to the privilege appear less 
controversial. However, relying on proportionality concerns to limit fundamental rights is 
always going to be a risky pursuit which can act to undermine the presumption of innocence, 
burden of proof, and the general perception of the criminal process as fair and legitimate.  
 
In a powerful dissent, Judge Pavlovschi found that the majority decision in O’Halloran was 
not only wrong, but also ‘an extremely dangerous approach.’112 He went on to state that:  
[I]n the particular circumstances of the case, compelling an accused to provide self-
incriminating evidence contrary to his will under the threat of criminal prosecution 
amounts to a kind of compulsion which runs counter to the notion of a fair trial and, 
accordingly, is incompatible with the Convention standards.113  
 
As to the ‘regulatory regime’ imposed on car owners, this new criterion is incompatible with 
the established case law. Public interest considerations pave the way for justifiable 
violations of the privilege to other crimes. Judge Pavlovschi fears that, ‘if one begins seeking 
justification from the basic principles of modern criminal procedure and the very essence of 
the notion of a fair trial for reasons of policy, and if the Court starts accepting such reasons, 
we will face a real threat to the European public order as protected by the Convention.’ In 
their dissenting opinion in Weh v Austria, Judges Lorenzen, Levits and Hajiyev also expressed 
concern with balancing the public interest in road safety against the privilege against self-
incrimination. They stated that provisions requiring car owners, on pain of penalty, to admit 
driving their car at the time of a specific offence will require them to provide the prosecution 
with a major element of evidence, being left with limited possibilities of defence in the 
subsequent criminal proceedings. Seen in this light, the infringement of the privilege does 
not appear proportionate to the aim of road safety. They felt that the vital public interest in 
the prosecution of traffic offences could not justify a departure from the basic principles of a 
fair procedure.114 
 
Both Jalloh and O’Halloran signal a significant shift in the European jurisprudence on the 
privilege against self-incrimination and create even more uncertainty as to its scope. It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to determine when, in practice, it might be considered 
acceptable to penalise those who do not cooperate in the criminal process. As a result of 
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these cases, the privilege, like reverse burdens of proof, may be opened up to a broader 
balancing exercise against other legitimate aims in the public interest. If this position is 
reached it will mean that every case in which the privilege is engaged could be decided 
according to the balance between the privilege and the interests of the public.115 Ashworth 
fears that, having stepped away from key points in its Saunders judgment, the European 
Court will come to regard the privilege and other Article 6 rights as capable of being traded 
off against the public interest.116 Such an approach is contrary to both the adversarial history 
of English criminal procedure and a conception of the criminal process whereby the state is 
called to account. 
 
O’Halloran is significant for several reasons: it appears to have brought the European Court 
in line with the domestic approach; it has further restricted the European view of the 
privilege by allowing compulsory questioning on pain of penalty in the determination of a 
criminal charge; and it has further paved the way for public interest concerns to be used as 
acceptable criteria for limiting the privilege. Although Mr O’Halloran initially disclosed the 
required information, Mr Francis was punished for making use of his fundamental right not 
to incriminate himself. In all of the European cases, up to this point, in which direct 
compulsion was applied to obtain information which contributed or could have contributed 
to a suspect’s conviction, the court had found a violation of Article 6. O’Halloran was 
followed by Luckhof and Spanner v Austria.117 This case also involved direct compulsion on 
the applicants to disclose information about the driver of their vehicles at the time of a 
specific driving offence. The case was held to be not materially different from O’Halloran 
and therefore fell to be decided on the same principles.  
 
 
5.4.2 Making sense of the scope 
 
The current scope of the privilege against self-incrimination is more bewildering than ever, 
with the more recent cases of Jalloh and O’Halloran making the older cases such as Saunders 
appear coherent and principled.  As it stands, the privilege does not seem to apply to: the 
gathering of information which has an existence independent of the will of the accused 
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(except where obtaining that information would violate the suspect’s Article 3 rights); 
information which it is necessary to obtain in the interest of road safety (but perhaps not for 
the prevention of terrorism or fraud); and information obtained during administrative 
investigations where that information is not subsequently used in criminal proceedings. 
Furthermore, as a result of the inconsistencies between the judgments in Funke, Saunders 
and JB, there is still confusion over exactly when, and under what circumstance, pre-existing 
documents fall within the scope of the privilege.  
 
Although the European Court initially granted the privilege status as an Article 6 right in a 
decision which left it open to a broad interpretation, it has since been upholding dangerous 
restrictions in controversial, inconsistent and confusing judgments. The continuation of such 
an approach leaves little hope for a process in which the accused can choose whether to 
participate and in which using state power to compel the cooperation of the accused is 
viewed as unacceptable. Instead, it has contributed to the emergence of a participatory 
model of procedure which relies on the participation of the defendant to achieve accurate 
outcomes. The restrictive scope of the privilege, and the imposition of penalties, is designed 
to secure cooperation with requirements to provide information. The value of the 
defendant’s participation in acquiring evidence and contributing to accurate fact finding is 
given greater weight than concern for his fundamental rights.  In a system based on calling 
the state to account, the privilege must be afforded a broad scope. No distinction should be 
drawn between requirements to speak and requirements to provide the authorities with 
documents, blood samples and the like. Where these can be obtained without the active 
cooperation of the accused then no issue surrounding the privilege is raised because he has 
not been required to incriminate himself.  The key point is that the suspect should not be 
required to actively cooperate or assist in proceedings against himself. When cooperation is 
a choice the autonomy of the accused is respected.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Dennis believes that the restrictions on the privilege against self-incrimination have 
happened, at least in part, due to the weakness of the main justifications for it.118 Without 
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having a clear understanding of what the privilege is for, it is inevitably difficult to know 
where to draw the line. Likewise, without a clear scope of the privilege, it will remain 
difficult to determine just what purpose it serves in practice. The current situation does little 
to clarify either the privilege’s scope or its rationale. Nevertheless, as a procedural right and 
a key component of the accused’s ability to choose whether to participate, it should not be 
so easy to interfere with it.  
 
The privilege against self-incrimination has clear links to the rise of adversarialism and, 
therefore, to workable defence rights in general. Its link to the presumption of innocence 
may also have something to do with this history. However, what seems most prevalent is the 
impact that the privilege can have on our relationship as individuals with the state; its ability 
to uphold certain elements of liberal democracy by ensuring our freedom to choose 
participation, rather than having it forced upon us. This is an underlying factor of the 
normative theory of the criminal process in which the state must account for its accusations 
and request for condemnation and punishment. Conversely, by restricting the breadth of the 
privilege in such a way that allows the state to compel its citizens to participate in the 
criminal process, English criminal procedure has shifted further away from its adversarial 
history to a participatory model of criminal procedure.  
 
If we take value in the privilege as a mechanism for reinforcing the boundaries of the state’s 
relationship with its citizens, and accept that these boundaries include the notion that the 
state cannot compel the active cooperation of the accused, then not only is there some sort 
of value or purpose in having the privilege, but there is also a means for determining its 
scope. This scope should be broad, prohibiting any requirement on the suspect to take 
active steps to incriminate himself. Such a conception of the privilege would help ensure 
that the process aims of accurate fact finding and conflict resolution are pursued without 
interfering with the necessary constraints which legitimise the system. Penalising those who 
exercise their choice not to participate by relying on the privilege is an unacceptable use of 
state power which is inimical to the relationship between the citizen and the state and the 
fairness of the proceedings. 
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6 
The Right to Silence 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents further examples of the ways in which defendants are penalised for 
their non-cooperation. It explores the right to silence and the implications of drawing 
adverse inferences from silence. The right to silence implies that a person accused of 
criminal wrongdoing is under no obligation to account for allegations or respond to 
questioning. However, there is no consensus regarding what the right entails. In R v Director 
of Serious Fraud Office Ex p. Smith, Lord Mustill identified six immunities from which the 
right to silence is used to refer: 
(1) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from being compelled on pain 
of punishment to answer questions posed by other persons or bodies. 
(2) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from being compelled on pain 
of punishment to answer questions the answers to which may incriminate them. 
(3) A specific immunity, possessed by all persons under suspicion of criminal responsibility 
whilst being interviewed by police officers or others in similar positions of authority, from 
being compelled on pain of punishment to answer questions of any kind. 
(4) A specific immunity, possessed by accused persons undergoing trial, from being 
compelled to give evidence, and from being compelled to answer questions put to them in 
the dock. 
(5) A specific immunity, possessed by persons who have been charged with a criminal 
offence, from having questions material to the offence addressed to them by police officers 
or persons in a similar position of authority. 
(6) A specific immunity (at least in certain circumstances, which it is unnecessary to explore), 
possessed by accused persons undergoing trial, from having adverse comment made on any 
failure (a) to answer questions before the trial, or (b) to give evidence at the trial.1 
 
Despite their differences in ‘nature, origin, incidence and importance’, all six immunities 
concern the legal significance of silence and the protection of citizens against the abuse of 
powers.2 
 
Like the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence reinforces the accused’s 
ability to choose whether to participate in the criminal process. However, whilst the 
privilege encompasses a more general right not to provide incriminating information to the 
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authorities, the right to silence, as a derivative application of the privilege, is more specific. If 
defined as an absolute right, it should protect suspects from being adversely affected by 
their refusal to answer questions or give testimony in criminal proceedings.  On this basis, to 
say that there is a right to silence should mean that no disadvantage can flow from 
exercising that right. This is an important element of the normative conception of criminal 
procedure in which the state must be able to account for its accusations and request for 
punishment without the active assistance of the accused. However, this understanding of 
the right to silence has been largely undermined by sections 34 to 39 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA). The CJPOA permits adverse inferences to be drawn from 
a suspect’s silence during police questioning, at trial, and where he fails to account for 
certain suspicious circumstances. In effect, it substantially qualifies the accused’s ability to 
exercise his right to silence free from consequence. It creates an expectation of cooperation 
and participation in order to further the aim of accurate fact finding, and to do so efficiently. 
 
It is not an offence or contempt to remain silent. This allows the courts to maintain that 
there is no direct duty to speak.3  Nevertheless, the CJPOA regime penalises suspects and 
defendants who refuse to cooperate in the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process, 
by pressuring them to participate, despite what should be their fundamental rights not to 
and by expressly allowing, if not encouraging, adverse inferences which correlate silence 
with guilt. Non-cooperation can therefore have a detrimental effect on the accused and the 
case outcome. This chapter begins with an assessment of the debate leading to the 
enactment of the CJPOA. It then looks at how the individual provisions have been 
interpreted and applied. It will be shown that, by equating silence with guilt, it has become 
difficult for defendants to test the prosecution case without actively participating. After 
assessing the individual provisions, the practical, normative and theoretical implications of 
the CJPOA are examined. Penalising those who rely on the right to silence, by allowing 
adverse inferences to be drawn, interferes with the factors which underlie the normative 
idea that the criminal process should call the state to account. It is also incompatible with 
notions of fairness and adversarialism set out in earlier chapters. The CJPOA has, thus, 
contributed to the emergence of a participatory model of procedure.  
 
 
6.2 The silence debate  
                                                             
3
 Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29 [48]; Condron v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 1 [59]. 
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Nearly two hundred years ago, Jeremy Bentham stated that, ‘Innocence claims the right of 
speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence.’4 Like Bentham, many critics feel that the 
right to silence acts as a shield for the guilty. These critics might argue that silence in the 
face of accusations constitutes reliable evidence of guilt which should be taken into 
consideration; denying consideration of such evidence could impede accurate fact finding. 
They might also consider silence a barrier to the efficient management of a case, particularly 
by hampering police efforts to investigate crimes. This argument would claim that even if 
drawing adverse inferences did not lead to an increase in the confession or conviction rate, 
by encouraging suspects to talk at an early stage, police questioning could be more 
productive and would tend to tie the suspect to a particular account.5 Requiring a suspect to 
answer questions put to him could therefore increase efficiency and case management, 
something which has been of particular concern in recent years.6 Reforms to the right to 
silence on this basis suggest a shift in the style of English criminal procedure towards a 
model of efficiency and managerialism, whereas the use of silence as a reliable indicator of 
guilt better reflects the inquisitorial emphasis on truth finding.  However, what appears to 
have emerged from these concerns is a participatory style of procedure. 
 
Prior to the CJPOA, reform to the law on the right to silence, which prohibited adverse 
prosecutorial comment and restricted judicial discretion to comment on the relevance of 
silence, had been considered by numerous Committees, Commissions and Working Groups. 
It was also an issue raised in public speeches by politicians, legal professionals and senior 
police officers who often believed the right was being exploited by professional criminals.7 
Those in favour of amending the right to silence included the police service, Crown 
Prosecution Service and the majority of judges, whilst those opposed to reform included the 
Bar Council, Law Society and the Criminal Bar Association.8 In 1972, the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee’s Eleventh Report recommended that courts allow adverse inferences to 
be drawn from silence in the police station and at trial.9 However, these proposals were met 
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with heavy criticism,10 and, in 1981, the majority of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure recommended that ‘the present law on the right to silence in the face of police 
questioning after caution should not be altered.’11 They were unanimous in regards to the 
right to silence in court, stating that to require the accused to answer a prima facie case at 
trial would tend to weaken the initial burden of proof which an accusatorial system places 
upon the prosecution.12 Conversely, a Home Office Working Group, established in the late 
1980s, recommended reforms allowing adverse inferences to be drawn, provided certain 
safeguards were in place. 13  In 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice advised 
against reforming the right to silence. The majority of the Commission felt that the possible 
increase in convictions of the guilty was outweighed by the risk of extra pressure on suspects 
to talk, possibly leading to miscarriages of justice.14 
 
6.2.1 Pre-trial reform 
There were different rationales for reforming the right to silence pre-trial and at trial. In 
relation to pre-trial silence, there was a belief that silence offered a shield for the guilty. 
Reform could therefore increase accurate convictions. However, in summarising the pre-
CJPOA research evidence on silence in the police station, the Royal Commission found that 
the right was exercised only in a minority of cases, and those who remained silent were 
more likely to plead guilty or be found guilty.15 The research evidence neither confirmed nor 
refuted the suggestion that silence is used by a disproportionate number of experienced 
criminals who exploit the system in order to obtain an acquittal.16 Although reform would 
not necessarily increase factually accurate convictions, in 1993, the then Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, announced the intention to modify the right to silence at a Conservative 
Party Conference. It was felt that drawing adverse inferences from silence was a matter of 
common sense, and despite the findings of the Royal Commission as well as later studies on 
the impact of the CJPOA,17 judges continue to speak in these terms. For example, in 
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 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Report Cmnd 8092 (HMSO: London, 1981) 4.53. 
12 Ibid 4.66. 
13 Home Office Working Group on the Right of Silence Report (HMSO: London, 1989). 
14 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (n 8) 53. 
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16 Ibid 53. 
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 T Bucke, R Street and D Brown The Right to Silence: The Impact of the Criminal Justice and Public 
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Webber,18 a case from 2004, the House of Lords stated that ‘the object of s.34 is to bring the 
law back into line with common sense.’19  
 
Those opposing reform to the right to silence, prior to the CJPOA, argued that silence is not 
necessarily an indication of guilt and pointed to the many possible innocent explanations for 
silence.20 For example, pre-trial silence might be a response to: an emotional and highly 
suggestible state of mind; ignorance to some vital facts which explain away otherwise 
suspicious circumstances; confusion and liability to make mistakes which could be 
interpreted as deliberate lies at trial; the protection of others; a reluctance to admit to 
having done something discreditable but not illegal; fear of reprisal; or a generally negative 
attitude or conception of the police and thus reluctance to cooperate with them.21 There 
were concerns that reform would weaken the protection which the right to silence affords 
to innocent suspects. Writing ahead of the CJPOA, Greer claimed that the right to silence 
should not merely remain a vital part of the criminal justice system; it should be 
strengthened.22 This is because its abolition would make it easier for the prosecution to 
establish guilt, thus increasing the possibility of wrongful convictions with no obvious gains 
for law enforcement.23 There exists a link here between the right to silence and the 
allocation of the burden of proof which is returned to in the examination of the theoretical 
implications of the reforms.   
 
Another rationale behind reforming the right to pre-trial silence concerned the use of 
ambush defences whereby a previously undisclosed defence is put forward at trial, catching 
the prosecution off guard. The threat of adverse inferences being drawn from silence at the 
pre-trial stage might encourage a defendant to adopt a consistent account of events. 
However, this rationale cannot extend to reforming the right to silence at trial. The 
defendant’s fear of being cross-examined on his new defence, coupled with the fear of 
having adverse inferences drawn if he does not testify, must be strong enough to tie him to 
one previously disclosed account. The ambush defence argument seems too weak to justify 
the inclusive approach to adverse inferences catered for by the CJPOA. Furthermore, 
ambush defences were not as significant a problem as suggested by pro-reformers. In a 
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study undertaken on behalf of the Royal Commission in 1993, Leng found that the 
proportion of contested cases in which ambush defences were raised was at most five per 
cent.24 Similarly, Zander and Henderson found a rate of seven to ten per cent in a sample of 
Crown Court cases, with two fifths of these causing no problem for the prosecution.25 
Regardless of the prevalence of ambush defences, interfering with an established defence 
right is not an appropriate way of dealing with them. When the prosecution encounter 
specific difficulties in addressing an ambush defence they may be better dealt with through 
the use of short adjournments to allow the prosecution time to investigate the new defence.  
Disclosure rules also intended to curb the use of ambush defences, such as those introduced 
by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, pose their own difficulties for a 
conception of criminal procedure based on calling the state to account, whilst further 
contributing to a shift in the style of English criminal procedure.26  
 
6.2.2 Trial reform 
Owing to the vulnerability of suspects and the risk of abuse of power associated with 
custodial interrogation, there has been more academic objection towards curtailing the right 
to silence in the police station than in court.27 However, most of the key arguments for 
reform were aimed at diminishing the negative effects of pre-trial silence on accurate 
outcomes and efficiency. Silence at trial can have little impact on the efficient investigation 
of crime or on the use of ambush defences. One might assume that participation at trial 
affects accurate fact finding in so far as it allows the defendant’s evidence to be tested and 
taken into account, but the actual impact this has on the factual accuracy of outcomes is 
questionable and relies on an assumption that silence is an indicator of guilt. Situations in 
which an innocent defendant might decline to testify at trial include: an unsympathetic 
character; being vulnerable or suggestible; sensitive or embarrassing subject matter; a 
physical or mental condition falling short of that required to be unfit to plead; an inability to 
recall the incident in question; stress or anxiety; fear of undermining a co-defendant’s case; 
or fear of reprisals. 28  
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Reforming the right to silence in court was intended to do more than clarify the common 
law’s position on judicial discretion to comment on silence.29 Given that it does little to 
address the reformer’s concerns regarding ambush defences and efficiency, it seems that its 
purpose was to increase participation. Redmayne points out that adverse inferences should 
not be drawn for instrumental reasons, such as encouraging defendants to speak.30 
However, this appears to be the intention of drawing adverse inferences from silence at 
trial. Its utility is in calling the accused to account and assisting the prosecution in securing 
convictions. It therefore adds force to the shift away from adversarialism and the idea of the 
trial as a forum for testing the prosecution case. The situation is comparable to the pre-
adversarial altercation trial in which there was an expectation that the accused would 
participate.31  Ultimately, the arguments against reform to the right of silence were either 
ignored or overlooked. The CJPOA introduced the reforms which had attracted significant 
criticism each time they were proposed. The following three sections set out the relevant 
CJPOA provisions and the key issues surrounding them.  
 
 
6.3 Sections 36 and 37  
 
Although the focus of this chapter is on sections 34 and 35, it is also important to consider 
sections 36 and 37. 
Section 36 provides that: 
(1) Where —  
(a) a person is arrested by a constable, and there is —  
(i) on his person; or  
(ii) in or on his clothing or footwear; or  
(iii) otherwise in his possession; or  
(iv) in any place in which he is at the time of his arrest,  
any object, substance or mark, or there is any mark on any such object; and 
(b) that or another constable investigating the case reasonably believes that the presence of 
the object, substance or mark may be attributable to the participation of the person 
arrested in the commission of an offence specified by the constable; and  
(c) the constable informs the person arrested that he so believes, and requests him to 
account for the presence of the object, substance or mark; and  
(d) the person fails or refuses to do so,  
then if, in any proceedings against the person for the offence so specified, evidence of those 
matters is given, subsection (2) below applies. 
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(2) Where this subsection applies —  
… 
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and  
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged,  
may draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper. 
 
Section 37 provides that: 
(1) Where —  
(a) a person arrested by a constable was found by him at a place at or about the time the 
offence for which he was arrested is alleged to have been committed; and  
(b) that or another constable investigating the offence reasonably believes that the presence 
of the person at that place and at that time may be attributable to his participation in the 
commission of the offence; and  
(c) the constable informs the person that he so believes, and requests him to account for 
that presence; and  
(d) the person fails or refuses to do so,  
then if, in any proceedings against the person for the offence, evidence of those matters is 
given, subsection (2) below applies. 
 
(2) Where this subsection applies —  
…  
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and  
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged,  
may draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper. 
 
It is important to draw attention to these often overlooked provisions, as they penalise 
those who do not cooperate in the criminal process in much the same way as sections 34 
and 35, albeit in more limited circumstances. Section 36 allows inferences to be drawn from 
an arrested person’s failure to account for suspicious objects, substances and marks. Section 
37 permits adverse inferences to be drawn from an arrested person’s failure to account for 
his suspicious presence at a particular place around the time that an offence was 
committed. Before these sections can operate, the police must explain why the 
circumstances are suspicious and that adverse inferences may be drawn.32 Furthermore, the 
investigating constable must reasonably believe that the circumstances may be attributable 
to the accused’s participation in the commission of the offence and advise the accused of 
this.33 As well as reinforcing the suspiciousness of certain circumstances, sections 36 and 37 
signal a desire for the accused to cooperate in the criminal process. Great pressure is placed 
upon them to offer an explanation, and failure to comply is penalised through adverse 
inferences. Unlike s.34 which requires the defendant to rely on a previously unmentioned 
fact before an adverse inference can be drawn, sections 36 and 37 apply regardless of the 
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particulars of the accused’s subsequent defence. The fact that he failed to explain the 
circumstances when questioned is sufficient. This suggests that the inferences which may be 
drawn under these sections relate directly to guilt rather than to the credibility of any 
defence at trial.34 However, silence cannot be the sole or main evidence against the 
defendant and the jury must be given a direction similar to that under s.34 and in line with 
the Judicial Studies Board specimen directions, discussed below. The most crucial point is 
that the jury must be told that they can only hold against the defendant a failure to give an 
explanation if they are sure that he had no acceptable explanation to offer.35  
 
Since the accused must be under arrest before these sections become applicable, he will 
have been cautioned and made aware of the consequences of failing to cooperate. 
However, unless he is at an authorised place of detention when questioned, he will not have 
been given access to a solicitor.36 He will therefore be expected to account for the relevant 
suspicious circumstances without the benefit of legal advice. As a result, the threat of 
adverse inferences could be used to encourage the accused to offer an explanation, 
regardless of the fact that he may be largely ignorant of the circumstances surrounding the 
offence, his arrest, the criminal process, or his rights as a suspect. Although detrimental for 
the accused, this might be advantageous for the police and prosecution, particularity in 
cases of secondary liability, such as joint enterprise and aiding and abetting where the 
accused’s failure to answer questions at the scene of a crime may help establish a case 
through the use of inferences under s.37.  This is further compounded by the fact that the 
defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime can in itself constitute encouragement of a 
crime if it was intended to, and did in fact, do so.37   
 
The fact that legal advice is not necessary before inferences can be drawn under sections 36 
and 37 when the accused has been questioned outside of the police station may be in 
conflict with the European Court’s decision in Murray v UK.38 They suggested that access to a 
lawyer was of paramount importance from the initial stage of police interrogation where the 
accused faces a dilemma relating to his defence.39 Such a dilemma arises where exercising 
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the right to silence may lead to adverse inferences. In addition, the application of sections 
36 and 37 in the absence of legal advice may be at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Cadder.40 Following the Strasbourg ruling in Salduz v Turkey,41 they held that, under Article 
6, the suspect must have access to legal advice before being interrogated by the police. 
Nonetheless, this decision seems to be confined to the point at which the suspect is in police 
detention. Sections 36 and 37 may fall outside of these decisions on the grounds that the 
right to access to legal advice, found in s.58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE), applies to arrested persons held in custody. Furthermore, it may be argued that 
inferences drawn from silence outside of the police station in the absence of legal advice are 
justifiable because the police and suspect are on more equal terms.42 If the decisions in 
Murray and Cadder acted to prohibit police questioning in the absence of provision for legal 
advice before detention in police custody, sections 36 and 37 could lose much of their 
applicability.   
 
A possible connection between silence and acceptance of guilt in suspicious circumstances 
arose in Collins.43 Two defendants were approached by the police and, before being 
cautioned or arrested, were questioned about a crime that had recently been committed 
nearby. The issue was whether one of the defendants had adopted his co-defendant’s lie by 
remaining silent and omitting to correct it. It was held that in this instance mere silence 
could not of itself amount to adoption of an answer, that the defendant had been entitled to 
exercise his right to silence and that the trial judge had been wrong to allow the co-
defendant’s lie to be treated as the defendant’s adopted answer. However, following the 
common law on pre-trial silence which is discussed below, the Court of Appeal found that an 
accused can, through his reaction, join in the answer given in response to an important 
question asked in his presence. This is subject to the jury being directed to consider whether 
in all the circumstances, the question called for some response from the defendant and 
whether by his reaction, he adopted the answer given.44 There is, therefore, scope for an 
accused’s silence to amount to adoption of another’s answer, even in the face of police 
questioning so long as they are on equal terms.45 Although Collins does not directly relate to 
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the application of s.36 or s.37, it does demonstrate how an accused’s failure to cooperate in 
the face of suspicious circumstances, and in the absence of legal advice, can be used against 
him.   
 
Unlike sections 34 and 35, sections 36 and 37 have received little academic attention; also 
they have generated very little case law. It may be that they are seldom used in practice, or 
they may be thought unobjectionable because of their very specific applicability and the fact 
that they require clear notice to the suspect.46 It may also be connected to the fact that 
inferences drawn from incriminating circumstances are already permitted at common law. 
An example is drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence. In order to reach a 
conclusion from circumstantial evidence, inferences will be drawn connecting the evidence 
to a conclusion of fact. Circumstantial evidence can be enough to lead to a conviction or 
acquittal.  A more specific example is the case of handling stolen goods, where the jury may 
infer that a defendant, having deliberately closed his eyes to the circumstances, knew or 
believed the goods to be stolen.47  
 
In Raviraj48 the Court of Appeal upheld a conviction after the judge had implied in his 
summing up that where the facts indicated recent possession of stolen goods, an exception 
to the right to silence existed. They found that the doctrine of recent possession is a 
particular aspect of the general proposition that where suspicious circumstances appear to 
demand an explanation, but no explanation or an entirely incredible explanation is given, 
the lack of explanation may warrant an inference of guilty knowledge in the defendant. This, 
in turn, is part of a wider proposition that guilt may be inferred from the unreasonable 
behaviour of a defendant when confronted with facts which seem to accuse.49 In some cases 
a s.36 or s.37 inference may overlap with an inference of guilty knowledge in a handling of 
stolen goods case when the defendant, after being cautioned and questioned, has failed to 
account for the presence of stolen goods. Sections 36 and 37 thus strengthen the fact 
finder’s capacity to infer guilt from certain circumstances. Yet, by emphasising the 
expectation on the accused to participate and increasing the pressure on him to cooperate, 
the provisions are going further than the common law and are extending the circumstances 
in which inferences can be drawn. As such, they are contributing to the participatory style of 
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procedure in which the accused’s active participation and cooperation are used to efficiently 
further the accurate fact finding aim.   
 
In the one reported case regarding s.36, the Court of Appeal took an expansive approach to 
its applicability. In Compton,50 two appellants had been convicted of conspiracy to supply 
heroin and cocaine, while a third was convicted of possessing proceeds of drug trafficking. 
They argued that no s.36 direction should have been given regarding their alleged failure to 
account for the presence of heroin contaminated money in their homes, claiming that they 
had not failed to ‘account’ for it. Upon being cautioned, two of the defendants had stated 
that the money had come from legitimate means, with one also pointing out that he was a 
heroin addict. This, it was held, did not ‘account’ for the presence of the heroin 
contaminated money. At trial, the defendants gave more specific accounts, stating the 
legitimate sources of the money. However, unlike s.34, s.36 invites no comparison between 
statements in interview and the evidence at trial. The sole question under s.36 was whether 
the defendant accounted for the presence of the substance, as put to him by the police 
officer.51 The Court of Appeal held that it is not enough to refer to other states of fact from 
which it can be inferred what the account might be.52  
 
The third defendant, when interviewed before the heroin had been detected, said that his 
wife was a heroin addict and that the money had come from his father and the sale of a 
vehicle. When re-interviewed after the heroin had been detected he exercised his right to 
silence. Again, he was held to have failed to account for the heroin contaminated money, 
even though it could have been inferred that the heroin came from his father who was a 
known drug dealer, his wife, or the purchaser of the vehicle. He had not accounted for a 
specific state of fact. In arriving at these conclusions, the Court of Appeal took a restrictive 
view as to when an accused can be said to have accounted for suspicious circumstances. The 
implication is that suspects must not only cooperate by offering a possible explanation, but 
must do so in a specific and detailed way.  It can be assumed that the same is true of s.37.  
 
The general perception of sections 36 and 37 as uncontroversial, which is reinforced through 
the lack of case law and academic attention, cannot disguise the fact that they have 
contributed to the shift in English criminal procedural style away from adversarialism and 
                                                             
50 [2002] EWCA Crim 2835. 
51
 Ibid [32]. 
52 Ibid [34]. 
147 
 
due process concerns. They penalise defendants who fail to cooperate in the criminal 
process through offering a specific account of certain circumstances to the police. However, 
their applicability is more specific and less open-ended than sections 34 and 35 and, as such, 
arguably has less potential to cause injustice.  
 
 
6.4 Pre-trial silence 
 
6.4.1 Common law  
At common law, silence as a response to accusations made by the police has been treated 
differently from accusations made by another citizen. In Christie53 the House of Lords held 
that an accused could, by his demeanour, wholly or partly accept the truth of accusations 
made by another citizen. Silence could thus be interpreted as acceptance of accusing 
statements.54 Later cases clarified the principle that silence as a reaction to an accusation by 
a person on an equal footing can attract an inference of acceptance of that accusation.55 
However, the evidential use of silence in the face of police accusations was less clear. In 
Chandler56 the Court of Appeal held that the Christie principle, whereby silence can be 
tantamount to acceptance of accusations, could apply during police questioning before 
caution, when the suspect and the police were speaking on equal terms. The presence of a 
solicitor also tended to put the suspect and police on a more equal footing. Chandler 
appeared to make a substantial inroad into the pre-trial right to silence, but its practical 
impact depended on when the suspect was cautioned.57 As a result of PACE, the police are 
required to caution a suspect when they have grounds to suspect him of committing an 
offence.58 It follows that in most cases the caution will have to be administered at the 
beginning of an interview, and that there will be no scope for the application of the Christie 
principle.59 In practical terms, silence in the face of accusations by the police was unlikely to 
warrant judicial comment that inferences can be drawn at common law.  
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In Gilbert,60 the defendant was charged with murder and raised the issue of self-defence at 
trial, having not mentioned this to the police during questioning. The trial judge, in asking 
the jury to consider whether it was remarkable that, when making his statement to the 
police, the appellant said nothing about self-defence, effectively invited the jury to reject 
this defence. The Court of Appeal, who noted that it was not possible to reconcile all of the 
judicial decisions on the use of pre-trial silence, held that this comment was a misdirection. 
They rejected the purported distinction between silence as evidence of guilt and silence as 
affecting the weight of subsequent evidence, with the latter amounting to no more than an 
indirect way of inferring the former. Gilbert consolidated the suspect’s right to silence in the 
police station and provided a significant contrast to the limits expressed in Chandler.61 
Although s.34 effectively reverses Gilbert, s.34(5) states that when evidence of silence falls 
outside the scope of s.34, such as when the accused has not been cautioned, the common 
law will still apply. This preserves the Christie principle as applied in Chandler, and, so, allows 
inferences to be drawn from a suspect’s failure to deny accusations in certain circumstances.  
 
6.4.2 Section 34   
Section 34 provides that: 
(1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given that the 
accused —  
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned under caution 
by a constable trying to discover whether or by whom the offence had been committed, 
failed to mention any fact relied on in his defence in those proceedings; or  
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for 
it, failed to mention any such fact,  
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably 
have been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case may 
be, subsection (2) below applies. 
 
(2) Where this subsection applies —  
… 
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer;  
and 
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged,  
may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper. 
 
Before a jury can be invited to draw adverse inferences under s.34, certain conditions must 
be satisfied: the accused must have been questioned about an offence by the police under 
caution; the constable carrying out the questioning must have been trying to discover 
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whether or by whom the offence was committed; the accused must have failed to mention, 
when questioned, a fact later relied on in his or her defence in criminal proceedings; and the 
fact must be one which, in the circumstances existing at the time, the accused could 
reasonably have been expected to mention when questioned.62 Silence alone cannot 
generate an inference; the suspect must rely on a fact at trial which was not mentioned 
during police questioning. In addition to these triggering conditions, the defendant must 
have been offered access to legal advice before being questioned.63  
 
Section 34 is a radical departure from the common law under which an invitation to draw 
adverse inferences from pre-trial silence would usually be a misdirection.64 It is a 
controversial provision which has generated an extensive and complex body of case law.  
Some judges initially resisted an expansive approach to drawing adverse inferences from 
silence. In Bowden, the Court of Appeal stated that, ‘since [the CJPOA provisions] restrict 
rights recognised at common law as appropriate to protect defendants against the risk of 
injustice, they should not be construed more widely than the statutory language requires.’65 
This reflects a view that the silence provisions should be approached carefully, perhaps 
because they contradict a procedural tradition within which the accused is not legally 
obliged to participate. Dennis believes that a combination of European Court of Human 
Rights and Court of Appeal jurisprudence has made the reform to the right to silence in the 
police station significantly less radical in certain respects than it might have been.66 This is 
largely a result of the numerous pre-conditions and essential directions which have 
developed and which must now be given before a s.34 inference can be drawn.67 
Nonetheless, s.34 itself invites an expansive interpretation and the effect of the legislation 
as a whole has been to greatly inhibit the accused’s free choice to remain silent under police 
questioning. As the case law has developed further, a broader understanding of s.34 has 
emerged. This has been particularly acute in regards to certain aspects of its application, 
such as the relevance of legal advice in determining the appropriateness of adverse 
inferences.  
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Despite the confusing and contradictory case law, the effect of s.34 has been to further 
distance the English criminal process from the adversarial model within which the right to 
silence became a workable safeguard for the accused. The provision is not only 
objectionable because of a loss of protection for innocent suspects in the police station and 
the increased risk of miscarriages of justice,68 but also because it hinders the accused’s right 
to choose whether to participate. The normative implications of s.34 are briefly examined in 
this section, but they are explored in more detail in a later section. By examining the law and 
how it has been applied, this part of the chapter demonstrates the extent to which the 
accused is penalised for his pre-trial non-cooperation and lack of participation. 
 
Reliance on a fact 
It is the failure to mention a fact later relied on in defence which triggers s.34. What 
constitutes a fact for the purposes of the provision has been interpreted quite liberally, 
expanding the potential range of situations in which a defendant can be penalised for his 
non-cooperation. In Webber,69 the object of bringing the law back into line with common 
sense was held by the House of Lords to justify a broad approach to the meaning of ‘fact’, 
covering any alleged fact which is in issue and is put forward as part of the defence case. A 
‘fact’ may include: assertions made by the accused during cross-examination;70 reliance on a 
fact adduced by defence witnesses or in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses;71 
adopting the evidence of a co-defendant;72 and putting forward factual explanations for 
facts asserted by the prosecution.73 However, in this last situation, the explanation must go 
beyond a hypothetical or speculative possibility which does not have a foundation of fact 
known to the defendant at the time of police interview.74  
 
In Betts and Hall,75 it was held that a bare admission of a fact asserted by the prosecution 
did not constitute a fact relied on by the defendant at trial. This is consistent with the 
Strasbourg judgment in Condron v UK76  which found that inferences from pre-trial silence 
should be restricted to cases in which the accused makes a positive assertion at trial. In 
                                                             
68 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (n 8); Greer (n 10). 
69 [2004] UKHL 1. 
70 Ibid. 
71
 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 R v Milford [2001] Crim LR 330. 
74 R v Nickolson [1999] Crim LR 61. 
75
 [2001] 2 Cr App R 16. 
76 (2001) 31 EHRR 1. 
151 
 
Smith,77 the Court of Appeal held that a judge had been wrong to direct a jury under s.34 
that it could draw an adverse inference from the fact that the defendant had given a no 
comment police interview where the only facts potentially giving rise to the adverse 
inference were the defendant's admission of an agreed fact and his denial of any 
involvement in the offence with which he had been charged. However, denials of facts 
asserted by the prosecution can be treated as facts relied on by the defendant. Thus, in Betts 
and Hall, Hall’s claim that, contrary to the prosecution’s assertion, he did not know the 
victim by sight, was asserting a fact. Asserting, or denying, a previously unmentioned fact 
will usually indicate that the defendant is relying on that fact, thus ensuring that the pre-
conditions for drawing adverse inferences under s.34 are met. Because of the expansive 
judicial interpretation of ‘fact’, and despite some attempt to restrict it, it has become 
increasingly difficult for a defendant to exercise his right to silence during police questioning 
without facing adverse consequences for doing so.  
 
Drawing adverse inferences 
The adverse inferences that can be drawn from silence are those that ‘appear proper’.78 In 
the context of s.34, this will most likely be an inference that the fact not mentioned during 
police questioning, but relied on at trial, was fabricated. This inference could then contribute 
to a finding of guilt. A s.34 inference can be drawn by the court when it is considering 
whether there is a case to answer (assuming that the defence rely on a previously 
undisclosed fact during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses), and when the court or 
jury are determining the guilt of the accused.79 According to s.38(3), silence cannot be the 
sole basis for these decisions. This has been supplemented by the European Court’s decision 
that silence should not be a main decisive factor.80 Although this is intended as a safeguard, 
there remains room for silence to play a role in convicting the accused. The Judicial Studies 
Board specimen direction and the case law insist that a jury may not consider silence unless 
satisfied that the other evidence discloses a prima facie case.81 However, this is inconsistent 
with allowing the court to draw adverse inferences when determining whether there is a 
case to answer in the first place. Evidence of silence may therefore play a more significant 
role than merely providing support for an already established case.82 Dennis points out that 
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the prima facie case requirement is probably essential to comply with the European Court’s 
restriction that silence may not provide the main evidence for conviction.83 Moreover, the 
requirement may go beyond insistence on a bare prima facie case. It has been suggested 
that the prosecution case should be so strong that it clearly calls for an answer by the 
defendant.84 
 
The Judicial Studies Board (JSB) specimen direction on inferences from pre-trial silence 
states that the judge should direct the jury that:    
you may draw the conclusion … from his failure that he [had no answer then/had no 
answer that he then believed would stand up to scrutiny/has since invented his 
account/has since tailored his account to fit the prosecution's case/(here refer to any 
other reasonable inferences contended for …)]. If you do draw that conclusion, you 
must not convict him wholly or mainly on the strength of it …but you may take it 
into account as some additional support for the prosecution's case … and when 
deciding whether his [evidence/case] about these facts is true.85 
 
The directions state also that the jury should be satisfied that when interviewed, the 
defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention the facts on which he now 
relies.86 This direction has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal.87 According to Redmayne, 
the JSB directions operate like a magic formula; so long as they are given by the judge, the 
jury can be left to draw an inference, with courts generally loath to identify factual situations 
where an inference should not be drawn.88 Even where the directions are not followed, 
there is no guarantee that the courts will interfere.89 A defective direction will not 
necessarily render a conviction unsafe.90 Thus, despite the need for a direction and a prima 
facie case, there remains scope for silence to influence a finding of guilt. 
 
The European Court’s approach   
It was thought by some that s.34 might be found incompatible with the ECHR.91 However, 
the European authorities have held inferences from silence to be within the limits of Article 
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6, so long as certain safeguards are in place. In Murray v UK,92 a case concerning the 
Northern Irish equivalent to the CJPOA, the European Court of Human Rights stated that: 
On the one hand, it is self-evident that it is incompatible with the immunities under 
consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a 
refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. On the other hand, the 
Court deems it equally obvious that these immunities cannot and should not 
prevent that the accused’s silence, in situations which clearly call for an explanation 
from him, be taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution.93 
 
They went on to say that: 
Whether the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence infringes 
Article 6 is a matter to be determined in the light of all the circumstances of the 
case, having particular regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn, the 
weight attached to them by the national courts in their assessment of the evidence 
and the degree of compulsion inherent in the situation.94  
 
A significant point in this case was that Murray had been tried by a Diplock court, and a 
reasoned judgment was given on the facts. It was suggested that the situation might be 
different in a jury trial. However, in Condron v UK,95  the Court clarified that adverse 
inferences could be drawn in jury trials, but stated that particular caution is required and 
that the jury should be directed carefully as to the conditions under which an inference can 
be drawn. On the facts in Condron the Court found that the judge’s directions to the jury left 
them ‘at liberty to draw an adverse inference notwithstanding that it may have been 
satisfied as to the plausible explanation’,96 and that, as a matter of fairness, the jury should 
have been directed that it could only draw an adverse inference if satisfied that the 
applicants' silence at the police interview could only sensibly be attributed to their having no 
answer or none that would stand up to cross-examination.97 A direction to that effect would 
have been more than ‘merely “desirable”.’98 In Beckles v UK,99 the Court confirmed that the 
jury should draw inferences when the defendant’s silence was, in effect, consistent only with 
guilt.  
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However, Adetoro v UK100 shows that such a direction is not always necessary. The trial 
judge had not made it clear that the jury must be sure that the defendant had no answer to 
give or none that would hold up to scrutiny before drawing an adverse inference under s.34, 
an important element of the direction. Although both the prosecution and Court of Appeal 
had acknowledged this mistake, the European Court found no breach of the Convention. The 
case against the defendant had been strong and there was no realistic possibility that the 
jury believed the defence story to be true, but at the same time drew an adverse inference 
against the defendant. Thus, in rejecting his defence, the jury must also have rejected the 
defendant’s excuse for silence. The Court distinguished two types of reasons for silence: 
those unconnected to the defendant’s substantive defence at trial, such as legal advice to 
remain silent; and those inherently linked to the substantive defence.101 A full direction 
appears less essential to ensure fairness in the second category. 
 
Notwithstanding European attempts to restrict the force of pre-trial silence through cautious 
directions to the jury, the broad nature of s.34 as well as judicial reluctance to interfere with 
initial decisions as to its application, grant it significant potential to affect the outcome of 
cases. Furthermore, a finding by the European Court that the CJPOA is consistent with 
fairness does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the defendant’s rights are not 
negatively affected. Normatively, the European Court’s decisions should not be taken as 
definitive, as the defining standard of fairness. Namely, their reluctance to meddle in the 
applicability of the CJPOA does not render the provisions unobjectionable.  
 
Silence and legal advice  
The relationship between s.34 inferences and legal advice has caused a particular problem 
for the practical application of s.34. Although it has suffered from an inconsistent judicial 
approach, an unnecessarily expansive interpretation of the provision has prevailed in this 
area. In Condron and Condron,102 it was held that the nature of any legal advice given was 
just one factor to be considered in a wider assessment of the reasonableness of an accused’s 
silence. Legal advice could not in itself circumvent an inference being drawn under s.34; to 
do so would render the section ‘wholly nugatory’.103 This is doubtful due to both the limited 
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use of pre-trial silence in practice and the fact that silence will not always be recommended 
as the best strategy.  
 
In Betts and Hall,104 the Court of Appeal held that if a defendant genuinely relied on legal 
advice, then no inference could be drawn. However, in Howell,105 it was suggested that the 
defendant should not only have genuinely relied on the legal advice given to him, but that it 
should also have been reasonable for him to do so.  Laws, LJ placed s.34 in the context of a 
general move towards a more participatory style of procedure which imposes normative 
expectations on the accused: 
It seems to us that this provision is one of several enacted in recent years which has 
served to counteract a culture, or belief, which had long been established in the 
practice of criminal cases, namely that in principle a defendant may without criticism 
withhold any disclosure of his defence until the trial. Now, the police interview and 
the trial are to be seen as part of a continuous process in which the suspect is 
engaged from the beginning… This benign continuum … is thwarted if currency is 
given to the belief that if a suspect remains silent on legal advice he may 
systematically avoid adverse comment at his trial. And it may encourage solicitors to 
advise silence for other than good objective reasons.106  
 
As well as pointing out the role of the CJPOA in discouraging ambush defences, this passage 
suggests that legal advice, and perhaps legal representatives more generally, should not be 
permitted to disturb the shift in English criminal procedure towards a participatory model of 
procedure.  This is in contrast to the fact that legal representatives were responsible for 
much of the shift towards adversarialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as 
explained in chapter 4.107 To negate the effect of legal advice by allowing adverse inferences 
to be drawn, irrespective of it, constitutes another step away from adversarialism.  
 
Howell contradicts the earlier decision of Betts and Hall in so far as the former requires an 
assessment of the quality of the advice as well as the factual issue of whether it was relied 
on. It has been described as ‘a mischievous decision which has created inconsistent case law 
on the important issue of the evidential consequences of remaining silent on legal advice.’108 
The Court in Hoare109 tried to reconcile the two decisions by stating that it is the true reason 
for silence which is important:  
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The whole basis of s.34… is an assumption that an innocent defendant... would give 
an early explanation to demonstrate his innocence.  
 
The section 34 inference is concerned with flushing out innocence at an early stage 
or supporting other evidence of guilt at a later stage, not simply with whether a 
guilty defendant is entitled, or genuinely or reasonably believes that he is entitled, 
to rely on legal rights of which his solicitor has advised him. Legal entitlement is one 
thing. An accused’s reason for exercising it is another. His belief in his entitlement 
may be genuine, but it does not follow that his reason for exercising it is.110  
 
The assumption here is that silence is suspicious and an indicator of guilt, with a broad 
interpretation of s.34 given as a result. The question for the jury is whether, regardless of 
legal advice genuinely given and genuinely accepted, an accused remained silent because of 
it and not because he had no story to give or none that would withstand scrutiny. In Beckles, 
the Court of Appeal approved Hoare, and emphasised that the ultimate question is the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s decision.111   
 
In a system which is centred around putting the prosecution to proof and calling the state to 
account for its accusations and request for punishment of the accused, the genuineness or 
reasonableness of a suspect’s reliance on legal advice is of little import. It is his entitlement 
to remain silent which is important, and which should prevent adverse inferences from 
being drawn. Yet, in practice, entitlement has been given less-than-due weight. There is an 
inconsistency between directing the jury to only draw an adverse inference if the only 
sensible explanation for silence is that the defendant had no answer to give, or none that 
would withstand scrutiny, and allowing adverse inferences to be drawn where a defendant 
has relied on legal advice to remain silent.112 Legal advice can always constitute an 
explanation for silence. Thus, whilst juries cannot rationally draw an adverse inference from 
silence in such cases, they are told that they can. Redmayne labels this area of s.34 case law 
a ‘sad mess.’113  
 
Another inconsistency arises from the fact that the operation of s.34 depends on the 
accused being afforded access to legal advice;114 yet, the content of that advice, in so far as 
the accused is advised to remain silent, has become irrelevant. As Cooper points out, ‘There 
would seem to be little point, if any, in insisting that a suspect receives (or at least has the 
                                                             
110
 Ibid [53] and [54]. 
111 R v Beckles [2004] EWCA Crim 2766 [46]. 
112 Redmayne (n 5) 1071. 
113
 Ibid. 
114 s.34(2A) CJPOA 1994. 
157 
 
opportunity to receive) legal advice in the police station if the jury might then conclude that 
it effectively amounts to an admission by conduct to accept a solicitor's advice to remain 
silent.’ 115 This challenges the position taken by the European Court in Condron; that access 
to legal advice and the physical presence of a solicitor during police interview must be 
considered a particularly important safeguard for dispelling any compulsion to speak which 
may be inherent in the terms of the caution.116 In Armstrong,117 the Court of Appeal did 
attempt to limit the risk of eliminating the weight to be given to the fact of legal advice 
altogether. The convictions of the two appellants were declared unsafe because the judge 
invited the jury to question whether one of the appellants had even been advised to remain 
silent, despite the fact that this was not an issue since the record of interview showed that 
such advice had been given. 
 
Legal advice is an essential element of the right to a fair trial,118 but the approach of the 
Court of Appeal in relation to s.34 has effectively weakened its protective role, such that its 
value is in danger of being seriously eroded.119 Cape argues that, as a matter of principle, a 
suspect should be able to rely on legal advice without fear of being penalised for doing so.120 
If defendants can never be sure that they are acting reasonably in relying on legal advice, 
then they can never be sure that they should accept that advice. Even before the CJPOA, 
instead of seeing legal advice as justifying silence, the Court of Appeal construed the 
presence of a solicitor as legitimising the evidential significance of silence.121 This was the 
case in Chandler122 where the presence of a solicitor helped put the police and suspect on 
even terms. However, the presence of a legal adviser will not necessarily enhance the 
position of the accused. In Paris, Abdullahi and Miller,123 one suspect had, in the presence of 
a solicitor, been intimidated and bullied into giving a false confession after denying 
involvement in an offence over three hundred times. As a result of the jurisprudence 
concerning the relationship between s.34 and legal advice, even a defendant who has 
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genuinely accepted and acted upon legal advice to remain silent may face a penalty for his 
non-cooperation. 
 
Silence, legal advice and legal privilege 
As the fact finder must be satisfied of the genuineness of the defendant’s reliance on legal 
advice to remain silent, the grounds for that advice may need to be disclosed to the court. 
Likewise, to discredit a claim of recent fabrication put forward by the prosecution, the 
defendant may wish to disclose both the fact that he had told his solicitor of the facts on 
which he now relies and the details of their conversation. This might entail a waiver of legal 
privilege. Where legal professional privilege arises, the effect of the privilege is essentially 
that neither legal adviser nor client can be required to disclose the privileged 
communication. 
 
In Seaton,124 the Court of Appeal analysed the previous domestic and European case law 
regarding the relationship between silence, legal advice, and legal privilege. They took 
particular account of Wilmot,125 Bowden,126 and Loizou,127 and came to some important 
conclusions. They held that a defendant cannot be asked whether he told his solicitor or 
counsel that what he now says is true unless he has waived privilege; if the defendant does 
give evidence of what passed between him and his solicitor he is not thereby waiving 
privilege entirely and generally. The test to determine what has been made available by his 
waiver is fairness and/or the avoidance of a misleading impression. However, if a defendant 
says that he gave his solicitor the account he offers at trial, he can be cross-examined about 
exactly what he told his solicitor on the topic. A defendant who adduces evidence that he 
was advised by his lawyer not to answer questions but goes no further than that does not 
thereby waive privilege. However, a defendant who adduces evidence of the content of, or 
reasons for, such advice does waive privilege, at least to the extent of opening up questions 
which properly go to whether such reason can be the true explanation for silence.128 In most 
cases a defendant will be able to give evidence of the fact that he informed his solicitor at 
the police station of the facts upon which he now relies in his defence, without waiving 
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privilege in relation to the entire pre-interview communication.129 Nevertheless, the effect of 
s.34 is to exert undue pressure on the defendant to waive privilege in order to convince a 
jury not to penalise him for non-cooperation.  
 
In Condron, the European Court held that the fact that the applicants had been subjected to 
cross-examination on the content of their solicitor’s advice could not be said to raise an 
issue of fairness under Article 6: ‘They were under no compulsion to disclose the advice 
given, other than the indirect compulsion to avoid the reason for their silence remaining at 
the level of a bare explanation.’130  Because the applicants had chosen to make the content 
of their solicitor’s advice a live issue as part of their defence, they could not complain that 
the scheme of s.34 overrode the confidentiality of their discussions with their solicitor. 
However, the ‘indirect compulsion’ put the defendants under pressure to waive privilege 
and cooperate in the criminal process by offering a detailed explanation for their earlier non-
participation. Faced with a difficult choice between adverse inferences of guilt or waiving 
privilege and disclosing potentially damaging information, defendants find themselves on 
the horns of a dilemma.  This raises the pressure upon them to second guess legal advice.  
 
Advising Silence 
One significant reason for advising silence is inadequate disclosure by the police, and it is in 
these circumstances that one might expect the courts to take a more restrictive approach to 
s.34. The police are under no obligation to disclose their evidence to a suspect during 
interview; this may be a concern for both innocent and guilty suspects who do not want to 
be misled. In Argent,131 the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that insufficient 
disclosure by the police should make evidence of the accused’s silence inadmissible, with the 
crucial issue being whether the police have given sufficient information to enable legal 
advisers to advise their clients properly. In Roble,132 the Court of Appeal suggested that good 
reason for silence may arise if the interviewing officer has disclosed so little that the solicitor 
cannot usefully advise his client, or if the nature of the offence, or the material in the hands 
of the police, is so complex, or relates to matters so long ago, that no sensible immediate 
response is feasible.133 In DPP v Ara,134 a decision to stay proceedings as an abuse of process 
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was held to be justified in the light of police refusal to disclose to a solicitor the terms of an 
interview with the defendant. Without this the defendant could not be given appropriate 
advice on whether to consent to a caution. It was held that, although there could be no 
general duty on the police of disclosure prior to charge, the failure to disclose the terms of 
the interview in the instant case, followed by the commencement and pursuit of criminal 
proceedings, had provided sufficient justification for the decision to stay the proceedings. 
This may have been an exceptional circumstance. Redmayne suggests that so long as a 
suspect knows the allegation against him, he is basically expected to respond with his 
defence even if there appears to be very little evidence against him.135  
 
Legal advisors have devised a way of preventing adverse inferences being drawn from pre-
trial silence through the use of pre-prepared statements followed by ‘no comment’ 
interviews. The defendant presents the police with a written statement and then refuses to 
answer questions. This is one area where a restrictive approach to the applicability of s.34 
was initially taken; preventing a direction allowing the jury to draw adverse inferences if the 
account in the prepared statement is consistent with the defendant’s evidence at trial.136  
However, this tactic requires the defendant to commit to a particular account of events and, 
recently, the courts have found that even the slightest omission or deviation from the 
statement can invite adverse inferences. In Mohammad,137 there were three matters 
regarding facts relied on by the defendant at trial, which the prosecution successfully argued 
had not been mentioned previously. All three of these matters were not materially different 
from those in the defendant’s pre-prepared statement. The Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that, in relation to two of the matters, the defendant had simply been putting flesh and 
bones on the facts he had already set out in the statement, and that the third matter was 
inconsequential for either the prosecution or defence.138 Nevertheless, they upheld the 
conviction, stating that it had not been wrong in law to give the jury a direction under 
s.34.139  This fastidious approach to pre-prepared statements pushes the application of s.34 
beyond its initial purpose of ensuring the early disclosure of defence cases. It shows a desire 
to secure defendant participation and a willingness to penalise non-cooperation.  In 
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Parradine,140 the Court of Appeal held that whether a s.34 direction should be given 
notwithstanding a pre-prepared statement will depend on the particular facts of the case. In 
this case, like in Mohammad, there had been no alteration in the defence. The defendant 
was held to have relied on a previously unmentioned fact by adding information about a 
man identified in his statement. 
 
Section 34 has given rise to many difficulties such that the benefits of keeping it may not 
outweigh the burdens imposed by its retention.141 Aside from the lack of uniformity in the 
judicial approach and the amount of time and resource the courts must put into clarifying 
s.34, its focus on the accused’s participation undermines the role of the defence as a 
party,142 the defendant’s ability to exercise his rights, and the necessary constraints which 
fairness concerns place on the operation of the criminal process. It does not have a place in 
an adversarial system in which the defendant need not participate and the trial operates as 
a forum to test the prosecution case. Neither does it fit into the normative theory of calling 
the state to account. 
 
 
6.5 Trial Silence  
 
6.5.1 Common law  
The accused became a competent witness on his own behalf by virtue of section 1 of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898. The Act was one of the final developments in the emergence of 
the adversarial system which had been gradually increasing the competency of defence 
witnesses. Whilst s.1(a) granted the defendant competency as a witness, s. 1(b) stated that 
the failure of an accused person to give evidence could not be made the subject of any 
comment by the prosecution. This provision was presumably intended to protect the 
defendant from being coerced into the witness box where he might be tricked into 
incriminating himself during cross-examination.143 Although the defendant was an 
incompetent witness until 1898, he could give an unsworn statement from the dock. As 
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explained in chapter 4, prior to the establishment of full defence counsel in the nineteenth 
century, the defendant was expected to speak on his own behalf to refute the evidence 
against him. The precise evidential status of unsworn statements was obscure,144 but the 
practice continued until its abolition by the Criminal Justice Act 1972. Section 1(b) of the 
1898 Act was repealed by the CJPOA.145 
 
Whilst ‘prosecutorial comment’ on a defendant’s in-court silence was forbidden, the 1898 
Act did not expressly prevent the judge or co-accused from passing comment. It had been 
held that a co-accused had a right to comment.146 However, the judicial position was less 
clear and a good deal of often inconsistent case law ensued. Whereas the initial view 
seemed to imply an unfettered discretion of the judge to comment on a defendant’s failure 
to testify,147 later cases restrained this by imposing a duty on the judge to exercise caution 
when commenting on failure to give evidence.148 In Bathurst,149 Lord Parker CJ stated that: 
The accepted form of comment is to inform the jury that, of course, he is not bound 
to give evidence, that he can sit back and see if the prosecution have proved their 
case, and that while the jury had been deprived of the opportunity of hearing his 
story tested in cross-examination, the one thing they must not do is to assume that 
he is guilty because he has not gone in the witness box.150 
 
Subsequent cases held that stronger comment may be appropriate, depending on the 
particular facts of the case.151 In Mutch,152 a distinction was drawn between cases of simple 
denial where the defendant puts the prosecution to proof, and cases in which the defence 
put forward a positive account and the defendant failed to give evidence in support of it. In 
this second category of ‘confession and avoidance’, stronger comment might be 
warranted.153 This approach was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal;154 it seems also to have 
been adopted by the House of Lords in its determination of the Northern Irish equivalent to 
s.35.155  
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The common law position on in-court silence was reviewed by the Court of Appeal in 
Martinez-Tobon,156 shortly before the CJPOA came into force. The Court recognised that 
previous cases on the subject were not easily reconcilable.157 They summarised the 
principles that apply at common law where a defendant does not testify as follows: 
(1)The judge should give the jury a direction along the lines of the Judicial Studies 
Board specimen direction based on R v Bathurst … (2) The essentials of that 
direction are that the defendant is under no obligation to testify and the jury should 
not assume he is guilty because he has not given evidence. (3) Provided those 
essentials are complied with, the judge may think it appropriate to make a stronger 
comment where the defence case involves alleged facts which (a) are at variance 
with prosecution evidence or additional to it and exculpatory, and (b) must, if true, 
be within the knowledge of the defendant. (4) The nature and strength of such 
comment must be a matter for the discretion of the judge and will depend upon the 
circumstances of the individual case. However, it must not be such as to contradict 
or nullify the essentials of the conventional direction.158 
 
Although an absolute right to silence did not exist prior to the enactment of the CJPOA, the 
boundaries of acceptable comment were significantly more restricted. If directed properly, it 
would be clear to the jury that the defendant is under no obligation to participate and that it 
is the state, through the prosecution, who must account for its allegations against him. Some 
defendants would have chosen to remain silent at trial on the basis that it would allow the 
defence to attack prosecution witnesses without evidence of the defendant’s previous bad 
character being admitted.159 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 terminated this by significantly 
broadening the circumstances in which the defendant’s bad character can be admitted such 
that silence no longer provides the defendant with a shield.160  He may now feel pressured 
to testify in an attempt to mitigate bad character evidence. However, even in cases that only 
called for the traditional Bathurst direction, a defendant might have been inhibited from 
remaining silent for fear that the jury would hold it against him. Whether this fear went 
beyond what one would ordinarily experience, given the possibility of ‘common sense’ 
inferences being drawn from a failure to testify, is questionable. Although the direction may 
have drawn the jury’s attention to something they would otherwise have thought to be 
inconsequential, it may have also acted to restrict how they took account of silence, by 
emphasising the existence of the right to silence and the fact that silence is not an indicator 
of guilt. It is, therefore, difficult to determine what the precise impact of comment under the 
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common law would have been on the defendant. Nonetheless, the defendant was better 
equipped to hold the state to account and put the prosecution to proof under the common 
law than he is under the CJPOA.  
 
6.5.2 Section 35 
Section 35 provides that: 
(1) At the trial of any person for an offence, subsections (2) and (3) below apply unless —  
(a) the accused’s guilt is not in issue; or  
(b) it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the accused makes it 
undesirable for him to give evidence;  
… 
 
(2) Where this subsection applies, the court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for the 
prosecution, satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on indictment, in the presence of the 
jury) that the accused is aware that the stage has been reached at which evidence can be 
given for the defence and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence and that, if he chooses not 
to give evidence, or having been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer any question, 
it will be permissible for the court or jury to draw such inferences as appear proper from his 
failure to give evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question.  
 
(3) Where this subsection applies, the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is 
guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences as appear proper from the failure of 
the accused to give evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question.  
 
Section 35 allows adverse inferences to be drawn from a defendant’s failure to testify in 
court, unless his physical or mental condition makes it undesirable for him to do so. Before 
an inference can be drawn, the defendant must have been made aware at the end of the 
prosecution’s case that the stage has been reached at which he can give evidence and the 
possible consequences of not doing so. Implicit in s.35 is the requirement that the 
prosecution must have presented a prima facie case, based on their own evidence, before 
the jury can be invited to draw inferences from the defendant’s in-court silence. In the 
absence of a prima facie case, the judge should find that the defence have no case to answer 
and the defendant will not be called upon to give evidence. Section 35(4) is believed to 
preserve the right to silence, as it provides that the accused is not a compellable witness and 
that he is not guilty of contempt of court if he does not testify. However, the overall effect of 
s.35 is to penalise defendants who do not actively participate through placing pressure on 
them to testify, and allowing adverse inferences of guilt to be drawn if they do not. This 
pressure will be even more acute for those defendants who feel they need to explain their 
pre-trial silence.  
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This part of the chapter examines the link which s.35 makes between silence and guilt, and 
shows how a broad judicial approach has made it increasingly difficult to avoid its 
application. Linking silence directly to guilt creates an expectation that the defendant should 
participate in the proceedings, and affects the ability of the defence to put the prosecution 
to proof.  
 
Silence as an indicator of guilt  
Section 35 is the only provision in the CJPOA which treats silence alone as suspicious and 
deserving of adverse treatment. Whereas sections 34, 36 and 37 require some triggering 
condition on the part of the accused before adverse inferences can be drawn, namely 
reliance on a previously unmentioned fact or silence in the face of suspicious circumstances, 
s.35 merely requires a competent defendant to exercise his right to remain silent. 
Consequently, subject to an appropriate direction to the jury, s.35 inferences can go straight 
to the issue of guilt rather than to the plausibility of specific facts, asserted by the 
prosecution or relied on by the defence. In this way, it has a more corrosive effect on the 
defendant’s fundamental right to silence than do the other provisions. This is compounded 
by the fact that it has been interpreted in a way that undermines the existence of innocent 
reasons for in-court silence.  
 
The Court of Appeal have held that it would be inappropriate for a judge to embark or invite 
the jury to embark on possible speculative reasons consistent with innocence which might 
prompt a defendant to remain silent.161 Consequently, where the defendant resists the 
pressure to testify at trial and can produce no evidence to explain his silence, he will have no 
choice but face the possibility of adverse inferences. Pattenden argues that the need to 
produce evidence for an innocent explanation places a new and unprincipled evidential 
burden on the accused.162  It is irreconcilable with the traditional theory that an accused can 
contest the case against him without calling evidence. This, it has been claimed, is a subtle 
subversion of the burden of proof and a ‘misguided, new development in the law of 
evidence.’163 Without knowing what the innocent explanation for a refusal to cooperate 
might be, it must be more consistent with fairness to, at least, take into account the fact that 
innocent explanations for silence do exist. Jackson points out that: 
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No matter how strong the evidence, the court or jury is in a position to draw the 
‘proper’ inference from silence only where it knows the reason for silence. Without 
knowledge of that reason, it would only seem safe to draw an inference of guilt 
where the trier of fact is already convinced of guilt on the basis of existing proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. But the inference then becomes merely an ex post facto 
rationalisation of what the trier of fact is already convinced of, and the provision 
becomes redundant. If the trier of fact is already convinced on the basis of lesser 
than this, then the provision is being used to do what in many cases it cannot do, 
namely provide the necessary evidence to bring the proof up to standard.164  
 
Thus, whilst the jury can only be sure that the defendant’s explanation for silence is false or 
that his silence stems from guilt where other evidence proves him guilty, s.35 allows silence 
to contribute to a finding of guilt. The fact that the burden is essentially on the defendant to 
produce evidence of a justification for silence acts to reinforce the conclusion that the 
provision is intended to increase participation. 
 
In order to address some aspects of the injustice inherent in equating silence directly with 
guilt, the trial judge could be under a duty, as part of his direction to the jury on silence, to 
remind them that silence is not necessarily an indicator of guilt, and that there could be a 
possible explanation for which the defence have not adduced evidence. This would assist the 
jury in making informed assessments of whether to infer guilt from silence.165 If applied to all 
of the silence provisions, it would likely decrease the risks of wrongful conviction and go 
some way to reasserting a strong right to silence. Among those advocating such a direction 
are Greer who maintains that, ‘the basic principle should be that, in trials on indictment, 
judges should be obliged to point out to jurors that silence…may be entirely innocent’, with 
possible grounds for an innocent explanation being listed by trial judges.166 Likewise, 
Pattenden suggests something similar to the Lucas direction given in relation to lies.167  
 
The argument for a Lucas type direction, indicating to the jury that there may have been 
innocent reasons for failure to give evidence, has been rejected by the House of Lords on the 
basis that it might mislead the jury as to the reason for silence, and result in unfounded 
speculation.168  This ignores the fact that the jury is already being asked to speculate guilt 
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from the defendant’s decision not to testify. With respect to s.34, the defendant may benefit 
from the incorporation of a Lucas direction into the s.34 direction if the case includes a lie as 
well as a failure to mention a fact later relied on, and the factual context is such that the 
defendant is entitled to a Lucas direction.169 It has been held that it is usually unhelpful to 
give both a s.34 and Lucas direction; and that the judge should adopt the direction more 
appropriate to the facts and issues in the case.170 Ignoring the possibility of innocent reasons 
for silence, and drawing adverse inferences from that can damage the aim of accurate fact 
finding rather than promote it. This unfortunate situation might occur where the defendant 
has failed to testify due to fear of reprisals from a co-accused or some other interested 
party. It would be difficult for the defence to produce evidence of this fear without exposing 
the defendant to that of which he was afraid. In practice, the need to offer evidence of an 
innocent explanation at trial puts further pressure on the defendant to actively participate.  
 
In the absence of a positive defence, putting the prosecution to proof may not attract an 
adverse inference under s.34. However, failure to testify in such circumstances can lead to 
adverse inferences being drawn under s.35. In Whitehead,171 a s.35 inference was held to be 
appropriate where the defence case was essentially that the complainant was lying about 
sexual abuse. In this type of ‘I didn’t do it’ case, the defendant does not have a positive 
defence; he can only deny the allegations made against him. Here, the applicability of s.35 
goes further than the distinction made at common law between ‘confession and avoidance’ 
cases which raise a positive defence with a factual basis within the defendant’s knowledge, 
and cases which simply deny the prosecution’s allegations and put them to proof.172  Section 
35 targets both defendants who put the prosecution to proof and defendants who do not 
support a positive defence with their own testimony. Redmayne notes that in those cases 
where a positive defence is not put forward, the s.35 inference appears to be extremely 
tenuous.173 It is a fundamental problem that s.35 makes such a strong connection between 
silence and guilt; it forces the defendant to participate if he wishes to prevent this link. To 
penalise those who do not testify through asserting the tenuous link between silence and 
guilt is counter to a system that allows the defence to test the prosecution case, whilst 
respecting defence rights and ensuring fairness. It is, thus, inconsistent with adversarial and 
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rights based accounts of criminal procedure, as well as the normative theory which requires 
the state to account for the accusations it makes against the accused.  
 
Judicial directions  
The Court of Appeal was given its first opportunity to restrict the scope of s.35 in Cowan.174 
Instead, however, they rejected the assertion that the provision should be used only 
exceptionally. They confirmed that the CJPOA was intended by Parliament to alter the law 
on the right to silence, but were adamant that the right to silence is preserved by s.35(4).175 
The Court endorsed the JSB specimen direction on silence at trial, but stated that it may be 
necessary to adapt or add to it in the particular circumstances of an individual case. They 
highlighted certain essential elements of the direction: 
(1) The judge will have told the jury that the burden of proof remains upon the 
prosecution throughout and what the required standard is. (2) It is necessary for the 
judge to make clear to the jury that the defendant is entitled to remain silent. That is 
his right and his choice. The right to silence remains. (3) An inference from failure to 
give evidence cannot on its own prove guilt. That is expressly stated in section 38(3) 
of the Act. (4) Therefore, the jury must be satisfied that the prosecution have 
established a case to answer before drawing any inferences from silence. Of course, 
the judge must have thought so or the question whether the defendant was to give 
evidence would not have arisen. But the jury may not believe the witnesses whose 
evidence the judge considered sufficient to raise a prima facie case. It must 
therefore be made clear to them that they must find there to be a case to answer on 
the prosecution evidence before drawing an adverse inference from the defendant’s 
silence. (5) If, despite any evidence relied upon to explain his silence or in the 
absence of any such evidence, the jury conclude the silence can only sensibly be 
attributed to the defendant’s having no answer or none that would stand up to 
cross-examination, they may draw an adverse inference.176 
 
Although appearing to place some limit on a potentially broad discretion to equate silence 
with guilt, a departure from an essential element of the judicial direction will not necessarily 
result in a successful appeal.177 Once the jury have satisfied themselves that the defendant 
has a case to answer, they are entitled to infer guilt from his failure to testify if it appears 
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proper to do so.178 As with s.34, the underlying assumption is that the innocent, with nothing 
to hide, will want to speak.  
 
Judges retain discretion as to whether, and in what terms, they should advise a jury for or 
against drawing inferences. In Cowan it was stated that the Court would not lightly interfere 
with the exercise of that discretion.179 However, in Lancaster180 the Court of Appeal did warn 
that, without individual consideration of the circumstances, the routine application of s.35 
‘can lead to unnecessary problems, whilst not necessarily contributing to the achievement of 
justice.’181 This may be particularly true where the defendant is testing the prosecution case 
without asserting a positive defence, or where the jury cannot be alerted to an innocent 
explanation for silence. For this reason, it is imperative that the jury are aware that the 
defendant commits no wrong by remaining silent, and that they do not attach more weight 
to the fact of silence than is necessary. In a conception of the criminal process based on 
calling the state to account this would be taken further, with the jury being advised not to 
use the fact of silence against the defendant who should not be penalised for exercising an 
established right. Although such a direction might interfere with the jury’s ‘common sense’ 
assessment of the case, like a direction alerting the jury to the possibility of innocent 
explanations for silence, it could protect the defendant from the risk of injustice, and ensure 
the fair and legitimate operation of the criminal process.  
 
Barriers to s.35 inferences 
There remains an unresolved issue as to the circumstances in which a jury should be 
directed against drawing adverse inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify. In 
Cowan, the Court of Appeal, in declining to address this query, stated that it is not possible 
to anticipate all of the circumstances in which a judge might think it right to direct or advise 
a jury against drawing an adverse inference.182  Likewise, in Murray, the European Court 
stated that it must not speculate on circumstances where inferences may or may not be 
drawn.183 However, it has also been made clear that the operation of s.35 is not to be 
reduced or marginalised,184 and the courts have generally been reluctant to minimise the 
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scope of s.35 by reference to asserted excuses. A submission that adverse inferences should 
not be drawn because the defendant had not been interviewed by the police at a time when 
events were fresh in his mind has been rejected.185 As has the argument that silence is 
necessary to conceal previous convictions.186 In the more recent case of Hamidi and 
Cherazi,187 the Court of Appeal held that it did not follow that because a jury should be 
directed not to draw adverse inferences against an absent co-accused, they should also be 
directed against drawing such inferences against the appellants. The Court reiterated the 
point made in Cowan that it would only be in exceptional cases that the ability to draw an 
adverse inference would be removed from the jury by direction.188 Had there been 
significant issues of fact between the appellants and their co-accused, the consideration of 
which would have been affected by the s.35 direction, there may have been exceptional 
circumstances which required the judge to ensure the parity sought.189  
 
The one substantive barrier to drawing adverse inferences from in-court silence is s.35(1)(b), 
when it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the accused makes it 
undesirable for him to give evidence. This provision has the potential to act as a safeguard 
for vulnerable defendants against an indiscriminate application of adverse inferences which 
can be drawn under s.35, notwithstanding the possibility of a legitimate explanation for 
silence. However, the provision is being applied too restrictively and is failing to fulfil its 
potential.190 In Friend,191 the first case to examine s.35(1)(b), the judge gave a s.35 direction, 
despite the defendant’s young age (fifteen years) and low IQ (mental age of around nine). 
The Court of Appeal felt that the trial judge had acted within his discretion, and went on to 
state that a physical condition might include a risk of an epileptic attack, and a mental 
condition might include latent schizophrenia.192  ‘Undesirable’ was, thus, interpreted in 
terms of the impact that testifying would have on a defendant’s immediate health. Little 
consideration was given to the quality of the defendant’s evidence or the fact that he may 
create a highly unfavourable impression through no fault of his own.  
 
                                                             
185 R v Napper [1996] Crim LR 591. 
186 See R v Cowan [1996] QB 373 and R v Becouarn [2005] UKHL 55. This argument is no longer 
relevant as a result of the bad character provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
187 [2010] EWCA Crim 66. 
188 Ibid [21]. 
189 Ibid [24]. 
190 Owusu-Bempah (n 165) 691. 
191
 [1997] 2 Cr App R 231. 
192 Ibid [242]. 
171 
 
Consequent upon the restrictive approach taken by the courts, all but those defendants who 
are borderline unfit to plead are expected to testify so that their credibility can be judged, 
even if they can do no more than deny the accusations.193 In order to safeguard those who 
are fit to plead, yet suffer from some mental or physical condition which may affect their 
testimony, the notion of ‘undesirable’ should be given a broader scope.194 In Friend’s second 
appeal, the Court opened up the possibility of a broader interpretation of s.35(1)(b) by 
quashing the conviction in the light of new expert evidence that Friend suffered from 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.195 Despite this, the judicial approach to s.35(1)(b) 
has remained narrow.196  This is particularly worrying for young defendants whose age is 
unlikely to impact the ‘desirability’ of their testimony.197 In Lancaster, the Court of Appeal 
stated that there might be some force in the argument that Friend applied an unduly 
restrictive interpretation of s.35(1)(b), but did not elaborate on this point.198  
 
In Tabbakh,199 the defendant had some degree of mental health problems, suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder and had self-harmed for some time. The Court of Appeal held 
that the trial judge had correctly ruled that the jury would be able to draw an adverse 
inference from his failure to give evidence. It was concluded that the defendant’s own 
health and welfare were not the only issue. The fact that he had a condition that might have 
created some difficulty in giving evidence was thought insufficient to justify the conclusion 
that it was undesirable that he should do so.200 It was submitted by the appellant that the 
greater the importance of the evidence, the less desirable it was for him to testify. 
Conversely, it was held that, given the potential importance of the defendant’s evidence to 
the case, the increased risk of self-harm (which was not of the most serious kind) did not 
make it undesirable for him to give evidence.201  The Court found that all of the 
circumstances of a case need to be taken into account such that when a defendant has a 
marginal health condition which would create a marginal risk of modest or temporary 
distress or regression if he were to give evidence, and if the only issue to which his evidence 
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could go were one of very peripheral significance, the judge would be entitled to take that 
into account in concluding that it was undesirable for him to give evidence.202   
 
The Court’s rejection of the appellant’s argument signals the underlying importance of 
defendant participation. As a result of this decision, the extent to which the defendant's 
wellbeing might be affected, if he were to give evidence, should be considered in the light of 
the importance of the evidence that he can provide; the greater the importance of the 
evidence, the more desirable it is for him to testify. Yet, the exercise of determining the 
desirability of a defendant’s testimony in relation to the importance of his evidence seems 
somewhat superfluous, as the defendant’s testimony will always be significant and has the 
potential to influence the jury’s assessment of the case, even where he is simply denying the 
allegations against him. The manner of giving evidence can have just as significant an impact 
as the content of that evidence. As it now stands, in order to fall within s.35(1)(b), the 
defendant will most likely need to show that he is suffering from a physical or mental 
condition that will certainly be triggered or worsened by giving evidence, and that his 
evidence will be of little importance to the case.203   
 
Practitioners worry about the vulnerability of defendants who are not considered 
‘undesirable’ witnesses for the purpose of s.35(1)(b). A post-CJPOA study found that there 
was apprehension that such defendants, having been effectively forced into the witness box, 
may come across poorly and damage their case; this may, in turn, raise the possibility of 
wrongful conviction.204 Because of the burden on the defence to produce evidence of an 
explanation for silence, in the absence of expert evidence as to why the defendant has not 
testified, the defence party will have to make a difficult decision as to whether or not the 
defendant should take the stand. Even where expert evidence has been presented, the 
judge does not have to draw the jury’s attention to it in his summing up on s.35, so long as 
the summing up as a whole made it clear that the expert evidence can be taken into 
account.205  The defendant’s participation in the trial process seems to be of paramount 
importance, above other considerations, including his wellbeing. 
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6.6 The CJPOA in practice  
 
Like many aspects of criminal justice research, it is harder to pinpoint the effect of the CJPOA 
on outputs than it is to identify its impact on judicial activity.206 However, Bucke, Street and 
Brown conducted empirical studies into the practical effects of the CJPOA.207 It is worth 
noting that, although a detailed and useful report, the information was gathered not long 
after the CJPOA came into force, at a time when the case law was beginning to develop. 
Fifteen years later, the situation might be quite different. This was the experience in 
Singapore where provisions similar to those in the CJPOA, and inspired by the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee’s 1972 report, had little effect initially, but saw much greater use in 
later years. This has been attributed to a cultural shift in criminal procedure and wider 
society towards tougher attitudes on crime and the creation of a tougher criminal justice 
system, resulting in the progressive erosion of the right to silence and privilege against self-
incrimination in Singapore.208 A shift in attitudes toward crime is also evident in England, 
with much more emphasis being put on securing convictions, ‘balancing’ the system, victim 
interests, and efficiency. As a result, English criminal procedure now places greater emphasis 
on the participation of the accused. The shift towards increased participation may have led 
to greater influence of the silence provisions. 
 
A principal conclusion from Bucke et al.’s post-CJPOA research is that the silence provisions 
do not have a major impact on the outcome of cases, with no discernible increase in the 
conviction rate or the rate of guilty pleas. Conviction rates since the study was published 
have varied. Whilst some sources suggest an increase of around ten per cent by 2007, others 
cite a roughly stable rate.209 However, there are many variables which can influence 
conviction rates such as changes in recording practices, making it difficult to determine the 
precise impact of the CJPOA.210 Nevertheless, the incentive element of the CJPOA may have 
encouraged more suspects and defendants to talk. Bucke et al.’s research points to a 
significant reduction in the extent to which suspects rely on their right to silence during 
police questioning, with the proportion of suspects refusing to answer some or all police 
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questions falling from 23 to 16 per cent.211 Still, there was no change in the proportion of 
suspects providing admissions.212 This is consistent with a police perception that more 
suspects are lying. As to the use of silence in court, the impression of practitioners is that 
gradually more defendants have been testifying. Virtually all barristers, CPS staff and 
defence solicitors agreed that fewer defendants were declining to testify.213  
 
The possibility that juries may have taken into consideration a defendant’s silence prior to 
the CJPOA raises further questions about the extent of the provisions’ impact. However, to 
try to isolate the effect of the CJPOA on juries’ decision-making would be problematic. In the 
absence of research into jury deliberations, the impact of silence on the outcome of cases 
will remain speculative. Nonetheless, perceptions of increased participation amongst 
defendants do point to the conclusion that the pressure imposed on them to cooperate and 
the adverse inferences that may be drawn if they do not, has actually increased 
participation. Bucke, Street and Brown concluded that the provisions have had a marked 
impact on: suspects’ use of silence at the police station; police practices in relation to 
interviewing and disclosure; the advice given at the police station by legal advisers; the 
proportion of defendants testifying at trial; the way in which cases are prosecuted and 
defended at trial; and on judge’s directions to the jury.214 The CJPOA may have also 
increased efficiency in the investigation stages, particularly by way of more productive 
interviews, greater scope for the investigation of accounts provided by suspects during 
interviews, and greater certainty of convictions where silence augments other evidence.215 
Despite a lack of change in plea, charge and conviction rates, the CJPOA has had an impact 
on the working of the criminal process, particularly the role of the accused as a participant.  
 
 
6.7 Theoretical implications of the CJPOA 
 
The CJPOA makes it difficult for the accused to successfully put the prosecution to proof and 
test the case against him without actively participating in the criminal process. It seems to 
place participatory burdens on the defendant both before and during trial. This is 
particularly so where the defendant wishes to assert an excuse for his earlier silence, such as 
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reliance on legal advice. Hodgson notes that, through the silence provisions, the accused is 
systematically restrained from behaving in an adversarial way, with penalties attached to the 
exercise of the right to put the prosecution to proof.216 The effect of the CJPOA is, thus, to 
move English criminal procedure further away from its adversarial style from which 
developed many legal norms now considered essential to guarantee a fair process. The 
result of this shift is a procedural model much more participation-focused, yet distinctive 
from the models identified in chapter 3.  This final part of the chapter identifies some of the 
different perspectives from which the scope and value of the right to silence can be viewed 
in order to gain a better understanding of the theoretical and normative impact of the 
CJPOA. As the right to silence is an application of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
there are some overlaps between this section and the justifications for the privilege set out 
in the previous chapter. However, since the two rights are being approached separately, and 
since the accused is penalised in different ways for relying on them, the focus here is 
specifically on the implications of limiting the right to silence.  
 
6.7.1 The value of the right to silence 
The merit of a right to silence as part of criminal procedure can be examined from a number 
of perspectives. One obvious issue relates to the relationship between silence and accurate 
outcomes. The nature of this relationship produced arguments for both supporters and 
opponents of reform prior to the CJPOA. Those who opposed reform believed that, by 
equating silence with guilt, innocent suspects and defendants would be put at risk of 
wrongful conviction.217 For those who supported reform, silence was perceived as suspicious 
and an indicator of guilt. Both the domestic and European Courts have taken the ‘silence as 
an indicator of guilt’ approach in their assessments of the CJPOA, and have, for the most 
part, adopted an expansive interpretation of the provisions.  For example, it has been largely 
felt that drawing adverse inferences from silence is a matter of ‘common sense’.218 However, 
this common sense argument is weakened by the many possible innocent explanations for 
silence. Furthermore, as Easton points out, common sense can be ‘unreliable, 
impressionistic and unsystematic’.219 It is because of the weakness of common sense 
thinking that clear judicial guidance is so important.220 Common sense may wrongly equate 
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silence with guilt and fail to consider other possible factors underlying silence, such as fear 
and anxiety. Juries may not be able to distinguish suspicious silence from innocent silence; 
they are being asked to speculate. This is unlikely to generate truth finding. Not only are 
adverse inferences from silence a dangerous and unnecessary application of ‘common 
sense’, they also undermine other criminal process values which are important for the 
normative theory of calling the state to account. The link between silence and the process 
aim of accurate fact finding is not sufficiently strong to warrant the CJPOA. 
 
Another perspective from which the right can be examined is based on policy considerations 
concerning protection against abuses of process. As an application of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the right to silence can help ensure that the authorities act legitimately in 
furthering the aims of the criminal process. This is particularly important during police 
interrogations where the right to silence can limit the pressure on a suspect to offer a false 
confession or disclose information that might be construed as criminal. The potential for 
abuse of law enforcement powers is at its greatest in relation to custodial interrogation by 
the police where there is also considerable physical and psychological pressure to 
cooperate. Suspects may be misrepresented or misunderstood, may panic or get confused, 
and the police may take advantage of this.  Dennis argues that such pressure, if taken to 
extremes, can be inconsistent with the fundamental values of the criminal law and may 
produce confessions that are unreliable.221 He submits that the curtailment of the right to 
silence in the police station is objectionable, and that section 34 ‘ought to be repealed as a 
matter of principle.’ 222 Circumstances change at the trial stage of the criminal process where 
the accused knows the precise charges against him, has heard the evidence against him, has 
had the opportunity to challenge it, and is participating in a public hearing before an 
impartial tribunal. Although silence may offer some protection against miscarriages of 
justice at trial, it is difficult to justify a strong right to silence in court on the same policy 
basis as silence in the police station.  
 
From the standpoint of a criminal process based on calling the state to account, greater 
concern must exist for the broader normative implications of limiting the right to silence. 
The idea that the state should be called to account for the accusations it makes against the 
defendant and in doing so, justify its request for punishment of the defendant, stems from 
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such fundamental legal norms as the presumption of innocence, fair trial guarantees which 
constrain the state’s powers against the accused, and a conception of the proper 
relationship between state and citizen in a liberal democracy. As illustrated below, the right 
to silence forms a valuable part of this. It allows the prosecution case to be tested whilst 
promoting fairness and legitimacy.  
 
6.7.2 The scope of the right to silence 
The appropriate limits of state-induced pressure on the accused to respond to a case against 
him depend on one’s view of the political obligation between state and citizen.223 A strong 
libertarian view of the relationship between citizen and state, such as the one expressed 
here, holds that citizens must be accorded maximum freedom in deciding whether to 
cooperate with state investigations.  As such, there should be no formal consequences for 
refusing to actively participate in the police station or at trial. Regard for suspects and 
defendants as autonomous citizens of a liberal polity who should be protected from the 
state’s potentially oppressive penal power should prevent us from requiring them to 
participate in proceedings against themselves.  As already noted, autonomy is respected by 
allowing freedom of choice. This can be exhibited through the right to silence. A less 
rigorous view would argue that it is not, in principle, unfair to expect citizens to respond to 
well-founded accusations. This view draws parallels with Greenawalt’s argument that 
adverse inferences can be a proper response to silence if substantial evidence of 
wrongdoing exists.224  The jurisprudence surrounding the CJPOA seems to correspond to this 
approach. On the other end of the spectrum is the view that direct pressure in the form of 
criminal sanctions for non-cooperation should be imposed to secure participation where it is 
not forthcoming. Although imposing criminal sanctions would represent an unnecessary and 
unacceptable use of state power, this is the approach that has been taken in regards to 
certain information that would ordinarily be thought to fall within the privilege against self-
incrimination.225 It is, therefore, not too farfetched to envisage such an approach being 
taken in regards to the right to silence, if doing so is believed to further the aims of the 
criminal process. 
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Whilst a theory of criminal procedure based on calling the state to account obviously calls 
for a strong liberal approach to the right to silence, other models and conceptions of 
criminal procedure do not accommodate a right to silence so easily. In an inquisitorial 
model, the nature and environment of the process emphasise participation, such that it 
would be rare for an accused to assert silence. In this situation, it is conceivable that there 
would be undesirable consequences for remaining silent, even in the absence of provisions 
for adverse inferences. Rules and procedures, including a proactive judiciary and reliance on 
a written dossier, place fewer impediments in the way of a defendant’s active participation. 
A jurisdiction which adopts these ‘inquisitorial’ characteristics is at greater ease in qualifying 
the right to silence. In France, for example, it is considered to be against the suspect’s own 
interests to exercise the right to silence.226 Duff et al. also struggle to accommodate a 
workable right to silence in their conception of the criminal trial as calling the defendant to 
answer to the charge against him and answer for any criminal conduct that he is proved to 
have committed.227 They believe there should be a normative expectation on him to take 
part in the trial process.228 This expectation is not easily reconcilable with a freely 
enforceable right to silence.  
 
A legal culture which discourages participation has developed in England over a long period 
of time. Also, there are many bars to effective communication with the accused, including 
the role of the judge and counsel, and the many complex rules of evidence. The 
professionalisation and formality of the criminal process, particularly at trial, together with 
factors such as the legal language used and dress code employed, may be far removed from 
the accused’s own social background and experiences. He may not understand much of the 
process, and feel alienated or intimidated. It would, thus, seem more appropriate for the 
English system to uphold a liberal interpretation of the right to silence, rather than to 
penalise those who exercise it. By adopting the CJPOA, England has clearly altered its 
procedural style. This is objectionable because the participation-focused model which 
appears to have been adopted has much less regard for issues of fairness and legitimacy.  
 
 
6.7.3 Implications of limiting the right to silence  
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The right to silence belongs to a cluster of criminal justice rights closely linked to the general 
issue of fairness. These rights include the presumption of innocence and burden of proof. 
Adherence to the presumption of innocence indicates that it is wrong to require an 
individual to supply evidence against himself. This, Ashworth believes, should be the 
practical meaning of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.229 On 
the other hand, Dennis believes that the claim that adverse inferences from silence violate 
the presumption of innocence seems to imply a claim that it is necessarily improper to draw 
any inferences from a person’s failure to explain away incriminating evidence.230 This, he 
submits, is contrary both to common sense and to existing law. However, by expressly 
catering for adverse inferences, the CJPOA goes beyond common sense by creating an 
expectation of participation whilst undermining explanations for silence that are not 
indicative of guilt.  
 
From a normative perspective, the presumption of innocence operates at trial by requiring 
the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt and operates beyond the trial as a direction 
to officials to treat the suspect as if he were innocent at all stages, until guilt is proven. It 
implies that the accused should not have to play a role in the state’s obligation to account 
for its accusations. Penalising non-cooperation through drawing adverse inferences of guilt 
against those who do not answer police questions or give evidence at trial is at odds with 
this interpretation of the presumption. However, the CJPOA also impacts narrower 
interpretations of the presumption by implying that if an accused cannot, or does not, 
account for allegations against him, then those allegations must be true. This is reminiscent 
of the pre-adversarial, altercation, or ‘accused speaks’ trial under which it was felt that an 
innocent defendant ought to be able to demonstrate his innocence for the jury.231 When the 
emphasis is on the defendant’s participation, the presumption of innocence is much less 
pronounced. Strengthening the prosecution’s position through an expectation that the 
defendant will cooperate and equating silence with guilt affects the burden of proof in a 
similar way.  
 
Setting a high standard of proof encourages the jury to probe the prosecution case, rather 
than focusing on whether or how the defendant gives evidence.  Instead, the defendant now 
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appears to have a participatory burden which detracts from the prosecution’s general 
burden of proof. Jackson points out that the ‘common sense’ approach to silence eases the 
burden which the prosecution must discharge by permitting the trier of fact to draw a direct 
inference of guilt on the basis that the accused was not prepared to assert his innocence on 
oath because he was not innocent.232 This would appear to allow the trier of fact to raise the 
prosecution case up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt when the case 
standing alone cannot reach this standard.233  
 
In reviewing the impact of the CJPOA, Bucke et al. found a difference in opinion amongst 
criminal justice practitioners as to whether the provisions had, in practice, if not in law, 
shifted the burden of proof onto the defendant. Those who felt that it did so argued that the 
defendant now has to effectively prove his innocence by accounting for his silence. Those 
who thought the opposite argued that the prosecution still have to prove its case beyond 
reasonable doubt.234 However, even some of those who thought that the burden of proof 
has not been affected considered that to allow inferences to be drawn from silence sat 
rather uneasily with a presumption of innocence; they expressed also misgivings about  
statements that the right to silence had been expressly preserved.235 Like practitioners, 
academic commentators are also divided on this point.236 Even if the burden of proof has not 
been expressly reversed, to allow inferences of guilt to be drawn from silence is to 
significantly restrict the perimeters of doubt, and, thereby, make it easier to find that the 
prosecution have discharged their burden.  
 
There are clearly several view-points from which the value and appropriate limits of the right 
to silence can be examined. From the perspective of the normative theory of criminal 
procedure influenced largely by adversarialism, due process and rights based concerns, 
there should be a liberal approach to the right to silence. This would protect the accused’s 
freedom to choose whether or not to participate. The English system has steered away from 
this approach and has become much more participation-orientated in an attempt to further 
the aim of accurate fact finding and increase efficiency. As such, it has resorted to penalising 
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suspects and defendants for their non-cooperation, while justifying this as ‘common sense’. 
It is tempting, but difficult, to label this as ‘inquisitorial’, because inquisitorialism usually 
emphasises and encourages participation in its structure and procedural style without the 
need to expressly penalise those who do not cooperate. The reforms to the right to silence 
might also link the English system with an emerging efficiency model which also gains 
support from recent developments, such as the Criminal Procedure Rules. However, despite 
the advantages that suspect cooperation may have for police investigations, as Birch points 
out, it is costly in terms of time and focus during the trial stage.237  It is also difficult to see 
how the CJPOA has brought English procedure closer to the Continent. Although continental 
Europe is relatively participation-focused, legislation allowing adverse inferences does not 
reflect common practice in Europe.238 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights 
has, for the most part, taken a more restrictive approach to the CJPOA than the domestic 
courts.  The CJPOA has, instead, contributed to the emergence of a procedural model which 
emphasises the defendant’s participation in pursuit of its aims, and which finds it harder to 
accommodate the widely recognised defence rights which developed as part of the 
adversarial system. 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored how the CJPOA has changed the style of English criminal 
procedure, and why it now seems incompatible with both traditional notions of 
adversarialism and a normative concept of the criminal process in which the state must 
account for its accusations and justify its request for condemnation and punishment of the 
accused. The CJPOA has had an impact on fundamental process norms, such as the 
presumption of innocence and burden of proof; it has created a new evidential burden on 
the defendant to provide an explanation for his silence in order to prevent adverse 
inferences against him; it forces him to second guess his solicitor’s advice to remain silent; 
and reverses a long history of English jurisprudence which upheld a right to silence. It does 
these things without significantly furthering its desired objectives of increasing the rate of 
confessions and convictions, increasing efficiency, and solving the problem of ambush 
defences. However, it has increased participation, by putting the focus on the accused and 
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creating an expectation of cooperation. The rules of criminal justice now reflect a prima 
facie obligation to participate; the courts have been reluctant to interfere with this. It must, 
nonetheless, be stressed that in order to have due respect for the necessary constraints 
which legitimacy and fairness should place on the criminal process, participation should be a 
choice rather than a penalty-backed requirement. The adverse inference from silence 
regime highlights the conflict between the aims of the criminal process and considerations 
of fairness, legitimacy and respect for rights.  
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7 
Disclosure 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Requiring the prosecution and defence to engage in pre-trial disclosure can influence the 
nature and outcome of criminal proceedings. Disclosure moulds the informational 
environment by contributing to both the way parties prepare for trial and the cases they put 
forward at the trial itself.1 It may promote accurate fact finding by preventing ambush 
defences which lead to unjust acquittals, and by preventing wrongful convictions which 
might occur as a result of prosecution non-disclosure. There are also obvious efficiency 
benefits in having notice of the evidence and arguments of the opposing party prior to trial, 
as it can save the courts both time and money. As a final example of penalising non-
cooperation, this chapter explores requirements for the defence to disclose their case 
before trial, and the provisions which permit adverse inferences to be drawn against those 
who fail to comply. A broad disclosure obligation for the prosecution is relatively easy to 
justify, as it is for the state, through the prosecution, to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Without foreknowledge of the case against the accused, the defence may 
not know how to prepare for trial or what evidence to call.2 Furthermore, since the defence 
lacks the resources and statutory powers to carry out a full investigation, they will usually 
have to rely on evidence uncovered by the police and prosecution in order to support their 
case. Consequently, they have a strong interest in gaining access ‘to all the fruits of the 
police investigation’.3 It is difficult to advance an argument in favour of defence disclosure 
on similar grounds.  
 
Prior to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), the defence were under 
no general duty to disclose their case to the prosecution. This can be justified as a reflection 
of the principle that the defendant need not respond until the prosecution have established 
a prima facie case in court.4 It is consistent with the normative theory of criminal procedure 
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in which the state is called to account for its accusations without resource from the accused. 
The CPIA reduced prosecution disclosure obligations at common law, and imposed radical 
new duties on the defence. The most significant element of the legislation, for the purposes 
of this chapter, is the requirement to provide a defence statement which sets out the details 
of the defence case. Failure to comply is penalised through provisions allowing adverse 
comment to be made and adverse inferences of guilt to be drawn. The defendant may also 
be penalised if disclosure is late or inconsistent with previous disclosure.  
 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the concerns which led to the enactment of the 
CPIA. This is followed by an examination of the current prosecution disclosure obligations. 
The focus then shifts to the requirements placed on the defence to disclose their case ahead 
of trial and the sanctions imposed for non-cooperation. The chapter then examines the 
issues of principle arising from defence disclosure obligations. Requirements on the defence 
to disclose the details of its case may interfere with important elements of the normative 
conception of criminal procedure that is based on calling the state to account. These include 
fairness guarantees and the proper relationship between citizen and state. The implications 
which the CPIA regime has for English criminal procedure are then discussed. Of particular 
interest is the impact of the link between the disclosure regime, the case management 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules, and the perceived need to tackle ambush 
defences. Within this area of law, it is not only the provisions for adverse inference which 
shape the procedural style, but also the general statutory duties placed on the defence. 
Defence disclosure aims to secure convictions as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
Underlying this is a desire to obtain the cooperation and participation of the defence. The 
current regime has, thus, contributed to the shift in English criminal procedure away from 
adversarialism to a participatory model. It is at odds with the normative theory of calling the 
state to account, interferes with the defendant’s ability to test the prosecution case, and 
raises important issues of principle.  
 
The key components of the CPIA regime are as follows: 
s. 3 Initial duty of prosecutor to disclose 
(1) The prosecutor must-  
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed 
to the accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case 
for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, or 
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description 
mentioned in paragraph (a). 
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s. 5 Compulsory duty by accused 
(5) Where this section applies, the accused must give a defence statement to the court and 
the prosecutor. 
 
s.6A Contents of defence statement 
(1) For the purposes of this Part a defence statement is a written statement -  
(a) setting out the nature of the accused’s defence, including any particular defences on 
which he intends to rely; 
(b) indicating the matters of fact on which he takes issue with the prosecution; 
(c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, why he takes issue with the prosecution;  
(ca) setting out the particulars of the matters of fact on which he intends to rely for the 
purposes of his defence;5 and 
(d) indicating any point of law (including any point as to the admissibility of evidence or an 
abuse of process) that he wishes to take, and any authority on which he intends to rely 
for that purpose. 
 
S.7A Continuing duty of prosecutor to disclose 
(2) The prosecutor must keep under review the question whether at any given time (and, in 
particular, following the giving of a defence statement) there is prosecution material which 
— 
(a) might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution 
against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, and 
(b) has not been disclosed to the accused. 
 
S.11 Faults in disclosure by accused 
(1) This section applies in the three cases set out in subsections (2), (3) and (4). 
 
(5)Where this section applies —  
(a) the court or any other party may make such comment as appears appropriate; 
(b) the court or jury may draw such inferences as appear proper in deciding whether the 
accused is guilty of the offence concerned. 
 
 
7.2 Disclosure reform 
 
Prosecution non-disclosure can result (and has resulted) in miscarriages of justice. High 
profile cases include Ward,6 in which police interview records revealing inconsistent and 
retracted confessions, as well as the results of scientific tests conducted by government 
forensic scientists, were withheld from the defence. In Taylor,7 senior police officers had not 
disclosed key facts about a prosecution witness which put his evidence and credibility into 
                                                             
5 This provision was inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s.60(1) and applies to 
cases in which Part 1 of the CPIA applied by virtue of s.1(1) or (2) before November 3rd 2008. 
6
 [1993] 1 WLR 619. 
7 (1994) 98 Cr App R 361. 
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question. In the case of Sally Clark,8 the fault for non-disclosure of test results which would 
have undermined the prosecution’s case lay with the Home Office pathologist and not the 
police or prosecution themselves. However, as a Home Office employee, the pathologist was 
an agent of the state and the state might therefore absorb accountability for his non-
disclosure. Despite these and other high profile cases of prosecution non-disclosure resulting 
in wrongful conviction,9 the concerns which led to the enactment of the CPIA were primarily 
focused on the negative implications of defence non-disclosure.  As a result, the 
government’s consultation paper on reform was largely ‘one-sided’.10  
 
The few statutory disclosure obligations placed on the defence, and the absence of any 
obligations at common law, were thought to have provided them with an unwarranted 
advantage which allowed them to ambush the prosecution with defences they were not 
prepared to address.  This view persisted, despite evidence to show that ambush defences 
were not a significant problem.11  With the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
(CJPOA) already in place to address the issue of ambush defences, it might be presumed that 
the problem was even less significant at the time the CPIA was enacted. There was also 
concern that the expansive approach to prosecution disclosure at common law allowed the 
defence to go on fishing expeditions; purposely wasting the time and resources of the police 
and prosecution by requiring them to sort through large masses of material in the hope of 
either causing delay or finding something that would provoke the prosecution to drop the 
case.  The defence could supposedly do this through successive requests for material far 
beyond the stage at which it could reasonably be claimed that the information was likely to 
cast doubt upon the prosecution case.12 However, there was, again, a lack of evidence to 
support these assertions; in other words, the reform campaign relied largely on anecdote.13 
The point that the defence is the best judge of what is relevant to its case supports wide 
                                                             
8 [2003] EWCA Crim 1020. 
9 Other cases include: R v Kiszko, The Times, 18 February, 1992; R v Maguire (1992) 94 Cr App R 133. 
10 A Ashworth ‘Crime, Community and Creeping Consequentialism’ [1996] Crim LR 220, 228. 
11 Leng found that ambush defences were raised in 5% of contested cases at the most: R Leng The 
Right to Silence in Police Interrogation: A Study of Some of the Issues Underlying the Debate, Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No.10 (HMSO: London, 1993); Zander and Henderson 
found a rate of 7% to 10% in a sample of Crown Court cases, with two fifths of these causing no 
problem for the prosecution. M Zander and P Henderson Crown Court Study Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice, Research Study No.19 (HMSO: London, 1993). See chapter 6 for further discussion on 
the proportion of ambush defences. 
12 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (HMSO: London, 1993) 93. 
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 M Redmayne ‘Process Gains and Process Values: The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996’ (1997) 60 MLR 79, 81. 
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disclosure, and ‘fishing expeditions’ may be a useful way of leading to evidence which will 
assist an innocent defendant. 14  
 
The CPIA is largely a result of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice’s 
recommendations.15 The Commission recommended a disclosure regime, based on two 
stages, whereby the prosecution would make primary disclosure, followed by the disclosure 
of a statement from the defence outlining the basics of its case. The prosecution would then 
make further disclosure of any information likely to help the defence case. According to the 
Commission’s report, the objective of the proposals was to ‘bring forward the moment at 
which the issues which the jury will have to decide can be clearly and concisely laid out’.16 
The Commission believed that there were powerful reasons for extending disclosure 
obligations to the defence: it would encourage earlier and better preparation of cases; result 
in the prosecution being dropped in light of the defence disclosure; result in earlier 
resolutions through guilty pleas; or the fixing of an earlier trial date. The length of the trial 
could also be more readily estimated, leading to better use of the time both of the court and 
of those involved in the trial, and ambush defences would be kept to a minimum.17 These 
are pragmatic reasons which focus on increasing efficiency and eliminating surprises to the 
prosecution. However, Zander argued that a general requirement of defence disclosure 
would involve significant extra delays, costs and inefficiencies which, in practice, have been 
barriers to a smooth operation of the provisions. 18   
 
Leng also felt that the proposals were flawed in principle and unlikely to deliver their 
promised gains. He opposed them on the basis that they would effect a significant change in 
the values of the criminal process away from procedural rights in the interests of 
efficiency.19 In reality, the regime may have decreased efficiency; significant delays, often 
lasting two to four hours or more, on the morning of trials, whilst advocates address 
disclosure issues, are not uncommon.20 In five per cent of cases examined by the CPS 
Inspectorate, some aspect of non-compliance with the disclosure regime resulted in 
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 Redmayne ‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its Discontents’ (n 1) 444. 
15 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (n 12) chapter 6. 
16 Ibid 84. 
17 Ibid 97. 
18 Ibid 22.  
19 Leng ‘Losing Sight of the Defendant: the Government’s Proposals on Pre-Trial Disclosure’ (n 4). 
20
 Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate A Thematic Review of the Duties of Disclosure of Unused 
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adjournments and ineffective trials whilst disclosure issues were being resolved.21 Although 
the Royal Commission stressed the efficiency benefits of reform, the government, 
particularly in relation to further reforms made under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA), 
focused on case outcomes. Increased incentives and sanctions for defence non-disclosure 
were intended to increase convictions.22 This demonstrates the twin-purpose of the 
disclosure regime as efficiently securing convictions. 
 
The original disclosure scheme, under the CPIA, was based on proposals set out in the Home 
Office Consultation Paper23 which was, itself, a response to the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations. However, the CPIA went further than the Commission had 
recommended; it introduced a more restrictive approach to prosecution disclosure and a 
broader approach to defence disclosure. It placed a greater emphasis on the alleged 
problems which disclosure causes to the prosecution than its importance as a safeguard 
against wrongful convictions. Initially the new disclosure regime did not work as intended. It 
was not enforced with vigour and, unlike the CJPOA 1994, produced little case law on the 
applicability of adverse inferences. In order to resolve this, amendments were made by Part 
5 of the CJA 2003. Although these amendments helped rectify the prosecution’s restrictive 
and subjective obligations, they also extended defence disclosure obligations, and made it 
easier to penalise defendant’s non-cooperation.  
 
Whether the CJA reforms made any practical improvements to the disclosure regime is 
questionable. Quirk believes that the disclosure provisions cannot work, because they lack 
consideration for the working of cultures and practices of the key protagonists and, so, 
result in inappropriate allocations of responsibilities.24  As shown below, the statutory 
regime requires the culturally adversarial police to fulfil an effectively inquisitorial function, 
prosecutors to view material from a defence perspective, the defence to act in the interest 
of the administration of the justice system rather than of their clients, and defendants’ to 
cooperate with proceedings against themselves.25 These are all requirements which the 
respective parties are not necessarily well-equipped to fulfil and, therefore, promote a shift 
in procedural style.   
                                                             
21 Ibid. 
22 Home Office Justice for All CM5563 (HMSO: London, 2002) chapter 3. 
23 Home Office Disclosure: A Consultation Document Cm.2864 (HMSO: London, 1995). 
24 H Quirk ‘The Significance of Culture in the Criminal Procedure Reform: Why the Revised Disclosure 
Scheme Cannot Work’ (2006) 10 E and P 42.  
25 Ibid 46. 
189 
 
 
 
7.3 Prosecution disclosure 
 
This chapter focuses on the disclosure obligations imposed on the defence. However, it is 
worth setting out the duties of the prosecution in order to gain a fuller understanding of the 
disclosure regime as a whole. The important position which prosecution disclosure holds in 
English criminal procedure can be traced back to the emergence of the adversarial system 
and, in particular, the Treason Trials Act of 1696 which included a provision granting treason 
defendants the right to obtain a copy of the indictment prior to the trial. In the preceding 
altercation trial, the defendant would often be unaware of the charges against him, and 
would have no knowledge of the prosecution’s case. The belief was that facing the 
defendant with the evidence in court for the first time would help the judge and jury 
ascertain the sincerity of his denials.26  Conversely, the requirement for the defendant to 
know the evidence against him has developed into a crucial safeguard against miscarriages 
of justice. 
 
It has become a fundamental principle that a defendant should not be tried without knowing 
the nature of the case against him.27 Article 6(3)(a) of the ECHR provides that everyone 
charged with a criminal offence has the right to be informed promptly, in a language which 
he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In 
England it has been accepted that adequate prosecution disclosure forms part of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal have endorsed this: ‘in our adversarial 
system, in which the police and prosecution control the investigatory process, an accused’s 
right to fair disclosure is an inseparable part of his right to a fair trial.’28 It is also an essential 
part of ensuring equality of arms between the parties. Equality of arms is one of the 
foundations of the adversarial system of adjudication,29 and has been referred to by the 
European Court of Human Rights as forming part of the right to an ‘adversarial trial’. In Rowe 
and Davis v UK,30 they stated that, ‘It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that 
criminal proceedings, including elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, 
                                                             
26 JH Langbein The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003) 63. 
27 Jespers v Belgium (1981) 27 DR 61; Edwards v UK (1992) 15 EHRR 417; Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v F [2009] UKHL 28. 
28 R v Brown [1995] 1 Cr App R 191 [198]. 
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should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution 
and defence.’31 The term ‘adversarial’ in this context was used by the European Court to 
refer to the requirement that the accused be present at trial and that the defence be able to 
challenge the submissions and observations of the prosecution and to lead its own 
evidence.32 It does not describe a pure adversarial model as defined in chapter 3. Article 6(1) 
requires that the prosecution disclose to the defence all material evidence in their 
possession for or against the accused.33 By limiting prosecution disclosure, the CPIA puts the 
parties in a less equal position and, thus, compromises the defendant’s ability to have a fair 
trial. Also, it shifts the English criminal process further away from adversarialism and the 
norms which govern issues of fairness.  
 
A distinction can be made between three types, or stages, of prosecution disclosure. The 
first is during the period between arrest and committal. Here the CPIA does not apply, but 
the police and prosecution may have some duty to disclose the information necessary to 
enable the accused to receive informed advice from his solicitor. In DPP v Ara,34 the decision 
to stay proceedings as an abuse of process was justified in the light of police refusal to 
disclose to a solicitor the terms of an interview with the defendant. However, this case may 
be confined to its specific facts, since the defendant could not be given appropriate advice 
from his solicitor on whether to consent to a caution without the disclosure. It was held that 
acceptance of a caution is inextricably linked with entitlement to informed legal advice.35 
There is no general duty on the police to disclose material before charge, and pre-committal 
disclosure requirements cannot normally exceed the duty of disclosure under the CPIA after 
committal. The test is what justice and fairness requires of the responsible prosecutor in the 
circumstances of each case.36 The two other types of disclosure occur after committal and 
are covered by the CPIA. These are disclosure of the evidence which the prosecution intends 
to present at trial, and disclosure of material not being used by the prosecution. Although 
the principle that the prosecution should disclose the evidence it will rely on has long been 
established and is generally uncontroversial, there are difficult issues surrounding the 
disclosure of unused material which is gathered during the investigation, but not put 
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forward by the prosecution at trial. This evidence may potentially assist the defendant in 
establishing innocence or developing a case.   
 
The Attorney General first set out guidelines on disclosure in 1981.37 These stated that 
unused material should be made available to the defence if it had some bearing on the 
offences charged and the surrounding circumstances of the case. There were also a number 
of grounds on which the prosecution could refuse disclosure, such as endangering a witness. 
However, the guidelines did not have the force of law, and subsequent cases set a broader 
test for prosecution disclosure.38 As the prosecution are supposed to be concerned with the 
pursuit of truth, as opposed to convicting the innocent, it seems fair that the defence have 
access to relevant unused material. The prosecution should be regarded as the trustee 
rather than the monopoly owner of the evidence in its possession.39 Yet, prosecution 
disclosure has frequently been inadequate, leading to miscarriages of justice, such as those 
referred to above, and continuing to result in unsafe convictions.40 Redmayne points out 
that it may be that the adversarial process promotes non-disclosure through its tendency to 
encourage practioners to think in terms of tactical advantage.41 This is part of the contest 
analogy, or combat effect,42 of the adversarial system and highlights a contradiction within 
it; although the idea of prosecution disclosure developed during the rise of adversarialism, 
the adversarial culture itself discourages it.   
 
Despite the importance of prosecution disclosure of unused material, when the CPIA was 
introduced, it was seen as responding to complaints by the police that prosecution 
disclosure had become too generous.43  The perceived unfettered right to disclosure was 
claimed by senior police officers to have led to the dropping of significant numbers of 
prosecutions where the police were not prepared to reveal sensitive documents.44 The CPIA 
restricted the prosecution’s duty of disclosure by initially splitting it into two stages. The first 
stage was governed by s.3 which originally provided that the prosecution must disclose 
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materials ‘which in the prosecutor’s opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution 
against the accused.’ It now provides for the disclosure to the accused of ‘any prosecution 
material … which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the 
prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused.’45 This is a more 
objective standard. Assuming that the defence duty to provide a defence statement was 
then complied with, the original CPIA imposed upon the prosecution secondary disclosure 
obligations under s.7. This required them to ‘disclose to the accused any prosecution 
material which has not been previously disclosed to the accused and which might be 
reasonably expected to assist the accused’s defence.’ The original two-stage procedure, 
which was highly subjective and dependent on defence disclosure, was amended by the CJA 
2003. Section 7A now requires the prosecutor to keep under review whether there is any 
evidence capable of undermining the prosecution case or assisting the defence. The 
amended s.3 and the new s.7A effectively eliminate the distinction between primary and 
secondary disclosure, and make it difficult to regard prosecution disclosure as being 
conditional on the service of a defence statement.46 However, the two remain linked in a 
practical way: the more the defence discloses in its statement, the more likely it is to alert 
the prosecution to disclosable material in its possession.47  
 
In terms of enforcement, Redmayne has noted a marked asymmetry in the Act.48 Whereas 
defence non-compliance may be penalised with adverse comment and adverse inferences, 
there are no such provisions to encourage prosecution disclosure. It might be said that there 
is, in fact, no disparity here. As explained below, the prosecution and defence are required 
to disclose different aspects of their case. Whilst the defence must essentially disclose all of 
the issues being raised, the prosecution must disclose the evidence being relied on and that 
capable of assisting the defence or undermining the prosecution. Since the nature of the 
disclosure differs, it could be argued that there is no need for corresponding penalties for 
non-compliance. Furthermore, specific provisions for penalising prosecution non-compliance 
may be felt unnecessary, since the defence can apply for further disclosure under s.8 if there 
is reasonable cause to believe that there is prosecution material required to be disclosed by 
s.7A. However, this only applies if the defence have complied with their obligation to furnish 
a defence statement. There is, also, the possibility of the judge using s.78 of the Police and 
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Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to exclude prosecution evidence not previously disclosed 
where its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings 
that the court ought not to admit it. Likewise, the judge could refuse leave to rely at trial on 
documents disclosed late, in breach of a Court order and without good cause.49 However, 
unlike s.78, this could apply equally to the defence. Nevertheless, an effect of the CPIA is to 
demonstrate a greater concern for defence cooperation by expressly subjecting defence 
failures to specific penalties. As a result, defence cooperation takes precedence over other 
considerations, such as the avoidance of wrongful convictions.  
 
The CPIA is accompanied by a number of guidelines intended to ensure proper prosecution 
disclosure.50 The most significant is the Code of Practice issued under Part II of the Act. The 
Code is particularly important because it regulates disclosure of information by the police 
and CPS. It requires two schedules listing unused material to be drawn up by the police, one 
for sensitive and one for non-sensitive material. The non-sensitive schedule will be disclosed 
to the defence at the same time as initial disclosure. The schedules are crucial to the 
disclosure regime. They form the basis on which the CPS will make decisions as to what 
material should be disclosed, and are the primary means by which the defence can make a 
claim that relevant material has not been disclosed.51 However, the institutional divide 
between the police and the prosecution is problematic. The police may not know enough 
about the legal elements of the case to appreciate the significance of some of the material, 
and the CPS is unable to disclose information to the defence which has not been disclosed to 
them by the police through the schedules.52 A likely result of this is that the defence will lack 
material relevant to its case. In addition, the police, who know that undisclosed material will 
often not be discovered, may be reluctant to reveal information likely to damage the 
prosecution’s case.  
 
The police can perceive themselves, and are often perceived by the public, as agents of the 
prosecution. So, concerns have been expressed as to whether any police employee, even 
                                                             
49 Lord Justice Gross Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings (Judiciary of England and Wales: 
London, 2011) 76. 
50 The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure; the Supplementary Attorney General’s Guidelines 
on Disclosure, Digitally Stored Material; Disclosure: A Protocol for the Control and Management of 
Unused material in the Crown Court; The Disclosure Manual. 
51 A Ashworth and M Redmayne The Criminal Process 4th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010) 
260. 
52
 Redmayne ‘Process Gains and Process Values: The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996’ 
(n 13) 82. 
194 
 
those not directly involved in the case, can be sufficiently impartial to execute this role.53 In 
Maxwell,54 the Court of Appeal had quashed the appellant’s convictions of murder and 
robbery following a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission on the ground 
that they had been procured by gross prosecutorial misconduct on the part of the police. 
Although the majority of the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision to order a 
retrial, Lord Brown stated that: ‘To describe police misconduct on this scale as merely 
shocking and disgraceful is to understate the gravity of its impact upon the integrity of the 
prosecution process. It is hard to imagine a worse case of sustained prosecutorial dishonesty 
designed to secure a conviction at all costs.’55 The police had misled the court, CPS and 
counsel by concealing and lying about a variety of benefits received by an informant and his 
family; had colluded in the informant’s perjury at trial; had lied in response to enquiries 
following conviction; and had perjured themselves in the ex parte leave hearing in the Court 
of Appeal. The CPS had no knowledge of this. More recently, the CPS were forced to 
discontinue proceedings in the trial of eight former police officers accused of conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice.56 A review of a certain section of the unused material 
uncovered that some copies of files, originally reviewed but not considered disclosable at 
the time, were missing. These copies had been destroyed and no record of the reason for 
their destruction had been made by the police officers concerned. Prosecution counsel and 
the CPS had been unaware of this. The former police officers in the case were accused of 
fabricating evidence which led to the wrongful conviction of the Cardiff Three.57  
 
The Code of Practice is intended to rectify the problems that arise from requiring the police 
to act in a way inconsistent with their occupational interests. For instance, the investigating 
officers have a duty to record all information received and to make disclosure of it to the 
prosecutor.58 They are also required to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry.59 Despite this, 
research on the operation of the CPIA found that schedules prepared by the police were 
poor, contained insufficient detail to enable prosecutors to make informed decisions about 
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what should be disclosed, and sometimes failed to mention significant information.60 The 
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate found defects in schedules in more than half of the 
cases it studied.61 Furthermore, the CPS was found to have inadequate resources for review 
of the schedules, and often made late or incomplete disclosure to the defence.62 
Incremental improvements have been noted by the CPS Inspectorate since their initial 
review in 2000.63 Yet, there remain concerns as to the police ability to understand the likely 
defence perspective on potential disclosure issues at the outset of an investigation.64  
 
Doubts have also been expressed as to the motivation of the prosecution when undertaking 
work of this nature, in particular whether they have the incentive to do a thorough job.65 
Quirk believes that the clash between disclosure requirements and occupational cultures led 
to the initial breakdown of secondary prosecution disclosure under the original CPIA, as 
practitioners adopted or ignored the provisions in accordance with their workloads or sense 
of justice.66 Although there is now an ongoing obligation on the prosecution to make 
adequate disclosure, the CPIA and accompanying Code of Practice continue to fail in 
considering the working routines of the police and prosecution which can lead to inadequate 
disclosure, with negative consequences for the defence. Currently, there are very few cases 
in which there is total compliance with all of the procedures and guidance within the 
disclosure regime.67 The initial duty of disclosure is properly complied with in just over half 
of cases.68 The CPIA appears to be compromising the adversarial role of criminal procedure 
without achieving gains in fairness or legitimacy.  
 
 
7.4 Defence disclosure 
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Prior to the CPIA, the general rule was that the defence had no obligation to disclose its case 
to the prosecution before trial. There were limited exceptions to this: disclosure of alibi 
defences and alibi witnesses were required in trials on indictment;69 disclosure of expert 
evidence was required in trials on indictment;70 and a more general requirement to disclose 
a defence in some serious or complex cases of fraud.71 The first two exceptions are 
restricted to specific evidence which the prosecution might have particular difficulty 
rebutting without notice, and the third provided the model for the disclosure scheme 
introduced by the CPIA.72 Although breach of these requirements could result in the 
exclusion of evidence, in practice, judges were reluctant to deprive the jury of the 
opportunity of hearing evidence which might help to establish the defendant’s innocence.73  
 
The CPIA imposed, for the first time in the history of English criminal procedure, a general 
duty on the defence to make pre-trial disclosure. Under the original CPIA, defence disclosure 
was voluntary in the magistrates’ court, but compulsory in the Crown Court.74 This is 
significant because nearly all criminal cases are heard in the magistrates’ court. However, 
since prosecution and defence disclosure remain linked in a practical way, the defence may 
gain from disclosing their case in summary trials. Whilst the general requirement to produce 
a defence statement remains voluntary in summary trials, compliance with sections 6C and 
6D are compulsory in both the magistrates’ and Crown courts. These provisions were 
introduced by the CJA 2003, and provide for the disclosure of information regarding 
witnesses and experts. They are discussed in more detail below. Whereas the Royal 
Commission recommended the defence only disclose sufficient information for the 
prosecution to understand the substance of its case, s.5 requires disclosure of a much more 
detailed defence statement. This must be given once the prosecution have made disclosure 
under s.3. This part of the chapter begins with a critical discussion of the information which 
the defence are required to disclose, before examining the penalties for non-compliance. 
 
7.4.1 Defence statements 
A central requirement of the CPIA is that defendants must disclose a statement detailing the 
nature of their defence, and indicating the matters on which they take issue with the 
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prosecution as well as why they do so. The current statutory regime for the content of 
defence statements was inserted by the CJA 2003 and can be found in s.6A(1) as set out 
above. It requires the accused to ‘specify his defence with particularity.’75 Subsection (2) 
provides that a defence statement which discloses an alibi must give particulars of it, 
including the name, address and date of birth of any alibi witnesses. The defence originally 
had to submit the statement within a 14 day time limit, as set out in s.12. This was 
predicated upon the importance of processing cases expeditiously in accordance with 
prevailing concerns for efficiency and managerialism.76 However, Denyer notes that the time 
limit was extended in most cases, and done so without any formal application. He believed 
the 14 day time limit to be ‘absurd’, particularly in heavy cases with defendants who are in 
custody.77  The time limit has now been extended to 28 days in the Crown Court, but 
remains 14 days in the magistrates’ court.78 Section 6B creates a duty of updated defence 
disclosure, putting the accused under a duty to provide an updated defence statement or to 
provide a written statement that no changes have been made. 
 
As well as extending the particulars that must be disclosed, the CJA 2003 also inserted s.6D 
which requires disclosure of details of experts consulted by the defence, but not used. The 
original proposed provision would have required the unused expert reports to be disclosed, 
but this was abandoned in the light of concerns over litigation privilege and the privilege 
against self-incrimination.79 This provision is not yet in force, but it will make it necessary for 
the defence to disclose the names and addresses of consulted experts. The provision was 
presumably intended to prevent the defence from ‘shopping around’ for experts who would 
support their case. However, the number of experts consulted may have no impact on the 
validity of their views. Although shopping around occurs very rarely in practice,80 it may be 
necessary in a case concerning a developing field or where a medical opinion is needed in 
connection with a mental disorder or some other condition for which diagnosis is not an 
exact science. Given the effect of legal privilege, it seems unlikely that the prosecution 
would benefit from the disclosure of consulted experts. Nevertheless, the possibility that it 
may happen raises questions about whether the defence are effectively being made to do 
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the prosecution’s work, and may even discourage the defence from consulting experts.81 
From the jury’s point of view, the adverse view of an expert originally consulted by the 
defence might carry more weight than that of the prosecution expert because it would seem 
to be evidence coming from the defence stable.82  Even without evidence of the consulted 
expert’s opinion, the defendant may be prejudiced by disclosing the fact that numerous 
experts were approached. The jury might over speculate to the detriment of the defendant, 
despite the fact that legal privilege would prevent them from hearing evidence of the 
expert’s opinion.  
 
Section 6C, which came into force in 2010, provides for the disclosure of the names, 
addresses and dates of birth of defence witnesses. Like the general defence statement, 
witness notices must be disclosed within 28 days of the prosecution complying with s.3.83 
Where the accused decides to call a witness who was not included in the original notice 
under s.6C, he must serve an amended notice. In many cases, the witness list will be 
tentative, as the defence cannot be sure whom to call until after completion of the 
prosecution evidence. This raises questions about the enforceability of s.6C in practice. The 
Royal Commission had decided not to recommend the disclosure of the names and 
addresses of defence witnesses, partly on the basis that such a requirement might lead to a 
breach of the principle that the defence should not be required to help the prosecution 
prove its case as the prosecution might itself call any witnesses disclosed by the defence but 
whom they decide not to call.84 Although it is early days for this provision, in the light of the 
extra time and resources that would be required, it seems unlikely that police will routinely 
interview defence witnesses. This is most probable in high profile or particularly serious or 
complex cases.  
 
Possible implications of the provision raise concerns. One such concern is that the police will 
put pressure on defence witnesses and ‘use the interview to browbeat, cajole or wheedle 
the witness to change his evidence or, failing that, not to testify for the defence.’85 Zander 
believes that giving the police the power to influence witnesses is itself an invitation to 
poison the well by ‘undue influence’, as they naturally want to get the evidence that will 
                                                             
81
 Redmayne ‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its Discontents’ (n 1) 449. 
82 Zander (n 80) 14. 
83 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (Notification of Intention to Call Defence 
Witnesses) (Time Limit) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/214). 
84
 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (n 12) 99. 
85 Zander (n 80) 2. 
199 
 
convict the defendant.86  In response to concerns about police conduct, s.21A of the CPIA 
provides for a Code of Practice regulating police interviews of defence witnesses.87 The Code 
of Practice requires the police to notify defence lawyers before the interview and give an 
opportunity for the defence to be present at any such interview. It also states that the 
witness must consent to the interview, and is entitled to be accompanied by a solicitor.  
 
Hungerford-Welch identifies a number of shortcomings with the Code of Practice.88 For 
instance, there is nothing in the Code to ensure that consent is freely given, and there are 
issues as to the availability of funding for the attendance of a solicitor. There are also 
concerns that having their details passed on to the prosecution will deter some witnesses 
from cooperating with the defence.89 Where the witness gives consent for the defendant’s 
solicitor to attend, paragraph 8.2 of the Code of Practice limits his role to that of observer. 
The defendant’s solicitor is not entitled to intervene if the police questioning becomes 
inappropriate, thus, preventing him from serving a useful purpose during the interview.90 
The witness must also consent before a copy of the record of interview is given to the 
accused. Where consent is not forthcoming, the possibility that the prosecution will ambush 
the defence arises. For instance, when the witness is testifying for the defence, the 
prosecution may put an adverse matter from the interview to him in cross-examination.91 
Such matters might require pre-trial disclosure as part of the prosecution’s CPIA obligations. 
However, where the evidence assists the prosecution case or undermines the defence case, 
rather than undermine the prosecution or assist the defence, it would not need to be 
disclosed under s.7A. Such a situation may occur when the prosecution uses information 
gathered during the interview to challenge the witness’s credibility or as evidence of an 
inconsistent statement. In R v H, Lord Bingham stated that: ‘If material does not weaken the 
prosecution case or strengthen that of the defendant, there is no requirement to disclose 
it....neutral material or material damaging the defendant need not be disclosed and should 
not be brought to the attention of the court.’92 The possibility that s.6C and the 
accompanying Code expose the defence to ambush is worrying, particularly given that 
concern over the use of ambush defences contributed to the enactment of the CPIA. 
Although the prosecution ambush may not go to an issue in the case in the same way as 
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ambush defences can, there is a contradiction in this approach. It highlights the underlying 
goal of securing defence cooperation above other concerns.   
 
Where witnesses decline to be interviewed by the police, it seems likely that the prosecution 
will want to cross-examine them on their refusal in an attempt to undermine the credibility 
of their evidence. This runs the risk of distracting the fact finder from the real issues of the 
case, and places the accused in danger of being prejudiced by a refusal to cooperate over 
which he may have little or no control.93  The defence case may thus be damaged by the 
witness’s unwillingness to be subject to scrutiny or to confirm the defence’s case prior to 
trial. Although this situation would not give rise to the possibility of adverse inferences 
under the CPIA, it does put the prosecution in an advantageous position. It reaffirms the aim 
of securing convictions; it also highlights the priority given to defence participation in the 
criminal process. Because they are not likely to be used often, Redmayne notes that the 
amendments concerning witnesses and experts can give the impression that they are 
designed more for their symbolic resonance than for their practical utility.94 They raise 
difficulties of enforceability and address no obvious problem. Yet they allow the government 
to claim that it is getting tough on defendants who abuse the disclosure regime or that it is 
tilting the system’s balance back towards the police and victims.95 They also contribute to 
the shift in procedural style towards a model in which the defence are expected to 
participate. 
 
In an examination of the original CPIA, Plontikoff and Woolfson found that 41 per cent of 
defence statements contained a bare denial of guilt, and a further 13 per cent fell short of 
the requirements set out for them.96 Even after the CJA 2003 amendments, there are still 
serious questions of compliance. It is the content of defence statements which seems to 
have caused the most concern for the courts. In Bryant,97 it was stated that the defence 
statement in issue was ‘woefully inadequate.’98 It consisted of a general denial of the counts 
in the indictment accompanied by the sentence, ‘the defendant takes issue with any witness 
purporting to give evidence contrary to his denials.’ The court stated that, ‘that sort of 
observation is not worth the paper it is written on. It is not the purpose of a defence case 
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statement.’99 If the defendant has no positive case to advance at trial, but declines to plead 
guilty, the Court of Appeal have suggested that the defence statement must say that the 
defendant does not admit the offence and calls the Crown to prove it; it must also say that 
he advances no positive case. If he is going to advance a positive case that must appear in 
the defence statement and notice must be given. Otherwise it would be open to defendants 
to simply ignore sections 5 and 6A.100 In this way, the judiciary are giving effect to the 
government’s agenda of increasing defence participation. In Essa,101 it was held by the Court 
of Appeal that, where there has been no defence statement and no positive defence put 
forward at trial, the significance of the absent defence statement may be marginal and a 
degree of judgment is advisable in the decision whether to embark upon cross-examination 
about it and, if cross-examination is embarked upon, the terms in which a direction be given 
to the jury.102 Nevertheless, the disclosure failure remains capable of leading to adverse 
comment and inferences of guilt.   
 
In the Review of Disclosure Obligations in Criminal Proceedings undertaken by Lord Justice 
Gross for the Judiciary of England and Wales, it was declared that ‘a defence refusal to 
engage in the disclosure process, coupled with persistent sniping at its suggested 
inadequacies, is unacceptable- and reflects a culture with which the system should not rest 
content.’103 It is believed that neither the fairness of the trial nor the fearless protection of 
the defendant’s legitimate interests warrant such an approach.104 However, the duty of 
providing information to the prosecution in advance of trial compromises the role of the 
defendant and defence, particularly when the duty is as broad and specific as that under the 
CPIA. The general effect of the CPIA is to shift the roles of the parties away from 
adversarialism, with the defence disclosure requirements making it increasingly difficult for 
the defendant to decline to participate and for the defence as a party to test the prosecution 
case.  
 
Edwards has noted that great tension is caused by over aggressive judicial attitudes to the 
completion of defence statements, such that they have progressed from their original 
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purpose of facilitating prosecution disclosure.105 They have become a case management 
form, particularly the requirements to set out the nature of the defence, the facts on which 
the defence rely, and identifying relevant points of law. As a result, there may be cases 
where to disclose such information will enable the prosecution to strengthen its case or 
weaken the effects of defence cross-examination.106 This situation arose in R (on the 
application of Firth) v Epping Magistrates’ Court,107 a case concerning assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm. During a committal hearing, the prosecution were allowed to rely on a 
case progression form prepared by the defence when the allegation was one of common 
assault. The form stated that ‘Only contact was made in self defence’. This was held to 
amount to evidence of acceptance that the defendant was involved in a physical encounter 
with the complainant. Since the defence submitted at the hearing that there was no case to 
answer, as there was no identification evidence, the earlier disclosure assisted the 
prosecution in strengthening, if not establishing, its case. The decision in this case has been 
affected by the more recent decision in Newell108 which is discussed below. However, it 
remains possible for information provided in case management forms and defence 
statements to be used to strengthen the prosecution’s case.  
 
 
7.4.2 Adverse inferences 
Defence disclosure is enforced through s.11 of the CPIA under which failure to disclose a 
defence statement, late disclosure, or departure from the statement can result in adverse 
comment and adverse inferences.109 By way of safeguards, s.11(8) states that where the 
accused puts forward a defence which is different to that in his defence statement, the court 
should have regard to the extent of the differences between the defences, and to whether 
there is any justification for a change in defence. Pursuant to s.11(10),  the accused cannot 
be convicted solely on an inference drawn under s.11(5).110  
 
It has already been noted that the CPIA had been found to work poorly, with many defence 
statements lacking the required detail. Yet, judges have been reluctant to sanction 
defendants with adverse inferences. This is evidenced by the lack of case law dealing directly 
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with the conditions under which an adverse inference can be drawn from non-disclosure.111 
They seem more concerned with the inadequacy of defence statements from a managerial 
point of view, and it makes little sense to invite adverse inferences of guilt on the basis that 
non-disclosure interferes with efficiency. Lord Justice Gross has recommended scant 
tolerance of late or uninformative defence statements.112 His report contends that, provided 
the prosecution’s tackle is in order, there can generally be no excuse for a defence failure to 
engage and at an early stage in the proceedings.113 These propositions reiterate the desire to 
ensure defence cooperation through the existing disclosure regime, which includes 
penalising defence failures through the use of adverse inferences.   
 
One reason why judges may have felt reluctant to give an adverse inference direction under 
the original CPIA was because fault in defence disclosure was likely to lie with the defence 
lawyer rather than the defendant.114 As a response, the CJA 2003 amendments imposed a 
tougher regime on defendants. Not only do defence statements need to be more detailed 
than previously, but also, under s.6E, unless the contrary is proved, defence statements will 
be deemed to have been given with the authority of the accused. The responsibility and 
burden of showing that it is not the defendant’s statement is that of the defendant, and it is 
not enough that he has not signed the statement, and denies having seen it.115 In Haynes, it 
was suggested that the defendant should have called his solicitors or the person from whom 
initial instructions had been taken to disprove that the statement was his.116 The effect of 
s.6E is that even if the accused has not signed the statement it will be regarded as his 
statement made by his authorised agent. The statement is, therefore, admissible as part of 
the prosecution case if it contains admissions or inconsistencies with the accused’s 
testimony at trial, and he may be cross-examined on it.117  
 
However, s.6E is unlikely to change the fact that it is defence lawyers who are generally 
responsible for disclosure and not the defendant himself. It has, therefore, become easier to 
penalise the defendant for non-cooperation, despite the fact that he may be no more 
culpable. In Essa,118 it was claimed that no defence statement had been served on the basis 
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of legal advice. The Court of Appeal could not see the logic behind such advice, stating that: 
‘It is not open to those who advise defendants to pick and choose which statutory rules 
applicable to the conduct of criminal proceedings they obey and which they do not.’119 The 
prosecution were allowed to make comment and raise the issue in cross-examination. Had 
there been evidence of the solicitor’s advice, the Court felt that it should have been dealt 
with in the same way as advice to remain silent is dealt with under s.34 CJPOA.120 Such 
advice would not in itself prevent adverse comment or inferences. The recent disclosure 
review has suggested that, provided the prosecution take a grip of its disclosure obligations 
from the outset, there is much to be said for the proposal that in appropriate cases the 
Court should press for involvement from the defendant personally, not merely his legal 
representatives.121 
 
The CJA 2003 also removed the requirement for leave to be given by the court before ‘such 
comment as appears appropriate’ is made by the prosecutor or co-defendant. However, 
leave is still required where the defence’s failure is in not having disclosed a point of law that 
was relied on or the names and addresses of witnesses called,122 and there are no specific 
sanctions for a failure to disclose the names and addresses of experts consulted, but not 
called. Regardless of whether the courts are ready and willing to penalise defendants for 
their failure to comply with the disclosure requirements, the statutory regime is significant 
in its effect on criminal procedure, by imposing new participatory expectations on the 
defendant and imposing penalties for non-cooperation. As a consequence, it has played a 
significant role in the changing nature of the English procedural model in much the same 
way as the CJPOA has. 
 
Section 11 is a further indication of the state’s intention to secure the defendant’s 
participation. However, as Redmayne points out, drawing adverse inferences of guilt from 
disclosure failures seems largely artificial.123 Even though the regime largely mirrors that 
imposed in relation to silence under the CJPOA, the CJPOA relies on a supposed pre-existing 
link between silence and guilt under which silence is in itself inherently suspicious. Adverse 
inferences from non-disclosure, on the other hand, depend on the creation of disclosure 
                                                             
119 Ibid [18]. 
120 Ibid [21]. See chapter 6. 
121 Lord Justice Gross (n 49) 73. 
122
 CPIA, s.11(6) and s.11(7). 
123 Redmayne ‘Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its Discontents’ (n 1) 446. 
205 
 
duties.124 The defendant’s failure to disclose the details of his defence before trial is only 
suspicious because the law places an obligation on him to do so. For this reason, the 
inference that the defence is fabricated, or that the defendant is guilty, may be weak.125  
This is not to say that non-disclosure of evidence presented at trial will never be the result of 
fabrication or guilt, but that the link is not a straightforward or obvious one. This is 
particularly true where the non-disclosure relates to a point of law, or where the problem is 
an insufficiently detailed defence statement but the defence raised is along the same lines 
as that disclosed. It is difficult to see how the lack of detail can point to guilt.126  It is also 
difficult to draw reliable inferences against the defendant where the issue is late disclosure. 
Inferences of guilt stemming from a failure to comply with the CPIA are thus hard to justify 
as ‘common sense’ in the way which inferences from silence have been. This might partly 
explain why s.11 is not enforced with any vigour, despite the research suggesting that most 
defence statements are insufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of the Act.127  
 
While s.11 inferences are largely ineffective in practice, the provision is normatively 
important, and has raised issues in the courts. In Rochford,128 the Court of Appeal addressed 
some significant questions as to the scope of the rules in s.6A and s.11. In this case, which 
concerned the offence of dangerous driving, the relevant part of the defence statement 
read: ‘The Defendant was not the driver of the vehicle in question at the material time. He 
accepts he may have been the person shown on the CCTV at the garage.’ The judge at the 
plea and case management hearing took the view that the statement did not comply with 
s.6A, as it did not say where the defendant was at the material time if he was not in the 
driving seat. The judge directed counsel to amend the statement, and said that a failure to 
do so would be treated as contempt of court. No amendment was made and the judge 
imposed a sentence upon the defendant of 28 days’ imprisonment. The judge had 
acknowledged the sanctions set out in s.11, but believed that they only applied once the 
case had been set out to the jury. He concluded that there must be sanctions at the pre-trial 
stage and that the relevant one was the ability of the court to order compliance and to 
punish as a contempt of court disobedience to the order.129 However, it is not possible to 
determine whether there has been a breach of s.6A until the evidence has been presented 
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to the jury. Although unlikely, it may have been that the defendant was going to make no 
positive case at all, and not raise the issue of his possible location elsewhere. If he were 
simply going to play a passive role and put the prosecution to proof, there would have been 
no breach.  The Court of Appeal noted that there is no entitlement to order compliance with 
s.6A and then punish as a contempt of court disobedience of that order. The sanctions for 
non-compliance exist in s.11. It is not open to the courts to add an additional extra statutory 
sanction of punishment of contempt of court.130 Had the Court of Appeal felt differently, the 
notion of the trial as a forum for testing the prosecution case would be completely 
undermined. 
 
In R (on the application of Tinnion) v Reading Crown Court,131 the Divisional Court clarified 
that the sanction against someone who fails to give notice of an alibi defence and intention 
to call witnesses for that defence is adverse comment and adverse inferences, not 
inadmissibility of the evidence. The Court believed that the trial judge may have been 
confused as the pre-CPIA penalty for failure to disclose a defence of alibi was exclusion of 
the evidence. This decision was upheld in Ullah132 where the trial judge was held to have 
made an error in principle by not allowing the evidence of a surprise alibi witness who had 
appeared in court after the close of the defence case. Although the earlier penalty of 
exclusion seems harsher, in some instances the penalty of adverse comments and inferences 
is worse for the defendant. In Tinnion, there was already doubt about the credibility of the 
defence and the defence witnesses. It might have been more damaging for the defendant to 
have had his defence the subject of adverse inferences than to not produce evidence for the 
defence at all.  
 
Whilst it is positive that the courts have confined the sanctions for non-compliance to those 
specified in s.11, and have dismissed attempts to extend them, the fact remains that the 
defendant’s non-cooperation is subject to penalty. Adverse inferences may be permissive 
rather than mandatory, but they still penalise defendants by allowing non-compliance to 
contribute to a finding of guilt. Furthermore, there appears to be an insufficient link 
between the breach and the punishment, again bringing to light the main driver for 
inferences from non-disclosure: ensuring defence cooperation. Nonetheless, the Court of 
Appeal have made it clear that in the light of the judicial control over the prosecution’s right 
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to comment on the absence of a defence statement, s.11(5) is compatible with the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial under the ECHR.133   
 
 
7.5 Issues of principle  
 
It has already been noted that the CPIA imposed general disclosure obligations on the 
defence for the first time, and that this has contributed to a shift in the style of English 
criminal procedure away from adversarialism towards a more participatory focused model. 
As such, the legislation raises significant matters of principle. By requiring the defence to 
disclose its case prior to trial, and by penalising non-cooperation through adverse comment 
and inferences of guilt, the CPIA erodes norms of fairness, such as the privilege against self-
incrimination, the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The obligation to 
cooperate, and the potential to assist the prosecution in establishing a case against the 
defendant, also affects the proper state-citizen relationship that should prevail in a liberal 
democracy. The CPIA is, therefore, detrimental to the normative conception of criminal 
procedure within which the state should be called to account for its accusations and request 
for condemnation and punishment of the accused. In his dissent from the Royal 
Commission’s proposals, Zander stated that defence disclosure is ‘designed to be helpful to 
the prosecution and, more generally, to the system. But it is not the job of the defendant to 
be helpful either to the prosecution or to the system. His task, if he chooses to put the 
prosecution to proof, is simply to defend himself.’134  
 
7.5.1 Issues of fairness 
Obligatory defence disclosure may hamper important principles necessary to maintain 
fairness and uphold the right to a fair trial. To assume that it is legitimate to require the 
defendant to provide the prosecution with information that may assist them in securing a 
conviction sits uneasily with the privilege against self-incrimination. For example, disclosure 
may lead to incrimination by establishing the actus reus through a defence such as self 
defence, as was the case in Firth. However, the decision in Firth has been complicated by the 
more recent case of Newell135 in which it was held that, although a statement in a Plea and 
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Case Management Hearing Form was admissible at trial against the defendant, the judge 
should have used his discretion under s.78 of PACE to exclude it.  
 
The charge in Newell was possession of cocaine with intent to supply. On the form, the 
defence had written ‘no possession’, whereas in a later defence statement, and at trial, the 
defence admitted possession, but denied intent to supply. The prosecution had used the 
earlier form to show this inconsistency and rely on it as evidence of guilt. As a consequence 
of this case, judges should use their discretion to exclude evidence against the defendant in 
Plea and Case Management Hearing Forms in the Crown Court and Trial Preparation Forms 
in the magistrates’ court. However, this is on the condition that the defence have followed 
the ‘letter and spirit of the Criminal Procedure Rules’.136 This means that directly 
incriminating evidence from such forms can be rightly admitted where the defence have 
failed to comply with case management directions, or have attempted to ambush the 
prosecution, or perhaps even failed to provide a defence statement as required by the CPIA. 
One of the reasons why the Court felt that the evidence should have been excluded in this 
case was because the defendant had provided a defence statement which made the case 
clear, and had been the subject of an adverse inference direction, due to late disclosure of 
the statement.137 This sanction was thought to be sufficient, and this was a case where there 
was no disadvantage to the Crown. However, because this case concerned the use of case 
management forms, rather than defence statements, it remains open for directly 
incriminating information contained in defence statements to be used against the 
defendant. One other point worth noting about Newell is that, once the prosecution had 
received the defence statement which stated that the defendant was in possession, but had 
no intent to supply, they added a further count of simple possession to which the defendant 
then pleaded guilty. Thus, the defence statement led directly to a conviction for possession. 
 
The Royal Commission rejected the objection that defence disclosure infringes the privilege 
on the basis that disclosure of the substance of the defence case at an earlier stage will no 
more incriminate the defendant nor help prove the case against him than it does when it is 
given in evidence at the hearing.138 The Commission believed that the matter was simply one 
of timing.139 However, even where disclosure does not directly incriminate the accused, it 
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may lead the police or prosecution to uncover incriminating information. In this way, the 
defendant will have assisted the prosecution in incriminating him. For example, details of an 
alibi defence will provide a timeline and witnesses for investigation. Also, details of defence 
witnesses disclosed under s.6C will provide material for investigation, and may lead to 
defence witnesses changing their evidence, or incriminating the defendant. When coupled 
with pressures to participate stemming from the CJPOA, there is a significant danger that 
defendants will be coerced into providing incriminating information to the prosecution. To 
claim that the defendant is not being compelled to say anything incriminating has been 
described as ‘naïve’.140  
 
In Rochford, the Court of Appeal stated that the privilege against self-incrimination survives 
s.6A, as the defendant is not obliged to incriminate himself if he does not wish to do so.141 
Non-compliance is not an offence. So, it could be argued that, because the adverse 
inferences of guilt that can be drawn under s.11 are not mandatory, they do not raise issues 
regarding the privilege. However, the potentially serious consequences that flow from 
adverse comment and inferences create an expectation of cooperation, and may result in 
undue pressure on the defendant to cooperate. Though a clear notion of the scope and 
rationale of the privilege might help to determine how far the defence disclosure obligations 
interfere with it, as suggested in chapter 5, this is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, the 
privilege is one of the generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of 
the notion of a fair procedure,142 and is an important tool for maintaining a proper 
relationship between citizens and state in which freedom and autonomy are respected.143 
Requiring the defendant to disclose information which might incriminate him or lead to self-
incrimination is at odds with the normative theory of calling the state to account. Also, it 
signals the system’s drift from fairness and legitimacy concerns. 
 
Linked to the implications which the disclosure obligations have for the privilege against self-
incrimination are concerns for its impact on the presumption of innocence. A broad 
interpretation of the presumption of innocence requires the accused to be treated as 
innocent at all stages, until guilt has been established. The accused should not have to 
contribute in the discharge of the state’s obligation to prove guilt, either expressly or in 
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consequence of a procedural requirement. Requiring the defence to supply even potentially 
incriminating information is not in the spirit of this conception of the presumption of 
innocence. To associate late, inconsistent, or non-disclosure with guilt by way of adverse 
inferences, is also damaging to the principle of the presumption of innocence. Like the 
CJPOA, the CPIA creates an expectation of participation and improperly links non-
cooperation to guilt. It also compromises a narrower interpretation of the presumption of 
innocence, which simply reflects the prosecution’s burden of proof. 
 
An absence of defence disclosure duties acts to uphold the burden of proof, because 
defence non-disclosure serves as an expression of the prosecution’s burden; if the state 
cannot make a prima facie case without the defence’s help, it should not bring a case to 
trial.144 Although the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, like the 
reforms to the right to silence, as well as developments in the realm of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the disclosure regime has an impact on the burden of proof, through its 
potential to assist the prosecution in discharging its burden. Richardson has argued that, 
because it is for the prosecution to adduce evidence to establish all the elements of the 
offence charged and show why the defendant is guilty, the imposition of an obligation on 
the defendant to say why he is not guilty immediately eases the burden on the 
prosecution.145 On the other hand, Redmayne contends that the burden of proof can be 
conceived of as a rule about the amount of evidence the prosecution needs to produce, that 
it says nothing about the source of that evidence.146 However, the source of evidence will 
determine the burden of proof, as the burden implies that it is for the prosecution to 
provide evidence of guilt. That is, they cannot rely on the defence to disclose it. To do so 
would undermine the defendant’s ability to test the prosecution’s case. Furthermore, the 
adverse inferences of guilt, which can be drawn where disclosure requirements are not 
complied with, have the potential to assist the prosecution in meeting its burden and reach 
a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
There is a lack of symmetry within the CPIA which also affects the prosecution’s burden of 
proof. With regard to the content of disclosure, the prosecution must disclose the evidence 
they will rely on, and not the case as they will put it in court, though the indictment will 
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provide the defence with such particulars of the conduct constituting the commission of the 
offence, so as to make clear what the prosecution alleges.147 The defence, on the other 
hand, must essentially disclose the case that they will present, including specific matters of 
fact and points of law. This means that the prosecution are better prepared to address the 
defence case at trial than the defence are to address the prosecution. The defence may be 
ignorant of the details of the prosecution’s arguments and, where they choose to address 
the prosecution’s case, may find it harder to dissuade the jury from convicting.  If the 
defence raise an undisclosed argument, they can be accused of ambushing the prosecution, 
or become subject to adverse inferences of guilt. Thus, whilst the prosecution may be able 
to adapt their case theories at trial, the defence are essentially locked into a particular 
approach. This lack of symmetry could be rectified by placing obligations on the prosecution 
to disclose their whole case to the defence. However, as well as subjecting the prosecution 
to the same difficulties which the defence face in adapting to new evidence, it would not 
solve the issues of principle which arise from the defence disclosure obligations.   
 
7.5.2 A ‘no assistance’ approach  
In Zander’s view, with the ‘reasonable exceptions’ of disclosure of alibi and expert evidence, 
‘it is wrong to require the defendant to be helpful by giving advance notice of his defence 
and to penalise him by adverse comment if he fails to do so.’148  This critique of defence 
disclosure reflects a ‘no assistance’ approach to the defence and the defendant’s role in the 
criminal process, which is consistent with a normative theory based on calling the state to 
account. The state should be required to prove its case without assistance from the 
defendant; if the prosecution cannot anticipate a defence, its case deserves to fail. Although 
this claim may appear harsh, it is not unreasonable. Prior to the CPIA, in the vast majority of 
cases, the prosecution were able to anticipate the defence, and were seldom successfully 
ambushed by the defence.149 However, it has been argued that this absolutist position goes 
too far by permitting defence tactics specifically designed to throw the prosecution off 
balance. Redmayne believes that ambush defences cannot be justified in that manner, and 
that the system has no reason to accommodate tactics designed to gain illegitimate 
acquittals.150 He contends that the absolutist position can be modified to make it more 
attractive, by distinguishing two different ways in which the defence can assist the 
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prosecution.151 Whilst knowing something about the defence that will be presented may 
help the prosecution to anticipate attacks on its case at trial, disclosure of the defence case 
will not necessarily help the prosecution establish a prima facie case. If the principle is that 
the defence should not have to assist the prosecution to make its prima facie case, then 
there should be no objection to disclosure.152   
 
However, there is no guarantee that disclosure will not assist the prosecution in establishing 
its case. Disclosure of a defence, such as self-defence or duress, may help the prosecution 
establish the actus reus, and even the disclosure of an alibi may assist the prosecution by 
providing the police with a time-frame of the defendant’s whereabouts and movements.  
Once defence cooperation actually helps the prosecution make its case, the defendant may 
become less forthcoming about his defence. Redmayne argues that the possibility of 
disclosure helping the prosecution make a prima facie case can be rectified with the 
modified ‘no assistance’ approach, by preventing the prosecution from using the fruits of 
disclosure as part of its case in chief.153 This may be difficult to apply in practice and, again, 
there is no guarantee that the defence disclosure has not provided assistance to the 
prosecution in establishing its case. For example, it may give prosecution witnesses a chance 
to tailor their evidence to the defence disclosed. Edwards highlights the example of a plain-
clothes police officer in the case of a youth who hits the officer during a stop and search. 
Disclosing that the defence will rely on the fact that the officer did not identify himself by 
documentation, as required under s.2(2) of PACE, will allow the officer to ensure that he 
mentions this fact in his evidence.154   
 
Early indication of the proposed defence case, which is the purpose of defence statements, 
can be used to improve the prosecution case even if it is not intended to help establish it; 
the defence becomes an object of investigation, and the prosecution case is reinforced as a 
result.155 In practice, the courts have not made a distinction in relation to the use of defence 
disclosure. As a result of Firth156 and Newell,157 at least where it can be said that the defence 
have not followed the letter and spirit of the Criminal Procedure Rules, the fruits of 
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disclosure can be used as evidence to establish a prima facie case. Moreover, such cases as 
Essa158 and Haynes159 show that the prosecution are capable of cross-examining the 
defendant on disclosure failures, pursuant to the CPIA, even where the defendant denies 
responsibility for the failure. Arguably, this assistance to the prosecution, even if 
inadvertent, undermines the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.160  
 
To expect, let alone require, the defendant to assist the prosecution in making its case is 
inconsistent with a conception of the relationship between citizen and state which underlies 
the normative theory of holding the state to account. As a consequence of the autonomy 
and dignity accorded to citizens in a liberal democracy, and the need to regulate the use of 
state powers and resources against citizens, the state must justify its allegations and request 
for conviction and punishment of the accused. It should not expect or require the accused to 
actively assist in the matter. Although the disclosure of some specific elements of the 
defence case, such as alibi or expert evidence, may seem necessary from a practical 
perspective, from the normative standpoint, protecting rights, fairness and autonomy take 
precedence. Where particularly significant problems arise for the prosecution, and the 
interests of justice are at stake, short adjournments may be used to allow time for the 
prosecution to address new or unanticipated evidence or arguments raised by the defence. 
Although this would upset the current emphasis on efficiency, it should be recalled that 
delays and adjournments are currently commonplace within the disclosure regime.161 
Nevertheless, this solution is unlikely to appeal in practice.  
 
Normatively, the right of the accused not to participate in proceedings against himself would 
be strong enough to justify an absolute rule against pre-trial defence disclosure. Contrarily, 
in practice, concessions are often made, in order to save time and money. What is most 
important is that these concessions do not significantly detract from the argument against 
requiring participation. Disclosure of the defendant’s alibi, as well as the details of expert 
witnesses that will be relied on at trial, can reasonably be required only if they impose 
minimum participatory requirements on the accused. Because disclosure of an alibi defence 
may provide the prosecution with information that they can investigate (which might lead to 
incrimination), the detail required for disclosure should be minimal. If approached carefully, 
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these exceptions may not affect the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, or the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
  
Any exception to a defence non-disclosure norm must be constrained, and should not be 
extended purely for pragmatic reasons, where to do so compromises the state’s obligation 
to prove guilt without the active assistance of the accused. For example, although the 
defence of duress can cause particular problems for the prosecution, making it an exception 
to a non-disclosure norm could go too far in requiring the defendant to assist the 
prosecution. It provides the prosecution with evidence of the actus reus which might 
effectively amount to the defendant incriminating himself and easing the burden of proof on 
the state. In the case of Hasan,162 Lord Bingham suggested that the conditions to be met 
before duress can be relied upon should be tightened. He went on to imply that it operates 
as a defence for those associated with criminal activity, beyond that for which they have 
been charged.163 To approach the defence of duress from this standpoint, and to allow it as 
an exception to a non-disclosure norm, is incompatible with a broad interpretation of the 
presumption of innocence which requires the defendant to be treated as if he is innocent, 
until guilt is proven.  
 
Exceptions to a non-disclosure norm should not be created on the assumption that the 
defendant is probably guilty and that his defence makes it difficult for the prosecution to 
prove it. When the system becomes less concerned with upholding principles, and more 
concerned with efficiency and convictions, there is greater leeway to open the defence up to 
cooperative requirements. Whilst an absolute defence non-disclosure norm would ensure 
that the state can account for its accusations and uphold the factors which underlie an 
argument against requiring participation, if concessions are to be made in practice they must 
be limited to those which have the least intrusion on the presumption of innocence, fair trial 
rights, and a conception of the relationship between citizen and state which limits state 
power and protects citizens’ autonomy through freedom of choice. The disclosure 
obligations placed on the defence through the CPIA are at odds with these principles.  
 
Although the Royal Commission believed it to be simply a matter of timing, there are 
important differences between imposing penalty-backed obligations on the defence to 
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disclose the details of their case prior to trial and requiring them to disclose evidence, and 
discharge evidential burdens, in court. As explained in chapter 4, evidential burdens require 
the defendant to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue, but do not require the 
defendant to assume a risk of conviction, since the prosecution will carry the legal burden of 
disproving the issue. The evidential burden is simply a burden of adducing sufficient 
evidence to support a case. It does not tie the defence to a particular account pre-trial. In 
practice, the defendant may have to participate in order to discharge the evidential burden. 
However, it can also be discharged through the testimony of other witnesses, or by pointing 
to some evidence already adduced by the prosecution. Stumer believes the evidential 
burden to be an essential device for narrowing the issues in a criminal trial.164 
 
A key distinction between pre-trial disclosure requirements and the requirement to disclose 
the nature of a defence at trial is that the defendant has greater choice in whether to 
cooperate in the latter. If he fails to satisfy an evidential burden, the prosecution still bear 
the legal burden of proof in relation to the charge, and there are no provisions for adverse 
inferences stemming from the defendant’s failure. The pressure to participate which the 
defendant may feel in order to discharge an evidential burden is not without consequence, 
but it places no formal requirements on him to participate. Furthermore, requirements to 
disclose the details of one’s defence at trial will not assist the prosecution in the same way 
as pre-trial disclosure. It does not afford the prosecution with the time or opportunity to 
construct counter-arguments or gather new evidence. Nor does it allow them the 
opportunity to strengthen or significantly change their case. Hence, it does not have the 
same implications for the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, 
or the burden of proof. As such, it is more consistent with the idea that the defence should 
not have to assist the prosecution in proving its case.  
 
 
7.6 Implications for English criminal procedure 
 
By imposing vast and detailed disclosure obligations on the defence and penalising non-
cooperation, the CPIA has significantly influenced the nature of English criminal procedure. It 
is aimed at those who exploit due process concerns to escape conviction, and it forms a 
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major part of the general move towards increasing defendant participation. Defence 
disclosure’s twin-purpose of efficiently increasing convictions fits into Packer’s Crime Control 
model of criminal procedure.165 As defined in chapter 3, this model is underlined by values 
‘based on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most 
important function to be performed by the criminal process.’166 A high rate of apprehension 
and conviction must be achieved with a premium on speed and finality. By attaching greater 
weight to these values than to due process concerns, the CPIA has helped push English 
procedure away from adversarialism. A major tool used to facilitate this shift is the case 
management provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules. These provisions, together with the 
disclosure regime and the perceived need to combat ambush defences, place burdens on 
the defence to cooperate, and have a significant influence over the style of criminal 
procedure and the defendant’s role as a participant.  
 
The Criminal Procedure Rules consolidate the Court’s case management powers and furnish 
a guide to the underlying culture intended to govern the conduct of criminal trials.167 This 
culture emphasises convictions and efficiency, and seems to imply that the defence should 
constructively participate.  As explained in chapter 3, under the Rules, the Court must 
further the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly by actively managing the case. 
This includes early identification of the issues.168 Each participant in the case must prepare 
and conduct the case in accordance with the overriding objective.169  The Rules thus indicate 
that the defence’s concern should not just be to win its own case, but to ensure that the 
case is dealt with justly, which includes efficiency and conviction of the guilty.170 It seems 
that these two aspects of the overriding objective are being emphasised, with less regard 
being given to dealing with the prosecution and the defence fairly, and recognising the rights 
of the defendant. 171 The increasing emphasis on case management and efficiency driven by 
the Rules and the disclosure regime clearly militates against adversarialism.  
 
Rule 3.3 requires the parties to actively assist the court in fulfilling its case management 
duties. Although most disclosure obligations under the CPIA are only mandatory in the 
Crown Court, these case management provisions are equally applicable in the magistrates’ 
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court. The defence may therefore be required to reveal details of its case prior to summary 
trials. Pre-trial case management forms similar to those requiring completion at plea and 
case management hearings in the Crown Court are also to be completed at first hearings in 
the magistrates’ court.172 The content of such forms may be admitted in evidence against 
the defendant under the retained common law hearsay rules, or as part of the court 
record.173 Linking the case management provisions within the Rules and the disclosure 
regime is Rule 3.10(a) which provides that, in order to manage a trial or appeal, ‘the court 
must establish, with the active assistance of the parties, what are the disputed issues.’ This 
Rule permits the court to place participatory requirements on the parties, including 
identifying points of law the parties intend to raise, and identifying information about 
witnesses and the order of their evidence.  
 
Despite the courts somewhat relaxed approach to enforcement of the CPIA through the use 
of s.11, they have made much of the changing nature of the criminal process, particularly in 
regards to defence tactics designed to ambush the prosecution. In Gleeson,174 which was 
decided shortly before the Criminal Procedure Rules were introduced, the defence had 
waited until the end of the prosecution case to raise a point of law in support of a 
submission of no case to answer. The Court of Appeal stated that: 
[A] prosecution should not be frustrated by errors of the prosecutor, unless such 
errors have immediately rendered a fair trial for the defendant impossible. For the 
defence advocates to seek to take advantage of such errors by deliberately delaying 
identification of an issue of fact or law in the case until the last possible moment is, 
in our view, no longer acceptable, given the legislative and procedural changes to 
our criminal justice process in recent years.175 
 
The CJA 2003 amendments make defence obligations clearer than they were at the time of 
Gleeson. The CPIA now specifies that the defence should disclose any points of law to be 
relied on. Furthermore, Rule 3.10 allows the court to require a party to identify any points of 
law intended to be raised that could affect the conduct of the trial. However, the case shows 
that the courts’ have tended to use the term ‘ambush’ quite loosely to cover a failure to 
correct prosecution mistakes. As noted in chapter 4, from an adversarial standpoint, in 
which the trial takes the form of a competition between two equal sides, a failure to 
mention or rectify a mistake made by the opposing party is not ordinarily objectionable.  
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In the Chorley Justices176 case, the Divisional Court stated that: 
If a defendant refuses to identify what the issues are, one thing is clear: he can 
derive no advantage from that or seek...to attempt to ambush at trial. The days of 
ambushing and taking last-minute technical points are gone. They are not consistent 
with the overriding objective of deciding cases justly, acquitting the innocent and 
convicting the guilty. 
 
This statement has been influential in later decisions.177 It was felt that the Criminal 
Procedure Rules effected a ‘sea change’ in the way cases should be constructed.178 In 
Penner,179 the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the position by stating that, ‘It is no longer 
possible to have cases...where points occur to someone and then an attempt is made to 
ambush the prosecution by a submission of no case to answer.’180  In Malcolm,181 it was 
explained that, ‘It is the duty of the defence to make its defence and issues that it raises 
clear to both the prosecution and the court at an early stage’.182 The case of Firth confirmed 
that the Rules reflect a new approach to the administration of criminal justice in which both 
sides, rather than the prosecution alone, are required to disclose the nature of their case 
well before trial.183 Support for this approach was thought to be those reasons advocated by 
Lord Justice Auld in Gleeson; namely that a criminal trial is a search for truth and not a game 
under which a guilty defendant should be provided with a sporting chance.184 More recently, 
in the case of R (on the application of Santos) v Stratford Magistrates’ Court,185 it was held 
that a technical point should not avail the applicant for judicial review of a refusal to state a 
case following conviction since he had failed to raise the matter at his trial before the 
magistrates’ court.   
 
The majority of these cases are not directly concerned with the CPIA, but they do 
demonstrate the general change in attitude which has occurred as a result. McEwan notes 
that an inevitable consequence of the changes brought about by the Rules, together with 
the ever-increasing rigour of defence disclosure requirements, is that elements of party 
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control over the conduct of the case are transferred to the court.186 The Judiciary’s case 
management role has been described as ‘of the first importance’ for the proper operation of 
the present disclosure regime.187  The 2011 Review of Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings 
advocates robust case management of disclosure matters by the judiciary, and believes that 
there is undoubted room for improvement in judicial performance in this area.188 The judge 
should take advantage of the provisions for case management, and the Review envisages the 
judge insisting on responsible engagement from the defence in the disclosure exercise, 
including the early identification of the principal disputed issues in the proceedings.189 Being 
more vigorous with case management would see a demand for even greater defence 
participation and cooperation throughout the criminal process.  
 
It now seems that the defendant is expected to participate constructively in his cooperation 
with the criminal process. This has the effect of further shifting the procedural arena away 
from an adversarial style contest in which the prosecution can be put to proof without the 
assistance of the defendant. The objective of securing the defendant’s constructive 
cooperation is highlighted by the fact that the trend of judicial rhetoric, which expresses 
such strong aversion for ambushing with new defences or technical and opportunistic 
points, has occurred despite the lack of evidence to show that they are a significant 
problem. Ironically, the majority of cases in which ambush defences are attempted end in 
conviction.190 The courts, like the government, appear to be relying on the ‘go to’ rationale 
of ambush defences in order to justify a requirement of defence cooperation, even if doing 
so results in marginalising defence rights and autonomy.  
 
Because it was long the general principle that the defence did not have to disclose its case 
before trial, it is understandable that some see a defence non-disclosure norm as being an 
intrinsic part of the adversarial system. As such, it has been stated that, ‘the disclosure rules 
under the [CPIA] represent a step away from adversarial justice.’191  However, Redmayne 
notes that adversarialism varies through time and between jurisdictions, making it difficult 
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to say which elements are essential to it in practice.192 As defined in chapter 3, it does not 
incorporate a defence non-disclosure norm. Even in the height of adversarialism, although 
prosecution disclosure became important, defence non-disclosure was not seen in itself as 
essential. Nonetheless, in the light of the wider impact of requiring defence participation, it 
is clear that imposing obligations on the defence to provide the prosecution with their case, 
and penalising their non-cooperation, interferes with norms which are associated with 
adversarialism. These norms tend to allow the defendant to take a passive role and enable 
him to choose whether or not to participate. Emphasising the defendant’s new participatory 
role through the assumption that defence statements have been given with his authority,193 
and through suggestions that in appropriate cases the court should press for involvement 
from him personally,194 has also had an impact on adversarialism by focussing on the 
defendant as a participant and detracting from the defence’s role as a party.  
 
Redmayne contends that the defence disclosure obligations achieve a subtle change in the 
nature of the criminal process: when the defence must disclose its case prior to trial, 
criminal procedure moves further towards a truth-oriented model.195 This may be an 
indication of a shift towards inquisitorialism. For example, Jorg et al. have noted that the 
logic of the English ‘adversarial’ type trial has been substantially qualified by duties of 
disclosure of evidence between parties. The disclosure obligations on the prosecution may 
be seen as redressing the inequality of arms during the pre-trial stage of the process and 
promoting fairness, but the duties imposed on the defence suggest a move towards the 
inquisitorial fact finding tradition.196 However, whilst the truth-finding aspect of disclosure 
may seem appealing, prosecution non-disclosure presents a greater threat to justice than 
defence non-disclosure. By limiting prosecution disclosure, the CPIA may be in some conflict 
with the aim of accurate fact finding. Furthermore, modern ‘inquisitorial’ type jurisdictions, 
such as France, neither require defence disclosure, nor do they attach penalties for the 
defence’s failure to disclose evidence.197 The CPIA is not consistent with common practice in 
continental systems which often rely on a written dossier that is accessible to both the 
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prosecution and defence.198 Despite a drive towards truth finding through early 
identification of the issues and rejection of ambush defences, the disclosure regime under 
the CPIA cannot accurately be described as moving England towards inquisitorialism. The 
weight attached to case management and efficiency, and the role imposed on the defence in 
achieving this through their cooperation, suggests a participatory model.  
 
 
7.7 Conclusion  
 
The CPIA has, undoubtedly, had an impact on English criminal procedure. Apart from limiting 
the prosecution’s disclosure obligations, it has imposed upon the defence new participatory 
requirements which, together with the Criminal Procedure Rules, have created expectations 
of constructive cooperation. Defence failure to comply with the disclosure provisions is 
penalised by way of adverse inferences, by equating non-cooperation with guilt. Leng notes 
that, for those familiar with the traditional model of adversarial criminal justice in which 
prosecution is something which happens to a non-volunteer, who is fully entitled to devote 
his energies to defending himself, the theme of the defendant as a participant with 
responsibilities in connection with the efficient running of the system is disturbing.199 
McEwan sees the disclosure requirements as part of a shift in English criminal justice away 
from adversarialism towards a managerial model which prioritises efficiency over fairness 
and due process.200 The focus on case management and eliminating surprise suggests that 
the new approach to criminal procedure is efficiency-driven. The desire for efficiency has 
contributed to the pursuit of defence cooperation. However, the result is a participation-
focused model of criminal procedure which relies on the cooperation of the defence to 
achieve its aims.  
 
Given the impact which compulsory defence disclosure has on established procedural 
norms, such as the burden of proof and the privilege against self-incrimination, and given 
the lack of evidence confirming the mischief which the CPIA was intended to address, the 
existence of a legitimate interest in locking the defendant to a particular defence before trial 
seems questionable. However, an unfortunate consequence of the changes to both the right 
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to silence and defence disclosure is that it has become increasingly difficult for a defendant 
to alter his defence prior to trial. Safeguards in s.11(8)of the CPIA which allow the court to 
consider the justifications for changes in defence before adverse comment or inferences can 
be made go some way to recognising this problem, as does the judicial reluctance to enforce 
the provisions. Yet, it seems that the current drive for efficiency in accurate fact finding will 
see the participatory model of criminal procedure continue to develop. The recent review of 
disclosure has proposed that a constructive defence approach to disclosure issues should be 
seen and encouraged as professional ‘best practice’. 201   
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8 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has explored the changing nature of English criminal procedure which has 
occurred as a result of increasing participatory requirements on the defendant and the 
imposition of penalties for non-cooperation with these requirements. This has been 
challenged on the basis of a normative theory of the criminal process in which the state 
should be called to account for the accusations it makes against the accused and its request 
for his condemnation and punishment. The normative theory is founded on a broad 
interpretation of the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and a conception of 
the relationship between citizen and state in a liberal democracy in which autonomy must 
be protected. The state should not use its potentially oppressive powers to enforce the 
criminal law against its citizens without first proving and justifying its allegations against 
them. This should be done without resource from the accused. When the onus is on the 
state to account for its accusations, and defendant participation is seen as a choice rather 
than a requirement, there should be no penalty for failure to cooperate. 
 
Chapters 2 through to 4 set out the theoretical foundation from which the three specific 
examples of penalising defendant non-cooperation were explored. Chapter 2 identified the 
aims of the criminal process as accurate fact finding and conflict resolution. Although the 
nature of legal systems means that conflict resolution will always be an integral feature, and 
accurate fact finding has instrumental value in achieving this aim, a conflict can be resolved 
without the active participation of the accused and without discovering the objective truth 
as to the state’s accusations. However, the greater emphasis put on accurate fact finding 
detracts from the conflict resolution goal by any other means. Whilst pursuit of the process 
aims have led to participatory requirements being placed on the defence, it has been argued 
that the aims should be subject to the constraints which ensuring legitimacy, fairness and 
respect for rights can impose. These constraints can prevent the defendant from being 
obliged to participate.  
 
Chapter 3 set out several models of criminal procedure. The way in which the aims and 
values of the criminal process are pursued is fundamental to its successful operation and, so, 
the process itself must be structured in a way best equipped to fulfil them. Although most 
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legal systems cannot easily be placed within one particular procedural model, identifying 
these models assists in placing a system on the procedural spectrum. This is useful in 
determining its priorities and whether participatory requirements can be easily 
accommodated. England correlates most closely to adversarialism in form, but may be more 
appropriately labelled as a hybrid. While many reforms have intended to increase accurate 
fact finding, English criminal procedure lacks the integral features of inquisitorialism such as, 
the investigative judge, the broad judicial role of the prosecutor, and the written dossier. 
The quest for efficiency has played an important role in reshaping proceedings, in particular 
through the case management provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules. However, due to 
the pressure to participate which the defendant now faces in the pursuit of both efficiency 
and accurate fact finding, and as a result of the penalties that non-cooperation entails, 
English criminal procedure now resembles a participatory model which relies on the 
participation of the defence; it requires the defendant’s participation in order to achieve its 
aims.  
 
Chapter 4 explored the issue of defendant participation more generally. It further developed 
the normative theory of criminal procedure, by contrasting it with Duff et al.’s 
communicative theory of the criminal trial.1 It argued that, as a result of many important 
rights and procedural norms that emerged during the rise of adversarialism in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, defendant participation should be a choice rather than 
a requirement. Unfortunately, because the modern criminal process now stresses the 
defendant’s participatory role, the defendant can face detrimental consequences if he 
refuses or fails to comply. One particular implication of this is to devalue the principle of the 
presumption of innocence, which should be seen as both a reflection of the prosecution’s 
burden of proof and a direction to officials to treat the accused as if he is innocent, until guilt 
is proven. The current emphasis on participation, and the availability of penalties for non-
cooperation, is a key indication of the participatory model of procedure which has emerged. 
 
Chapters 5 through to 7 explored three examples of the increasing participatory 
requirements and penalties for non-cooperation. These were: limitations placed on the 
privilege against self-incrimination through restrictive jurisprudence and specific offences of 
non-compliance; statutory provisions allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from silence; 
and defence disclosure obligations reinforced by an adverse inference regime. By analysing 
                                                             
1 A Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall and V Tadros (eds) The Trial on Trial Volume 3 (Hart: Oxford, 2007). 
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these specific areas of law, it becomes clear that criminal procedure has shifted away from 
due process concerns. Rather than allowing considerations of legitimacy and fairness to act 
as a potential constraint on the ability to reach accurate verdicts, reforms and developments 
in these areas have concentrated on attaining efficiency and accurate fact finding. This has 
led to significant interference with the rights of the accused. As well as eroding the right to 
silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, all three examples affect the 
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and the state-citizen relationship. This is 
not acceptable within the normative conception of the criminal process in which the state 
must account for its accusations against the accused.  
 
 
8.1 The participatory model 
 
Aside from the clear normative implications which come from penalising non-cooperation, 
the current laws regarding the right to silence, the privilege against self-incrimination and 
defence disclosure carry implications for the nature of English criminal procedure in practice. 
What is often referred to as an adversarial system (usually in the knowledge that it is more 
of a hybrid between adversarialism and inquistorialism, and is influenced by other factors, 
such as efficiency), can no longer be viewed as such. It is now a participatory model of 
criminal procedure in which the participation and cooperation of the defendant as an 
individual and the defence as a party are required. Dennis has noted that in recent years 
criminal proceedings have increasingly been taking on the flavour of a dialogue in which the 
defendant is being obliged to participate.2 The participatory model is, thus, a new style of 
procedure. It is reminiscent of the pre-adversarial altercation trial in which the accused’s 
participation was essential. Although what we see now is different in form, both rely on a 
lack of procedural protection for the accused in order to secure his participation in 
pursuance of the process aims.   
 
The thesis has made no specific attempt to define or describe the participatory model of 
criminal procedure in a detailed way. The participatory model is not intended to be a 
normative, theoretical or ideal construct which can be used to compare and contrast existing 
legal systems in the way which many models of procedure are. Instead, it is a way of 
identifying the current state of English criminal procedure which has arisen out of the trend 
                                                             
2 I Dennis The Law of Evidence 4th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2010), 453. 
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in criminal justice reforms to secure the active participation and cooperation of the 
defendant and the defence party. Defence participation seems to be seen as the key to 
accurate fact finding and efficiency, despite its implications for established rights and 
procedural norms. It is quite far removed from England’s adversarial history and, although 
retaining some of the form of the adversarial system, no longer reflects adversarialism in 
terms of its priorities and values.  
 
The participatory model does not directly correspond to any of the other models identified 
in chapter 3. It shares a focus on truth finding with inquisitorialism, but does not employ a 
similar form or structure. The culture of cooperation and participation which is apparent in 
the inquisitorial model (without the use of specific obligations and penalties) is not present 
in the participatory model. The participatory model can also be differentiated from a 
European model. That is, English criminal procedure does not mirror common practice on 
the continent. Furthermore, many of the participatory requirements have raised issues 
concerning Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although efficiency is a 
key concern, and managerialism is used as one way to attain it, the participatory model is 
not an efficiency model. There may be an overlap between the two, but the focus of the 
participatory model is on the perceived benefits of participation, one of which is efficiency.  
 
The participatory model has not been created by design. Instead, it is the consequence of 
procedural reforms and developments aimed at increasing accurate fact finding and 
efficiency in the criminal process through the participation of the defence. This has occurred 
with little regard for the issues of principle which legitimise the system. For example, in 
furthering the overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules, convicting the guilty and 
dealing with cases efficiently and expeditiously have taken precedence over dealing with the 
prosecution and the defence fairly and recognising the rights of the defendant.3 
Furthermore, developments in defence disclosure obligations, such as requiring the details 
of witnesses to be disclosed, have been taken forward, despite concern over their impact on 
the rights of the defendant.4 Other examples include limiting the scope of the privilege 
against self-incrimination even beyond the arguably restrictive interpretation given by the 
                                                             
3 R (on the application of Firth) v Epping Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 388; R v SVS Solicitors [2012] 
EWCA Crim 319. 
4 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (HMSO: London, 1993) 99. 
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European Court of Human Rights in Saunders,5 and labelling adverse inferences from silence 
as ‘common sense’ without giving due regard to innocent explanations for silence.6 In brief, 
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the shift from adversarialism to a participatory 
model has gone largely unchecked by any serious consideration for due process concerns.  
 
 
8.2 Beyond efficiency 
 
Commentators who have recognised the recent shifts in English criminal procedure away 
from adversarialism view it predominantly as a move towards managerialism and efficiency, 
rather than participation. Richardson contends that since 1993, and at an accelerating pace, 
the perspective that has informed all reforms to the rules of criminal evidence and 
procedure has been that the great majority of those accused of crime are guilty of what is 
alleged or something similar to what is alleged, that too many of them are getting away with 
it, and that the rules need to be changed with a view to securing a higher conviction rate.7 
He states that, ‘Principle and justice have been sacrificed at the altar of expediency.’8 He also 
believes that the senior judiciary, on the whole, have endorsed this trend enthusiastically, 
and that the primary casualty has been the principle that it is for the prosecution to prove 
guilt unaided by the defendant.9 McEwan argues that criminal procedure is becoming 
dominated by managerialist concerns and has transformed into a managerial system.10 The 
ad hoc reforms which she points to as being responsible for this include plea and case 
management hearings and the greater inclusion of hearsay and written evidence, as well as 
the disclosure provisions and the Criminal Procedure Rules. She argues that there has been a 
transfer of power from parties to the court effected by the Rules. 11  However, the essential 
structure remains what Damaska has labelled coordinate rather than hierarchical.12 McEwan 
believes that the shift away from adversarialism matters if the adversarial features we are 
                                                             
5 Saunders v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 313. See the later cases of Brown v Stott [2001] 2 All ER 97 and 
O’Halloran and Francis v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 21. 
6
 R v Webber [2004] UKHL 1. 
7 J Richardson ‘A “Just” Outcome: Losing Sight of the Purpose of Criminal Procedure’ (2011) Journal of 
Commonwealth Criminal Law Inaugural Issue 105, 106. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 J McEwan ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31 Legal 
Studies 519. 
11 Ibid 544. 
12
 M Damaska The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 
(Yale University Press: New Haven, 1986). 
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losing reflect an ideology containing important values, and if those values are not effectively 
protected by the system that is emerging to replace it.13 Although the essential principles of 
due process are not exclusive to adversarial proceedings, the participatory model has 
tended not to retain them. 
 
Hodgson also points to managerialist efficiency as the primary driver behind legislative 
reforms over the last twenty years.14 She notes that criminal justice has moved away from 
adversarialism because it is costly in terms of time and money, at a time when government 
wants to be tough on crime. The result has been the attenuation of defence rights and new 
pressures on the defence to cooperate in the investigation and assembly of evidence against 
them.15 Drawing on the legal response to counter-terrorism, the role of the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission as a form of post-conviction review, and the increasingly 
interdependent relationship between the police and the prosecution, she finds that the 
change is not driven by a desire to move to a new procedural model, such as the inquisitorial 
process, but simply by efficiency and managerialism. Hodgson also recognises the role of 
reforms to the right to silence and the disclosure regime as part of this shift. She argues that 
the danger is that criminal justice has many inter-linked parts and piecemeal change without 
regard to the overall consequences or wider structural model will weaken established 
procedural guarantees.16  This thesis differs from the accounts given by others because it 
looks specifically at those reforms intended to secure the participation and cooperation of 
the accused. However, whilst it is submitted that the shift in English criminal procedure is to 
a participatory model, rather than one of efficiency, there are similarities between all of 
these conclusions; they all recognise a shift away from adversarialism and a change in 
procedural style at the expense of important issues of principle.  
 
This thesis is also distinctive because of the normative stance that it adopts. Other academic 
commentators have taken a rights based approach to criminal procedure,17 and Ho has 
presented a theory of the adversarial model of the criminal trial as primarily a process of 
holding the executive to account on its request for conviction and punishment.18 This work, 
                                                             
13
 McEwan (n 10) 523. 
14 J Hodgson ‘The Future of Adversarial Criminal Justice in 21st Century Britain’ (2010) 35 North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 319. 
15 Ibid 360. 
16 Ibid 361. 
17
 A Ashworth and M Redmayne The Criminal Process 4
th
 edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010). 
18 HL Ho ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ (2010) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87. 
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on the other hand, has used the normative stance to argue against participatory 
requirements being placed on the defence throughout the criminal process to the extent 
that there should be no obligation or expectation to actively participate in a way that will aid 
the state in accounting for its accusations against the accused. Instead of directing the jury 
that they may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence, the normative approach 
requires the judge to direct the jury that innocent reasons for silence do exist and that 
silence is not synonymous with guilt and so should not be used as evidence of guilt. It can 
also accommodate a broad interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination which 
does not distinguish between evidence dependent or independent of the will of the accused; 
and it can prevent the defendant from having to disclose the nature of his defence prior to 
trial even if this may lead to particular problems for the prosecution.  
 
Through the normative theory employed, this thesis has taken an absolutist stance against 
requiring the defendant to actively participate in the criminal process. It has not recognised 
any principled exceptions to this, particularly in regards to the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to silence and defence disclosure. This is because it should be for the 
state alone to prove, and justify, the charges brought against the accused. 
 
Where procedural rights and norms are weak or non-existent, it becomes possible to require 
the defendant to cooperate in order to efficiently pursue factually accurate outcomes. 
Conversely, granting the accused the freedom to choose whether or not to cooperate with 
or assist the state in pursuance of its aims is reflective of a normative understanding of the 
criminal process as a process of calling and holding the state to account in its enforcement of 
the criminal law. A criminal conviction makes a public condemnatory statement about the 
defendant, and can have far-reaching and enduring consequences. For this reason, it is 
essential that the state account for the accusations it makes against a citizen.  
 
 
8.3 What happens next? 
 
If the normative theory advanced in this thesis were to be put into practice, with the 
defendant facing no detrimental consequences for choosing not to participate in the 
criminal process, it is likely that some would see it as a step backwards. However, taking a 
step backwards would not be a bad thing. The old common law positions on the right to 
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silence and defence disclosure are more favorable, and most post-Funke19 cases concerning 
the privilege against self-incrimination would be better off reversed. Following this path 
would lead to greater respect and concern for a broad interpretation of the presumption of 
innocence, the right to a fair trial, and a conception of the relationship between citizen and 
state in which state power is controlled, and liberty and autonomy are protected. However, 
it may be that, rather than go backwards, the system can only evolve. If this is the case, then 
the theory still has a place in the evolving system. It can be used to prevent the pursuit of 
efficient fact finding from further advancing the participatory model at the expense of 
legitimacy, fairness and respect for rights. Unfortunately, there is currently a real threat of 
this happening. For example, the increasingly limited scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination could become even more restricted, with the use of criminal sanctions against 
those who refuse to incriminate themselves (or others) being extended. Taken to the 
extreme, this could completely jeopradise the right to silence in the police station and at 
trial, and lead to a greater risk of defendants being coerced into offering unreliable 
evidence; of their being convicted on the basis of their true, but unconvincing, testimony; or 
being convicted for offences of failing to answer questions.  Whilst this would obviously raise 
Article 6 issues, it could be achieved on proportionality and public interest grounds. 
 
There should also be concern regarding the judicial approach to defence participation and 
defence rights. The case of Rochford20 shows that there are judges who feel the need to 
treat non-cooperation as a contempt of court, even before it can be established that the 
defendant has failed to comply with his participatory obligations. Furthermore, the case law 
in relation to legal advice to remain silent in the police station has effectively undermined 
the right to such advice, by requiring the defendant to second guess whether it is reasonable 
to rely upon it.21 The judicial approach to reverse burdens of proof is also concerning; the 
continued, and inconsistent use of proportionality arguments to justify an imposition of legal 
burdens on the defence does not sit well with the presumption of innocence. Fortunately, 
some judges do appear mindful of the consequences of this new participatory model, as is 
demonstrated by the decision in Newell22 that information disclosed in case management 
forms should ordinarily be excluded as evidence against the defendant.23 Nevertheless, at 
the very least, we can use the normative theory presented in this thesis as a reminder that 
                                                             
19 (1993) 16 EHRR 297. 
20 [2010] EWCA Crim 1928. 
21 R v Howell [2005] 1 Cr App R 1; R v Hoare [2004] EWCA Crim 784. 
22
 [2012] EWCA Crim 650. 
23 However, this decision is qualified. See chapter 7. 
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the system needs underlying principles to restrain how the state acts in relation to its 
obligation to prove guilt. A legitimate system must have regard for fairness and respect for 
rights. These values should operate to prevent, for instance, reforms which require 
defendant participation and penalise non-cooperation. Given the potential for things to go 
further, it seems that we need this reminder.  
 
The intrusions on defence rights, which have occurred as a result of reforms that have taken 
place over the past couple of decades, are not glaringly obvious, and sometimes depend on 
broad interpretations of rights beyond that which the courts have been willing to give them.  
Until we encounter the kind of obvious injustice to innocent defendants which leads to, and 
necessitates, the strengthening of due process rights,24 the participatory model is likely to 
continue to develop, with defendants being penalised for their non-cooperation. Before we 
accept the imposition of participatory requirements and penalties against those who fail to 
comply, we must take cognizance of the negative impact this has on: procedural norms such 
as the presumption of innocence; fair trial guarantees, including the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to silence; and the relationship between citizen and state. Once 
we recognise the magnitude of the participatory model, our next task is to decide whether 
to abandon it or change how we define and understand our system.  
 
                                                             
24 Such as the miscarriages of justice which contributed to the development of the adversarial system, 
particularly the Treason Trials Act of 1696 and, more recently, to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984. 
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